HOW COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE

by ADMIRAL C. TURNER JOY

U.S.N. (Ret.)

WITH A FOREWARD BY

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY,
U.S.A. (Ret.)

The Macmillan Company, New York, 1955

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FOREWORD

by GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, U.S.A. (Ret.)

Throughout my tenure as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Admiral C Turner Joy was the Commander of Naval Forces in the Far East. He served as Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference during my period of responsibility for the armistice effort. I could not overstate the value of his calm advice, his skillful performance, and his loyal personal support during that trying time. His qualities of absolute integrity, deep sincerity, and intelligent devotion to the best interests of freedom shone brightly through all the dark shadows of our negotiations with the Communists at Kaesong and Panmunjom. His power of penetrating analysis was superb. No one could have more ably represented the United States in that conference.

Admiral Joy's analysis of Communist techniques is drawn from the experience of ten arduous months of confronting the Communists almost daily. The negotiations he conducted covered the entire spectrum of Communist interests and objectives – political and military, in Korea and world-wide. I know of no citizen of the free world who could speak of Communist negotiating tactics from a broader base of practical knowledge.

All Americans would be well advised to consider Admiral Joy's thoughtful and well documented examination of the Communist negotiating procedure. It should be obvious that we Americans must learn to meet Communists successfully in the arena of negotiations. Otherwise – but there must be no

otherwise. The world is so ordered today that there is no acceptable alternative to successful negotiations with Communists. It is the duty, and it is in the self-interest, of every American to make himself aware of the nature of these relentless, ruthless men. Admiral Joy's terse analysis will provide a basic education toward that essential end.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to Senator William E. Jenner and to the secretary of his committee, Dr. Edna Fluegel, for encouraging me to write this book.

The analytical pattern of this book does not lend itself to proper recognition of the work done by the men of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference. I wish it did. Never before was such a superb team assembled as that representing the United Nations at Kaesong and Panmunjom. For the men who served with me – from our great commander, General Matthew B Ridgway, to the most junior of the delegation personnel – *quality* is the word, quality of mind and of heart. They were men of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. They were magnificent.

As Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Delegation, I was responsible to General Ridgway, who at that fame served as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. In turn, General Ridgway reported to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. The United States Government was the executive agent of the United Nations for the Korean War, and for the armistice that ended it.

General Ridgway and his United Nations Command staff gave our delegation full, steady support at every turn in the long road to an armistice. I could not have asked for more wholehearted backing.

The delegates and principal staff officers of the United Nations Command delegation under my command constituted the most effective joint group of officers I have

ever known. They were the cream of the Far East Command. The nation has not recognized adequately the unique service rendered by that matchless assembly of dedicated men. I salute them in this poor way, hoping that if ever again the United States of America is in need of her finest sons, men like these will stand forth.

ADMIRAL C TURNER JOY, U S N (Ret)

UNITED NATIONS
|
UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
|
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
General Matthew B. Ridgway
|
SENIOR DELEGATE, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
*Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy
|

|
DELEGATES

* Major General L C Craigie, USAF
* Major General H I Modes, USA

* Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN
* Major General S Y Paik, ROKA
Major General H in Turner, USAF
Major General W K Harrison, USA
Rear Admiral R E Libby, USN
Major General Heung Koon Lee, ROKA
Major General J H Yu,ROKA
Major General C B Ferenbaugh, USA
.
* Original slate of delegates

|
STAFF OFFICERS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS
Brigadier General W P Nuckols, USAF
Colonel D H Galloway, USA
Colonel G C Mudgett, USA
Captain H in Briggs, USN
Colonel D O Darrow, USAF
Colonel George W Hickman, Jr., USA
Colonel A J Kinney, USAF
Colonel J C Murray, USMC
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Lieutenant R. F. Underwood, USA
Warrant Officer Kenneth Wu, USA

~~ *PREFACE* ~~

The spreading stain of Communism now blotches a vast area of the earth. A great Communist empire sweeps from the Elbe River in Germany to central Indochina, covering an area more than four times as extensive as the United States and containing a population five tunes that of Europe. Communists have come to control this, the most monstrous tyranny in history, by shrewdly combining force and negotiation.

The measure of expansion achieved by Communism through negotiations is impossible to disassociate from what they have achieved by force, for the Communists never completely separate the two methods. Yet their negotiating methods have yielded them rich returns. Some of their profits derived principally from negotiation are clearly identifiable. The negotiations at Yalta had the effect of delivering to Communism, among other things of value, China, North Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. The negotiations at Geneva delivered to Communism almost half of Indochina. On occasion, success in negotiations had to be confirmed by further Communist military operations. Such a case was China. Elsewhere, partial success in military operations was made complete by victory in negotiations. Such was Indochina. Thus the interplay of force and negotiations in the Communist method has produced major extensions of human slavery. Perhaps it is time that we Americans, at whom Communist designs of world domination ultimately point, inform ourselves of the techniques employed by these, our relentless enemies, in negotiating their way to evil triumph.

Each negotiating situation presents differing aspects, as Yalta differed from Geneva, as Potsdam differed from Panmunjom.

Yet the Communist dogma is a strong rule, strongly compelling Communists to adhere to it at all times. It is possible, therefore, to identify certain fundamental techniques applying to Communist negotiatory efforts wherever and whenever they occur. Of all opportunities to view the Communist technique in negotiations, none is so comprehensive as Panmunjom. There, for two long years, the Communists exposed their negotiating system, applying it to all the many facets of that extended international parley. For this reason, and for the reason that the author of this account participated in the Korean Armistice Conference as the Senior Western Delegate, attention hereafter will be focused on the methods used by Communists at Kaesong and at Panmunjom, Korea. Americans are urged to consider well the following analysis of the techniques of their enemies, for the American future is largely dependent on how competently we meet these Communist tactics in many dangerous tomorrows.

Contents

FOREWORD *by GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, U.S.A. (Ret.)* i

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii

~~ PREFACE ~~ viii

I THE STAGE SETTING 1

II THE COMMUNIST DELEGATION 11

III THE LOADED AGENDA 19

IV INCIDENTS 31

V ROADBLOCKS 41

VI PREMEDITATED CRIMES. 65

VII THE VETO 77

VIII RED HERRINGS 93

IX TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 105

X INCHES INTO MILES 123

XI THE WELSHERS 135

XII WEARYING TACTICS 143

XIII PRISONERS OF WAR 153

XIV FROM THIS THORN, THESE WOUNDS, THESE WARNINGS 169

CHAPTER I

I THE STAGE SETTING

Communists neither blunder into conferences nor rush pell-mell to engage in negotiation. *First, they carefully set the stage.* Their concern for maintaining "face," as well as their regard for practical advantages arising from favorable negotiating conditions, causes the Communists to consider carefully the physical circumstances in which a parley is to occur. Witness how they applied this principle of stage setting in the Korean Armistice Conference.

During late June of 1951, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations remarked publicly that it might be well if the opposing sides in Korea arranged a truce, based on the 38th Parallel as a truce line. The first notification to the United Nations Command that the Communists would like an armistice in Korea came from Washington to the United Nations Command headquarters in Tokyo. General Matthew B Ridgway, Commander in Chief, was directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to broadcast by radio a message to the Communist military commanders in Korea, inquiring whether truce talks were desired. On 20 June, 1951, General Ridgway caused a message to the Communists to be broadcast, suggesting that truce talks be held in the Danish hospital ship *Jutlandia*, after the ship had been brought to the harbor of Wonsan, North Korea. Thus General Ridgway offered as a site for truce talks a hospital ship, internationally recognized as a nonbelligerent facility, a ship provided by a government (Denmark) which had not participated in the

Korean fighting. This neutral, noncombative ship was to be placed in waters controlled by Communist guns and mine fields. This seemed as reasonable an arrangement as could be conceived.

The arrogant Communist reply came by radio on the night of 1 July. It did not even mention the *Jutlandia*. The language used in the response might be paraphrased as follows:.

"If you desire a truce, come to Kaesong and we'll talk."

Kaesong is a city almost precisely on the 38th Parallel of latitude. We were to learn later the significance of that fact. Moreover, Kaesong was controlled by the Red Chinese, so that by going to Kaesong the United Nations Command representatives in effect went to the Communists, rather than meeting them halfway. Obviously, the Communists wished to make it appear that the United Nations Command was in need of a cessation of hostilities and therefore came hat in hand to a Communist citadel to ask a truce. General Ridgway recognized these facts but considered that in the interests of saving time and of showing sincere intentions Kaesong should be accepted.

On the 8th of July, Colonel Andrew J. Kinney, USAF, and several other United States officers proceeded to Kaesong to arrange with Communist liaison officers for the meeting of delegations on July 10th. Without success, Kinney sought Communist agreement to a demilitarized neutral zone around Kaesong. The Communists refused to give up their advantage of military control of the Kaesong area. Throughout this initial meeting Kinney and his party, though completely without arms, were surrounded by troops of armed Communist soldiers brandishing hand machine guns

threateningly. Communist photographers and press representatives did not fail to make the most of this situation, in line with their thesis that the United Nations Command, not the Communists, needed and sought a truce.

At the opening meeting of liaison officers, the Communists strongly argued that the United Nations Command delegation should remain overnight at Kaesong during the course of the negotiations. The Communists wished to hold the United Nations Command delegation in their military grip while parleying. This Kinney flatly rejected, having already been subjected to the "captive" treatment in store for Americans at Kaesong.

Communist concern with even the smallest detail of stage setting, especially where "face" is involved, was illustrated at the liaison officers' meeting. Within a Korean teahouse on the outskirts of Kaesong, a long table to be used by the delegations had been set up so that one delegation would face north, the other south. Oriental custom has it that at a truce discussion the victor faces south, the defeated faces north. Unaware of this consideration, Kinney accidentally arrogated to his party the north side of the conference table, the victor's side. The Communists were flustered and dismayed by this development, so much so that the Communist liaison officer actually stuttered in replying to Kinney's opening remarks. Two days later, when the main delegations met, the Communists made certain that the north side of the table went to them by the simple act of barring the United Nations Command delegation from access to it.

While seeking by every means to create an illusion that the Kaesong meetings represented a conference between the victorious Red Army and defeated Americans, the

Communists knew well that simple equality was quite enough for their purposes. As their renegade British reporter Alan Winnington told Western newsmen, "This is the first time Oriental Communists have ever sat down at a conference table on terms of equality with Americans, and they intend to make the most of it." After all, what nation but Red China in all the world today can boast of fighting the United States and her allies to a stalemate? Was not Communist prestige enhanced by compelling delegates from the powerful United Nations Command to meet Communist China's representatives under battlefield conditions of equality? Moreover, was it not plain that some undermining of the United States' position of non-recognition of the Red Chinese regime must result when senior Americans sought to negotiate with representatives of that regime whose existence the United States officially denied? Yes, I am sure the Communists knew that equality at Kaesong was sufficient.

The Communists proceeded industriously to embroider the situation in their favor. At the first meeting of the delegates, I seated myself at the conference table and almost sank out of sight. The Communists had provided a chair for me which was considerably shorter than a standard chair. Across the table, the senior Communist delegate, General Nam Il, protruded a good foot above my cagily diminished stature. This had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam B with a chair about four inches higher than usual. Chain-smoking Nam Il puffed his cigarette in obvious satisfaction as he glowered down on me, an apparently torpedoed admiral. This condition of affairs was promptly rectified when I exchanged my foreshortened chair for a normal one, but not before Communist photographers had exposed reels of film. Such devices by the Communists may

seem childish when each is considered in isolation. It should be borne in mind, however, that a great multitude of these maneuvers can add up to a propaganda total of effective magnitude.

Not the least of the stage setting employed by the Communists was their legion of armed guards. These heavily armed sentinels were everywhere, governing each step taken by the United Nations Command delegation. During a recess of the first meeting of delegates I was directly threatened by a Communist guard who pointed a burp gun at me and growled menacingly. My messenger, dispatched to convey an interim report to General Ridgway, was halted and turned back by Communist armed force. One sentinel posted conspicuously beside the access doorway to the conference room wore a gaudy medal which he proudly related to Colonel Kinney was for "killing forty Americans". Such impositions resulted in my protesting to Nam Il in unmistakable terms, demanding prompt elimination of such crudities. Nam Il was evasive, however. No doubt he calculated that the Communist propaganda machine was acquiring a wealth of material suitable for picturing the United Nations Command as a beaten suppliant for an armistice.

The ever present Communist newsmen and photographers led me to announce to Nam Il that Western newsmen would attend the subsequent meetings of the delegations. Nam Il immediately agreed. Having set the stage and directed the shooting of distorted scenes by his own photographers, Nam Il may have felt that he could afford to open the further proceedings to the frank cameras of Western newsmen. One hour later, however, Nam Il recanted his agreement and announced that the question of

admitting Western newsmen to Kaesong would have to be ruled on by his superiors. Note the ensuing discussion:

[1]ADMIRAL JOY: I am still not satisfied with your answer concerning the newsmen. I wish to re-emphasize that the presence of newsmen at this conference is considered of major importance to us. I repeat we require twenty newsmen to proceed daily with our delegation from the Imjin River to the site of the conference. Do you have any further comments to make concerning the newsmen?

GENERAL NAM IL: I have nothing more to say than I gave the answer already. That means that I did not give you the answer. I don't mean to say I refused the newsmen to come to the conference site area, but for the time being the matter must be held in abeyance, and the question of the newsmen is not the principal problem for our discussion, so while we carry on our discussion about main problems we will have chance to talk over the matter. So I find it better to go over to discussing the mam problems from now on.

ADMIRAL JOY: Before we recess, I wash to read to you a dispatch I have received from the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command:.

"I desire that you inform the Communist delegates as follows: The presence of a selected number of newsmen at a conference of such major importance to the entire world is considered an inherent right by members of the

[1] The dialogue illustrations appearing in this book are verbatim from the Armistice Conference.

United Nations. Therefore, a selected group of professional newsmen, photographers, and newsreel cameramen numbering approximately twenty will accompany and be an integral part of the United Nations Command delegation to any or all future sessions beginning 12 July.".

GENERAL NAM IL (interrupting): You mean the newspapermen are an integral part of the delegation?

ADMIRAL JOY: They are part of the delegation party – the command party that comes up every day, though not into this room.

[Continuing with General Ridgway's message] "This party of newsmen will be controlled by our officer personnel. The United Nations Command neither asks nor desires that newsmen be admitted to the conference room. Signed Ridgway".

If by tomorrow morning you still feel that newsmen are unacceptable at the site of the conference we request that you inform us by 0730 tomorrow by what date it will be possible to resume the conference with newsmen present at the conference site.

GENERAL NAM IL: I am not quite clear. Do you mean that without the party of newspapermen, you don't want to proceed with the meeting at all?

ADMIRAL JOY: We wish to proceed with the meeting, but we will recess until you inform us that the newsmen are acceptable.

When our delegation failed to appear at Kaesong the next day, the Communists hurriedly dispatched a message to the

United Nations Command agreeing to equitable conditions at the conference site, including agreement to withdraw their armed personnel from the immediate vicinity.

Other embroideries of the basic stage setting occurred as the conference evolved. An amusing sequence arose in connection with flags. Just prior to one of the early meetings, one of our interpreters placed on the conference table a small standard bearing a handkerchief-sized replica of the United Nations flag. Throughout that session the Communists regarded the miniature flag with suspicion and dislike. Nam Il took occasion repeatedly to push the small standard away from the center of the table. I would casually set it back dead center. Following a recess, the Communists offered an improvement of this game by placing on the table another standard bearing a North Korean flag, identical in all respects to the United Nations emblem except that it rose some six inches higher. All in the United Nations Command delegation speculated with amusement as to where an increase in the height of the United Nations Command standard would lead. I hastened to veto any tendency toward such competition, thereby perhaps averting construction of the two tallest flagpoles on earth.

Sadly, one must relate that not all the stage setting favorable to the Communist cause was at their initiative. Without any intention whatsoever to aid the Communists in preparing the scene, certain actions of the United States Government unintentionally did just that. The United States impatiently broadcast the first *direct* appeal for truce talks, despite the fact that it was the Communists, not the United Nations Command, who sorely needed a truce. The Secretary of State was reported to have stated that a truce settlement with the Communists along the 38th Parallel would be

acceptable to the United States Government. How this piece of stage setting affected matters will be discussed later. It is not unlikely that the peremptory recall of General Douglas MacArthur just after that renowned officer had advocated more vigorous military action against the Communists may have had as great an effect as any. These developments reinforced the picture that the Communists wished the world to accept, the picture of a United Nations Command, frustrated militarily, begging a truce that would simply restore the situation as it existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Thus, by their own devious methods, and assisted by windfalls of American policy mistakes, the Communists prepared the scene for the crucial negotiations to follow.

CHAPTER II

II THE COMMUNIST DELEGATION

The Communist system of negotiating does not depend critically on the individuals involved. Their method is a dogma followed slavishly by each of their representatives. None the less, any extended negotiation will be marked by occasions when doctrine does not apply perfectly, and a degree of ingenuity will be required of the participants. Knowing this, the Communists are quite careful in the selection of their negotiating teams. Force of intellect is the primary consideration. Reputation, rank, and position are of secondary consideration to the Communists in choosing the members of their delegation. Persistence and an unruffled demeanor in the face of logic seemed to be the prime characteristics of their negotiating group at the Korean Armistice Conference. A slight bent to sardonic humor was observable in some few of the Chinese delegates. When asked to say how long it would take his own superiors to provide him guidance on a certain question, the Chinese delegate General Hsieh Fang said, “I have no talent for prophecy.”

The nominal chief of the Communist delegation was General Nam Il, allegedly a North Korean and today the Foreign Minister of the North Korean puppet state. Born in Asiatic Russia of Korean parentage about 1913, Nam Il attended military schools in the USSR and was reported to have fought in the Red Army as a captain during World War

II. He came to North Korea with the Soviets at the end of the war and was assigned to key posts in the field of education and propaganda. As Vice Minister of Education after 1948, he was influential in shaping the educational policies of the so-called "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" in line with Soviet plans, and in converting the Education Ministry into a key propaganda agency of the government. Shortly before the attack on the Republic of Korea in June of 1950, Nam Il was called into the National Defense Ministry and assigned a top planning post in preparation for the attack. When appointed to head the Communist delegation, Nam Il was Chief of Staff of the North Korean "People's Army". In August of 1953, Nam Il was appointed Foreign Minister of his government.

Nam Il was short in stature, slender, and gave the impression of considerable nervous energy. He spoke forcefully in Korean, seeming to spit out his words. At no time did he ever exhibit the least tendency to humor. If he laughed, it was in a sarcastic vein. His smooth Oriental face rarely revealed emotion, and if so the emotion was anger or feigned astonishment. He dressed nattily in the Russian type of uniform of the North Korean Army. His military boots were highly polished at all times.

Nam Il did not appear to be at ease during our sessions, possibly because he was one of the first Orientals to face a delegation of Occidentals on equal terms. His nervousness was the more understandable when one considered that he was merely the figurehead of his delegation. The actual power was vested in Chinese General Hsieh Fang. Nam Il was ever careful to secure an approving nod from Hsieh before launching into his long tirades against the United States.

The senior Chinese of the Communist delegation, and the de facto chief of the entire Communist group, was the slight Manchurian General Hsieh Fang. Although the history of his background is somewhat uncertain, we know he was born in 1904 in Manchuria. He was sent to Japan by the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang, where he graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1923. He later attended a university in Moscow. In 1940 he joined the Japanese puppet regime in Peking on orders from the Chinese Communists, remaining there until 1945. He is credited, during 1946-1948, with bringing about the defection of a number of contingents of Chinese Nationalists troops and with playing a leading part in the uprising at Changsha, China. When appointed to the Communist delegation, he was serving as political commissar and Chief of Staff of the so-called Chinese People's "Volunteer" forces in Korea.

Hsieh Fang was thin and angular. His nondescript uniform folded about his spare frame gracelessly. He gave me the impression of Shakespeare's "Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look … such men are dangerous." Hsieh was indeed dangerous. He possessed a bitterly sharp mind, and used it effectively. His head was radically close-cropped, giving the impression of a high forehead. Sharp eyes flicked restlessly as he watched proceedings. Hsieh Fang rarely spoke from prepared material as Nam Il did invariably. His remarks were extemporaneous and fluent.

Hsieh Fang was markedly the mental superior among the Communist delegation. He conducted himself in a self-assured manner at all times, never bothering to check his intended remarks with other Communists before making them. He was the only member of the Communist delegation who seemed to be confident of his position with his

Communist superiors in Peking. On the many occasions when it became obvious that no progress could be made in the day's meeting, any Communist spokesman but Hsieh Fang would feel compelled to deliver a long-winded harangue praising Communist objectives and damning those of the United Nations Command. Not so Hsieh Fang. If there was nothing more to be accomplished, he simply shut up his brief case and departed. Evidently he felt no need to make a "record" for his superiors to read and applaud.

Hsieh Fang showed less obedience to the Soviet-Communist dogma than other members of the Communist delegation. His manner of expressing himself in Chinese was not larded with the standard Communist terminology. The language he used appeared to be his own. He had a sharp, clear mind, one coldly calculating the accomplishment of his mission. I cannot help wondering what effect, if any, Hsieh Fang's long exposure to our Western ethics and thoughts may have had on his Communist convictions.

The only other delegate in the Communist group with whom we had serious intercourse was North Korean General Lee Sang Jo. His background is more obscure, though we know that he was born in 1913 in Korea and that he went to China in His youth and graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy, then the Chinese equivalent of the United States Military Academy. He joined the Communist party in 1940 and became identified as a trusty henchman of the pro-Soviet Korean faction. He is also known to have commanded a detachment of the Korean Volunteer Army which fought in China with the Communist forces against the Chinese Nationalists. He is described as one of a group of thirty-six Soviet citizens who returned to Korea in 1945 with the Soviet Army. Just prior to the Armistice Conference, Lee occupied

the post of Chief of Staff to the North Korean National Defense Minister, Vice Marshal Choe Yong Gun, one of the influential leaders of the pro-Soviet North Korean group.

Lee Sang Jo was addicted to endless rambling statements, often absolutely irrelevant to the subject under discussion. A doctrinaire Communist, Lee employed the Communist dogma of long, wearisome repetition at every opportunity. He was an accomplished liar to boot. He was short and chunky, often dirty and slovenly. It fascinated all of us to watch Lee Sang Jo permit flies to crawl across his face without brushing them away. Apparently he thought this showed iron self-control. For my part, I concluded he was simply accustomed to having flies on his person.

The three delegates I have described constituted the vocal section of the Communist delegation. Making up the total of five delegates were another North Korean and another Chinese. These two never spoke, or otherwise indicated that they were more than window dressing.

Two officers of the Communist group who were not delegates, but staff officers, are worth discussing. They were the two liaison officers, Colonel Chang of North Korea and Colonel Tsai of China. These two did more of the actual negotiating than did any one of their superiors, the delegates [sic] Chang was a hard-faced Korean, short and stocky. He spoke Korean and Chinese. Though he never revealed the fact fully, we were convinced that he at least understood English. It was rumored that Chang stood high in the favor of the Chinese and thus swung considerable weight in the Communist delegation.

Colonel Tsai of Red China, the other Communist liaison officer, was tall and spare. He managed to wear the

graceless, unadorned uniform of the Red Chinese "Volunteers" with a degree of dignity. Both Chang and Tsai were doctrinaire Communists, rarely varying from the dogma of the approved Communist method. There was a considerable difference in the reaction of the two in the face of unforeseen events, however. At the first meeting of liaison officers, our United Nations Command liaison party was made up of Colonels Kinney and Murray of the United States, and Lieutenant Colonel Lee of the Republic of Korea. Chang and Tsai represented the Communists. When our Lieutenant Colonel Lee attempted to seat himself at the conference table on a collapsible chair, he upset the chair and sprawled on the floor. Tsai, the Chinese, laughed heartily. Chang, the Soviet-trained Korean, retained a stony silence. On another occasion we had sent our Korean liaison officer to deliver a message to the Communists at Panmunjom. Chang and Tsai met Colonel Lee there. Lee was an able linguist, speaking English, Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and some German. On this occasion Lee chose to speak in English. Chang lost his temper. "Are you not a Korean?" he shouted. "Why do you not speak Korean?" Lee answered calmly "I will speak in whatever language I wish. That is what we are fighting for, freedom of speech." Tsai seemed somewhat amused by this exchange.

Once during a plenary session of the full delegations, North Korean delegate General Lee Sang Jo penciled a note to Nam Il in Korean characters large enough to be read easily from our side of the table. It said, "These imperialist errand boys are lower than dogs in a morgue." This is the ultimate Korean insult. Our General Paik, delegate of the Republic of Korea, very nearly went physically across the table after Lee Sang Jo, but managed to restrain himself.

One of the most humorous remarks of the Armistice Conference was that of our witty Air Force General Turner in response to being called a fool. General Turner had replaced our able Air Force delegate General Craigie. Hsieh Fang, after an extended argument with Turner, made an audible aside remark to Colonel Chang, "This man is a complete fool." Our Colonel Kinney, noting this, urged General Turner to scorch Hsieh Fang for indulging in personalities and abusive language instead of dealing with the issues at hand. Turner, however, made the following reply to Kinney in a loud, clear voice. "You say he has called me a fool? No, I will not enter into a debate with him on that score. He has all the points on his side." Colonel Tsai, evidently understanding this perfectly, was hardly able to control his laughter. Hsieh Fang and Chang remained grim.

Throughout the course of the negotiations, two Western-world newspapermen lived with and advised the Communist delegation. These were Wilfred Burchett, who served a Paris newspaper, and Alan Winnington, the latter reported to be a British citizen. Winnington, an effeminate-looking chap, acted as public relations officer for the Communists. He sought to "feed" the Communist version of events to the Western news correspondents who accompanied the United Nations Command delegation each day to the meeting site. It appeared to me that he was remarkably unsuccessful in this effort. Owing to the brilliant management of press affairs by our own public information officer, Air Force General William Nuckols, I never had occasion to be seriously concerned with the treasonable activities of Winnington.

These were the principal men we dealt with during the armistice conference – two from Red China, three from North Korea. It is worth noting that the North Koreans were far

more slavish in following the Soviet-Communist doctrine than were the Red Chinese. It is worth repeating that ultimate authority in the mixed Communist delegation appeared to be in the hands of the Red Chinese.

CHAPTER III

III THE LOADED AGENDA

With the stage set to their liking, Communists proceed to implement the second principle of their negotiating method. They seek an agenda composed of conclusions favorable to their basic objectives. Among men who adhere to logic, an agenda is understood to be only a list of topics to be discussed, concerning which agreed conclusions are later required For example, Americans meeting to discuss arrangements for a baseball game might adopt an agenda as follows.

1. Place the game is to be played.
2. Time the game is to start.
3. Selection of umpires.

Communists, however, would submit an agenda like this.

1. Agreement that game is to be played in Shanghai.
2. Agreement that game be played at night.
3. Agreement that umpires be Chinese officials.

Thus the Communists seek to place their negotiating opponents on the defensive from the outset. If their rigged agenda is carelessly accepted by their opponents, the Communists are able to argue that the only questions remaining are exactly where in Shanghai the ball game is to be played, exactly what time at night the game is to start, and precisely which Chinese are to officiate. Notice how the Communists sought these advantages by such procedures at Kaesong.

Consistent with their concept of an agenda as a set of conclusions, the Communists formally proposed the following as the first two items for discussion.

1. Establishment of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides, and establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
2. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea.

Nam Il supported these two points by simply asserting that they were "basic and inseparable". He said that withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea was "a basic step toward peace". Thus the Communist concept of an agenda was a set of conclusions which would restore the situation in Korea to that obtaining before they launched their aggression.

In contrast, note the agenda proposals made by the United Nations Command on the same day in connection with the same two points.

1. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea.
2. Cessation of hostilities and acts of armed force under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities in Korea.

This difference of approach gave rise to a major discussion between Nam Il and me on the first day of the conference.

ADMIRAL JOY: It is the position of the representatives of the United Nations Command that the proper order of business is to first establish the general topics which both

sides agree to discuss, then subsequently to determine the specific agreement, the details. Such a case is that of the demilitarized zone. Your delegation has offered a particular demarcation line [the 38th Parallel] and a particular demilitarized zone as an agenda item. The delegation of the United Nations Command believes that first it should be agreed that discussion of some demarcation line and some demilitarized zone is desired by and agreeable to both parties. Once this general topic is agreed on, later meetings can approach the question as to which particular line and zone can be agreed upon. It is for this reason that the United Nations Command agenda contains items which only describe the general area of discussion. No effort should be made to state in an agenda what the details of these arrangements will be. Agreement to place an item on the agenda in no way commits either delegation to any specific detail. The same is the case with the demilitarized zone. Both delegations wish to discuss a demilitarized zone. Exactly where this zone shall be will become a topic of later discussion. We both can agree, however, that the general question of a demilitarized zone should be one of the items to be discussed on the agenda. At a later meeting the exact boundary definition of the demilitarized zone may be reached. I will now take up the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. What do you mean by foreign armed forces? What forces do you include?

GENERAL NAM IL: Please go ahead.

ADMIRAL JOY: The various governments with armed forces in Korea operating with the United Nations Command have authorized these armed forces to be in Korea. Therefore, the withdrawal of these armed forces from

Korea must be approved by those same governments, as well as by the United Nations itself. The delegation of the United Nations Command can make arrangements only pertaining to the cessation of military action of these armed forces within Korea. Only after an armistice has been agreed to and military action has ceased can the matter of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea be discussed with the governments concerned. Therefore, it is our view that this matter cannot be placed upon an agenda for the military representatives to discuss.

GENERAL NAM IL: First I am going to answer the question of the foreign troops – what is meant by the foreign troops. By "foreign troops" we mean all troops who are here under the permission of their own governments, so the foreign troops under the name of United Nations in Korea, they are all foreign troops. And now I am going to talk about using some terms of procedure of meeting.

ADMIRAL JOY: You haven't yet finished with the item of foreign troops.

GENERAL NAM IL: Don't interrupt, I have the floor.

About the terms. On discussing cease fire today, one side is the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers, and the other side is the United Nations forces. The term "Communists" is not proper here because you are not handling with the Communist but with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers. It is simple to define the term "foreign troops". By "foreign troops in Korea", we mean those troops who are not Korean troops, who are not the troops composed of the Koreans.

ADMIRAL JOY: Of foreign troops not composed of Koreans. That is what you mean?

GENERAL NAM IL: Troops in Korea which are not Korean troops. They are the foreign troops.

The next day at Kaesong saw a continuation of the dispute regarding the nature of an agenda. I opened the question.

ADMIRAL JOY: We do not believe you understand yet what we mean by an agenda. We wish to specifically define it again. An agenda is merely a list, in order, of subjects to be discussed. Is that your understanding of an agenda?

GENERAL NAM IL: We know fully what an agenda means.

The senior delegate of the other party asked me if I clearly understood the term "agenda". By agenda it is meant the items that will be discussed at a meeting, ordered items which will be discussed at a meeting and which must be considered first when the agenda is being formed. What are the important problems to be discussed at a meeting? Then the important problems must be discussed first. That is to say what kind of problems should be discussed and what are the central problems, then the central problems are discussed first.

ADMIRAL JOY: When I use the term "agenda", I am referring to a group of items which are general questions – general items such as the demilitarized zone. You, however, are in fact talking about one line [the 38th Parallel] when as a matter of fact there are many lines – many possible lines.

GENERAL NAM IL: We have showed you our line. What are the possible lines for you?

ADMIRAL JOY: We do not suggest any line yet because that is getting into the substance of that item of the agenda.

GENERAL NAM IL: As for a line, we proposed a concrete line.

ADMIRAL JOY: As I understand it, you do not wish to broaden the question of a demilitarized zone.

GENERAL NAM IL: May I ask what you imply by "broaden"?

ADMIRAL JOY: To make it more general.

GENERAL NAM IL: Our proposal is general.

ADMIRAL JOY: Referring again to your item on the agenda, we cannot agree to have any specific line on the agenda as you propose.

GENERAL NAM IL: You do not agree?

ADMIRAL JOY: We will agree to place on the agenda an item calling for the establishment of some demilitarized zone. The location and limits of that zone can be discussed later when the substance of the item is taken up. I would like to re-emphasize that the work of this meeting on the agenda is not to determine solutions of problems, lines, etc., but to formulate an agenda – in other words, to state the problems to be discussed at later meetings.

GENERAL NAM IL: We cannot consider the 38th Parallel line as an imaginary line. The 38th Parallel line had existed and the war broke out right on that line. Therefore, it is the principle that the question of the cease fire must be concluded also on the 38th Parallel line. Therefore, this must be on the agenda.

In order to comprehend fully the arrogance of Nam Il's self-termed "agenda", it is necessary to recollect the military situation as it then existed. The line of ground battle extended across Korea on the bias, with its western terminus south of the 38th Parallel and its eastern terminus well north of the Parallel. (See map.) This line of ground contact constituted defensible battle positions from which the United States Eighth Army had been launching punishing attacks on the Communists. The 38th Parallel afforded no such positions. In the air, the domain of the Fifth Air Force, was unchallenged on either side of the ground battle line, except along the Yalu River far to the north. On the sea, United States Naval forces held uncontested sway to the northernmost extremities of the Korean coast line. During the spring of 1951, this combination of United Nations Command combat arms had beaten the Communists severely, so severely that in June they sought an armistice. Communist supplies to the ground forces had been reduced to a trickle by the incessant pounding of the Navy and the Air Force. The Eighth Army was moving ahead inexorably, battering the Communist Army with superior firepower, threatening a decisive breakthrough. Talk of extending United States air action to Manchuria was rampant, complete with ominous overtones of the atomic bomb. Here, then, was a Communist army on the verge of crushing military defeat, seeking a respite from our military pressure an armistice. It was in such circumstances that Nam Il mouthed his pretentious agenda.


USSR
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Hungnam
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Wonsan
SEA
TRUCE LINE
38°
Kaesong
Panmunjom
Munsan
Imjin
Inchon
Seoul
Han River
Chungju
YELLOW
SEA
SOUTH
KOREA
Taegu
Pusan
Mokpo
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50

Nam Il's assertion that the 38th Parallel was indisputably the proper truce line between the opposed forces rested initially on two logical, but erroneous, premises. The first was the fact that Jacob Malik, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, had made a public remark in June, 1951, to the effect that both sides in Korea should withdraw from the 38th Parallel and cease fire. Since the United Nations Command had taken the direct initiative in seeking an armistice soon after Malik's remark, the Communists concluded that Malik's suggested truce line was satisfactory to the United States. Nam Il's second main premise was the fact that the Secretary of State of the United States had been reported as saying an armistice "on the 38th Parallel" would be satisfactory.

For these reasons Nam Il no doubt was confident that serious opposition to the 38th Parallel as a truce line either would not develop or would not persist. Accordingly, Nam Il sought to "stack" the agenda, presenting therein his conclusion that the 38th Parallel was the only possible line of demarcation, or, as he put it, "the basis of the armistice".

Discussion between Nam Il and me flowed with all the speed of a stiff concrete mix. Each statement by Nam Il had to be translated into English and Chinese, each statement I made had to be rendered in Korean and Chinese. Interpreters stood at the elbows of each senior delegate to perform this exacting function. Nam Il appeared to be somewhat irritated by the inevitable delays of translation, and more so by the occasional errors made by his own interpreters. For our side, Lieutenants Horace and Dick Underwood, brothers, handled the Korean translation, and Warrant Officer Kenneth Wu provided the Chinese. They

were impeccable linguists, adding keen intelligence to their talents as interpreters.

During translations, Nam Il chain smoked, fiddled with pencils (which he frequently broke), rattled papers, conversed in whispers with his Chinese colleagues, and generally conducted himself like a cat on a hot tin roof. The actual power in the Communist delegation, shrewd Chinese General Hsieh Fang, watched proceedings broodingly. Occasionally he passed a terse note to Nam Il, who invariably seemed to comply with the instructions contained therein. Hsieh Fang's sole concession to the tension of the situation was a nervous bobbing of his close-cropped head. His saturnine yellow face was a set mask, revealing nothing, expressing nothing.

These two men, Nam Il of North Korea and Hsieh Fang of Red China, were the source of all actions by the Communist delegation, with the Chinese taking an increasingly dominant role as time passed. Between them they provided unplumbed depths of cunning and deviousness as they sought to fasten upon the Korean Armistice Conference their "loaded" agenda.

They failed. The agenda finally adopted, after ten plenary sessions of bitter argument, contained no conclusions It read as follows.

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea
3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition,

authority, and functions of a supervisory organ for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice
4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war
5. Recommendations to governments of countries concerned on both sides

Despite the success of the United Nations Command delegation in preventing inclusion of Communist "conclusions" in the agenda, in retrospect it is clear that we made a grave error in forming the agenda, a mistake which ultimately cost us dearly. We failed to foresee the use that the Communists would make of the chronological order of the agenda items. By allowing the item on "Establishment of a Demarcation Line" to precede all others, we opened for the Communists a road to a *de facto* cease fire *prior* to agreement on other substantive questions. By agreeing to discuss the position of the truce line first, we permitted the Communists to insist that this question had to be settled before other agenda items were explored. As will be discussed in a later chapter, on orders from Washington we eventually agreed to a provisional truce line with a thirty-day time limit, thereby giving the Communists a respite from United Nations Command military pressure. This allowed the Communists a sorely needed breathing spell in which to dig in and stabilize their battle line. Consequently, they were able to haggle and delay in respect to subsequent agenda items, free from the compulsion of impending military disaster.

In the end, the second principle of Communist negotiating methods, that of "stacking" the agenda, was frustrated I must, in honesty, hasten to add that this outcome was not principally the result of negotiating skill on the part of the United Nations Command delegation. Rather, it was

the result of our unmistakably firm refusal to agree to inclusion of Communist conclusions in the agenda, and to the crucially important fact that the United States Government backed the United Nations Command delegation to the hilt in this attitude. Probably most of all, the result was the product of the heavy pressure which had been exerted on the Communist armies by United Nations Command offensive operations prior to the conference. Nothing is so persuasive to Communists as force.

That the Communist agenda effort failed certainly was not a result of a lack of Communist effort at Kaesong, nor does it imply an omission of that same effort in the future. Attempting to rig an agenda with conclusions favorable to their cause costs the Communists nothing but the respect of those few people who persist in being so naively charitable as to put faith in the sincerity of Communist intentions. These few the Communists will disillusion at future negotiations. The rest of us will not be surprised.

CHAPTER IV

IV INCIDENTS

Once negotiations have actually begun, Communists are not satisfied to allow matters to proceed in a climate of peace and calm. Rather, they create "incidents" calculated to provide advantage for their negotiating efforts or for their basic propaganda objectives, or for both. Such "incidents" do not simply occur they are plotted and triggered by the Communist negotiating teams. Their two purposes, negotiating advantage and propaganda, are usually served equally by a. single incident. Such a case was the first incident at Kaesong.

The strong insistence on equitable conditions at Kaesong registered by General Ridgway and me, coupled with temporary suspension of negotiations, had forced the Communists to agree to withdraw their armed personnel from the immediate vicinity of the Kaesong meeting place and to cease interfering with the movements of the United Nations Command delegation. The Communists had been compelled to accept these arrangements when General Ridgway peremptorily halted the negotiations on July 12th. He refused to allow the United Nations Command delegation to return to Kaesong until the Communist commanders agreed to guarantee the neutrality of the meeting area. Their urgent need for a military breathing spell left the Communists no choice except that of acceding to General Ridgway's just demands for equity at Kaesong. This transaction between General Ridgway and the Communist

commanders was conducted in glaring publicity, to the keen embarrassment of the Communists.

As a result, the picture so carefully nurtured by the Communists, the picture of a United Nations Command begging a truce, had been knocked somewhat askew. To Communist minds it was clear that the time had come for an incident. It was necessary to paint in bold strokes the fact of Communist military dominance at Kaesong. They went about the job with commendable directness.

On the morning of 4 August, the United Nations Command delegation was proceeding toward the Kaesong teahouse in which the meetings were held. Our convoy of jeeps was halted in mid-course while an entire company of about one hundred heavily armed Chinese, complete with machine guns and mortars, marched across our path and through the immediate conference area. This was in flagrant violation of the commitments made to General Ridgway by the Communist commanders only two weeks earlier. The point of this demonstration seemed to be that notwithstanding verbal agreements to keep the conference area free of armed men, no one would be allowed to forget the hard fact that Communist military forces actually surrounded and controlled the area. To illustrate the point, the Communists simply marched an organized military force through the conference environs.

On entering the conference room, I immediately registered a vigorous protest to Nam Il. Blandly, he replied that the forces in question were “military police”. Military police rarely march about in groups of 100, carrying heavy machine guns and 6o-milhmeter mortars.

On returning to Munsan that evening, I reported the incident to General Ridgway, advising him that there could be no possible construction placed upon it other than intentional action designed to emphasize Communist military control of Kaesong. General Ridgway reacted with characteristic vigor. Resorting again to open radio broadcast, he announced suspension of the negotiations with resumption contingent on the creation of a neutral zone around Kaesong into which no armed personnel of either side were to be introduced.

The Communists hesitated five days before acceding to General Ridgway's requirements. To accept even justified dictation from the United Nations Command, establishing equitable conditions at Kaesong, was destructive of the illusion so painstakingly prepared. Those days of hesitation must have been a period of dead-end frustration for the Communists. If they did not accept General Ridgway's requirements, the military breathing spell they so badly needed would terminate. If they *did* accept General Ridgway's dictum, pretensions that Communists sat at Kaesong in the seat of victors would be difficult to believe. At the last they chose what must have seemed to them the lesser of the evils. They did not do so, however, without further efforts to turn even a bad situation to the advantage. In replying to General Ridgway by radio broadcast in the English language, they politely accepted his requirements and requested the United Nations Command delegation to return to Kaesong as soon as possible. In transmitting the same message over their propaganda radios in Japanese and Chinese, the wording was very different Instead of "requesting" the return of the United Nations Command delegation to Kaesong, the message "demanded at once". Thus they hoped to preserve some vestige of their battered

illusion. General Ridgway did not allow the Communists even this face-saving maneuver. Instead, he declared their reply evasive and demanded still further assurances of equity at Kaesong. At the last the Communists were almost literally on their knees, begging the return of the United Nations Command delegation.

I feel sure that such a disastrous miscarriage of their scheme to demonstrate military dominance caused the Communists to invert the basic pattern of the incidents they instigated. Thereafter, all incidents were designed to regain "face" by disclosing alleged United Nations Command brutality in the use of military force around Kaesong, rather than Communist dominance.

The next "incident" unfolded by the Communists violently revealed their new pattern. On 19 August, Communist liaison officers established contact with our own, charging that a Chinese "security patrol" in the newly established Kaesong neutral zone had been attacked by United Nations Command troops. Investigation revealed that a Chinese patrol of about fifteen men had been fired on from ambush, and the leader killed, a short distance within the imaginary circle of neutrality around Kaesong. A joint investigation did not reveal a scrap of evidence that United Nations Command troops were involved in this action. All evidence pointed in the other direction. For example, it was established beyond question that those who executed the ambush were not in uniform, nor did they wear steel helmets. All United Nations Command troops in Korea were fully uniformed and possessed the American type of helmet. We concluded that this incident was the work of partisans living in the seventy-five square miles of the neutral zone. The Communists had previously informed our liaison officers that "individuals

hostile to the armistice negotiations" were living in the Kaesong neutral zone. A few members of my staff suspected that the Communists might have arranged the incident themselves, using their own troops.

Despite all evidence to the contrary, the Communists loudly trumpeted a charge of "wanton attack" by the United Nations Command. The new pattern had emerged. The Communist plan now was to invoke the sympathy of the world by alleging fictitious brutalities perpetrated by the United Nations Command. Since the August 19th incident worked out fairly well for the Communists, at least without disastrous results, no doubt they felt encouraged. Accordingly, they hastened to cook up what they probably hoped would be a masterpiece In this manner, the Kaesong conference site came to be "bombed".

At midnight of August 22nd, our liaison officer, Colonel A. J. Kinney, was requested to come to Kaesong by his Communist counterpart, Colonel Chang. Chang's message to Kinney alleged that United Nations Command aircraft had bombed Kaesong in an effort to murder the Communist delegation. As I watched Kinney and his party depart in the dark and in a steady rain, I did not envy them their task.

While at Kaesong, Kinney was shown a series of displays of "evidence" calculated to prove a bombing of Kaesong had occurred and had been earned out by United Nations Command aircraft. Owing to the continuing activities of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in and over the general area, a possibility existed that one of our aviators had mistakenly attacked the neutral zone. On the other hand, Kinney, himself an aviator, was not much impressed with the "evidence". He was first shown a twisted piece of metal covered with oil which the Communists stated was a napalm

bomb dropped by the attacking aircraft. There was no napalm jelly about, no scorching of the earth, no evidence of an explosion. Kinney identified the piece of metal as the wing tip of a crashed aircraft. At another point Kinney was shown a small, unexploded aircraft rocket. The Communists asserted the attacking aircraft had fired this projectile. Unhappily for them, United Nations Command air forces in Korea had not been issued a rocket of that size in nearly a year. Thus the show proceeded until 3:00 AM. Standing in the darkness and pouring rain, Kinney asked that the investigation be suspended until daylight. Chang refused, demanding an instant acknowledgment of responsibility by the United Nations Command for this "dastardly attack". (No one was injured, and nothing was damaged by the alleged attack – a result not common after a United Nations Command air strike.) When Kinney refused to acknowledge United Nations Command responsibility for this evident sham, Chang then announced the immediate and indefinite suspension of the armistice conference.

When Kinney reported the foregoing events to me, one fact stood out plainly. No individual Communist, not even their delegation, would have assumed the responsibility for terminating the armistice conference without checking such intentions with higher headquarters. Yet Chang was able to make his announcement of termination immediately upon hearing that Kinney refused to acknowledge responsibility for the "bombing". It was inconceivable that higher headquarters (Pyongyang and Peiping, if not Moscow) could have been reached and could have reacted in the few hours between the alleged tune of the bombing and Kinney's disclaimer. Accordingly, the conclusion was inescapable that the decision to terminate the conference was reached well before the alleged bombing occurred. This was the clincher

which, along with the other technical errors committed by the Communists in setting up the "bombing," pointed the finger of responsibility straight at themselves.

Why did the Communists arrange the sham bombing of Kaesong, with its resultant break-off of the armistice conference? The answer to this question probably lies in the argument over the truce line. The initiation of armistice talks early in July, amid high hopes in the Western world that hostilities would soon cease, had caused a relaxation of United Nations Command military pressure on the Communist forces in Korea. The grinding attack of the United States Eighth Army had been slowed down, granting the Communist forces an opportunity to replenish their supplies and reinforce their battered units. By mid-August the military capabilities of the Communist forces were improved over what they had been in June. Meanwhile, it had become apparent to the Communist delegation that we would not accept the 38th Parallel of latitude as the line of demarcation between both sides. If they wanted this Parallel as a truce line, they would have to drive the battle line southward in Korea until it became coincident with the 38th Parallel. This being so, there remained the question of justifying the enormous casualties to be expected from a general offensive. To their minds it must have seemed desirable to break off the conference under circumstances which apparently justified that action, and which also justified another offensive against the United Nations Command. For such purposes, what could be better than to show a dastardly attempt by the United Nations Command to murder the Communist delegation in their beds? As an added fillip, such guilt fixed upon the United Nations Command might create dissension among the Western allies and weaken their will to resist an armistice on Communist terms.

Because the Communist charges of “bombing” and “attempted murder” were almost universally rejected throughout the Western world, the Communists did not achieve their purpose of creating dissension. Because those charges no doubt were believed throughout the Communist world, they probably achieved their purpose of justifying the attacks launched against the Eighth Army and the appalling losses suffered by the Chinese as a consequence. From that point on, the Communist plan went completely sour. After stopping and then containing the initial attacks made by Communist forces, the Eighth Army began a counteroffensive of its own. By the end of September, the enemy was again in deep trouble. The line of ground contact, far from being moved southward to the 38th Parallel, had moved northward under the pressure of the United Nations Command offensive. Seeing this, the Communists promptly took action to resume the suspended negotiations.

Of all “incidents” by which the Communists sought to gain advantages, none was so bloody nor so successful as the Koje-do riots of prisoners of war. By instigating a violent revolt of prisoners held by the United Nations Command, the Communists created an atmosphere which gravely jeopardized the major position of our delegation in the armistice conference that relating to the exchange of prisoners. How developments were affected by this maneuver will be described in a later chapter. It can be said now, however, that the prisoner riots were a consummation of continuous Communist efforts to gain negotiating or propaganda advantage by staging incidents calculated to serve those ends.

I shiver whenever I think by what narrow margins so many of their plots were frustrated. One thing is certain –

future negotiations with the Communists will be marked by more incidents. The “incident” is one of their tested techniques. Employing it, the Communists fumbled or were tripped up many times in the Korean conference. But we may be sure they learned from those errors. For the future, watch out!

CHAPTER V

V ROADBLOCKS

One of the most notable negotiating tactics of the Communists is to delay progress. As a general matter, Communists believe that once negotiations have been initiated, to delay progress toward consummation of agreements tends to weaken the position of their opponents. They hope to exploit to their advantage the characteristic impatience of Western peoples, impatience to complete a task once it has been begun. This is a shrewd analysis, particularly as it applies to Americans. We are a people who like to get things done. We are taught by word and example throughout our lives that once we tackle a job, the point is to finish it successfully as soon as possible. It is probably true that this same quality of impatience made America the greatest nation on earth. It is certainly true, however, that the Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience through the imposition of endless delays.

Another primary Western characteristic the Communists rely upon in executing their delaying technique is our concern for human suffering. Since they are totally unaffected by humane considerations, Communists are willing to impose delays on negotiations even if such delays mean greatly increased human suffering and loss of life. At the same time, they know well that we of the Western world are unwilling to seek negotiating advantages through delays, if such delays entail increased human misery. Accordingly, Communist

negotiators act upon the premise that if they delay matters long enough, their free-world opponents will recede from previously held positions in order to achieve a measure of progress, especially in the face of continued war and its attendant horrors.

An example of the Communist delaying tactics occurred in connection with the debate over fixing a line of demarcation on which war should cease. The United Nations Command insisted that this should be in the area of the line of actual ground contact, the battle line. The Communists clung to their proposal that the 38th Parallel be the truce line. Bear in mind that the Communists ultimately agreed to the line of ground contact – in fact, this solution probably was never truly objectionable to them. Still, they sought by extended argument to delay matters in the hope of realizing concessions from our delegation. In this context the following exchange took place on 11 August, 1951.

GENERAL NAM IL: With regard to your statement yesterday that your side is through with discussing our proposal of the 38th Parallel, I cannot but consider it as a rude and improper declaration that you are not willing to reach a settlement. If your side really has a serious intention to negotiate an armistice and to reach a settlement, you should give up such an attitude. In accordance with our consistent attitude of analyzing and studying the statements of the other side, I have again studied your statement of yesterday.

As a result, I cannot but say that our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is fair and reasonable and that it should be discussed and

accepted. On the contrary, your proposal is unacceptable. Contrary to what you have been stating, our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is first and foremost drawn up and formulated on the basis of real military realities.

The characteristics and trend of the development of the war in the past seven months during this year, and the present situation in which both sides occupy sectors similar in area south and north of the 38th Parallel, reflect the military realities of the battle front at the present stage. Therefore, to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides is the most logical and workable proposal.

But you are not willing to give a concrete answer in your refutation of our proposal, which has been proven to be correct by both reason and facts, but you merely insist that the sole purpose of our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is the political division of Korea. Such a statement itself is a demonstration of your deliberate ignorance of our repeatedly expressed views. We have clearly stated on 3 August that our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is merely to make it the military demarcation line to be observed by both sides during the armistice. From its name alone, one should be able to understand that it is not to be a political demarcation line. But what is more, we have further stated that the domestic problems in Korea, including the problem of its unification, should be settled by the Korean people themselves by peaceful and democratic means after the realization of an armistice agreement in Korea and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea.

Your persistent opposition to our statements and explanations cannot but raise the question in our mind that since you have no reason for your opposition, you are using such statements which are contrary to facts to cover up your inability to find an argument, and to cover up the real motive of your insistence on pushing the military demarcation line wholly to the north of the 38th Parallel. I have pointed out that your insistence on placing the military demarcation line to the north of the 38th Parallel and within our positions proves that it is you who have malicious political intentions. All that I would like to say is that such intention of yours can in no way be realized.

You said again yesterday that we proposed to make the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line in order to save face, but the plain truth is that we insist upon this proposal simply because it reflects the military realities of the battle front at the present stage, and is reasonable and fair to both sides, and at the same time favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

We insist upon the truth and intend to do nothing else. This allegation of yours is a fabrication and is inappropriate. We do not wish to hear again such discourteous remarks. As a matter of fact, the people who really wanted to save face with respect to the military situation are those who seek to attain by means of absurd theories what they have not won, and the people who wanted to save face with respect to the political situation are those who have crossed the ocean to intervene in the domestic affairs of another country, not those who fight the foreign interventionists heroically

and selflessly. It is clear enough, and requires no further explanation.

Yesterday, you also said that we deny completely the total effect of your air and naval forces. As a matter of fact, we have never denied it. On the contrary, we have given it due appraisal. What we are against is your attempt to secure compensation on the ground by exaggerating the effectiveness of your air and naval forces, and thus to place the military demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel and within our positions.

We say that if it were not for the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, your army would have long ago been driven out of the Korean Peninsula by our mighty and superior ground forces. That is our fairly high appraisal of the effectiveness of your air and naval forces. Moreover, ever since 27 July, we have repeatedly explained by logic and by facts this self-evident situation. Yet, you have never given any concrete reply to our explanation and instead still insisted upon the independence and superiority of your air and naval forces, and upon the compensation you must get for it when drawing the military demarcation line on the ground. This is not a commendable attitude.

Could you explain how your proposal can still stand when the premise upon which your proposal has been conceived and raised has already been refuted and is no longer existent? It is indeed entirely unjustifiable that up until now you should still cling to your proposal. To insist upon doing what is itself entirely unjustifiable, is this not for the purpose of attaining some malignant political desire?

From your statements we really cannot see that your proposal is a proposal of the so-called armistice at the current battle line. Sometimes you claim that your proposed military demarcation line and demilitarized zone are based on the present battle line Sometimes you say that your proposed demilitarized zone is located in the general area of the battle line. You also deliberately confuse the military demarcation line with the battle line.

If your proposal were in reality, as you claim it to be, the military demarcation line you proposed should have been the present battle line itself. Yet the military demarcation line you draw on the map is deep within our area north of the 38th Parallel. I do not understand why you have not been willing to clarify this point frankly.

You say your proposed demilitarized zone may be adjusted. This we have noted. Then why have I not been responsive? For what actually is the nature of your so-called adjustment? Actually, such adjustments are only for you to occupy an area slightly less than 12,000 square kilometers which we would give up if we withdrew from the present battle line in accordance with your proposal.

Do you suppose it possible for us to take an interest in such adjustments? If you allege that I have not understood you correctly, will you point out the exact mistake?

You have indeed stated more than once that you are always willing to discuss your demilitarized zone on the basis of the present battle line and the military situation or military realities, as you sometimes call them.

But to my knowledge your proposed demilitarized zone is the area between the lines drawn on your map,

and those three lines are north of the 38th Parallel, above the present battle line, and within our positions. Consequently, such a statement on your part is just empty words without any actual meaning.

For the above reasons, we contend that the arguments supporting your proposal are untenable and, therefore, your proposal is unreasonable, unfair, and indeed absurd. Hence it cannot be considered.

Finally, I wish to state again that a demilitarized zone based on the 38th Parallel is fair and reasonable. As soon as we determine the principle of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, the details of the demilitarized zone will not be difficult to negotiate when it comes to the discussion of a demilitarized zone.

ADMIRAL JOY: Yesterday you stated "Has it occurred to you, that according to your logic, should our army, acknowledged as mighty and superior by the whole world, stop fighting so that your troops will escape the fate of annihilation, are we not entitled to an even greater compensation and to propose a demarcation line and demilitarized zone to the neighborhood of the Naktong River?" Again today you mention your mighty and superior ground forces.

We do not now, nor have we ever disputed the great numerical preponderance of your ground forces. However, in view of your progress northward since February, we ridicule your use of the word "superior". We are quite willing to let the world judge that point.

We also recognize as self-evident the fact that the capabilities of these already numerically greater ground forces, available to you, will begin to increase the day an

armistice goes into effect. These same capabilities will continue to materially increase each week the armistice is in effect. It is during this period when our air and naval forces must remain inactive that your ground troops could be rested and re-equipped without interference. They could be positioned at your leisure.

We know well that once these ground forces are fully reconditioned they have the capability, which presently is restricted, of launching and sustaining an attack that could be disastrous to any force not in a naturally strong and well defensive position. We know that you recognize that fact also.

It is exactly for the reasons you have stated that this delegation has consistently pointed out that the United Nations Command requires adequate natural defense positions with sufficient depth to ensure that they cannot be quickly overrun by a numerically greater ground force. We realize that it would take several weeks of full-time operation for our air and naval forces to again create the situation in your rear areas that presently prohibit[s] the full utilization of your numerically greater ground forces.

It is precisely for these stated reasons that the United Nations Command delegation has consistently held that the military realities which govern the present situation justify improvement in the defensive position of our ground forces as a just compensation for the withdrawal of our strong air and naval forces.

You have criticized our proposed demilitarized zone. We would welcome an exposition of *your conception* of a demilitarized zone *based on the present battle line and*

the over-all military situation. Will you provide us a map showing such a zone?

GENERAL NAM IL Is that all?

ADMIRAL JOY That is all.

GENERAL NAM IL We have repeatedly explained the military demarcation line and also the demilitarized zone. We clearly explained that the 38th Parallel should be fixed as the military demarcation line and troops of both sides should withdraw ten kilometers on each side and establish a zone of twenty kilometers as the demilitarized zone.

The 38th Parallel appears clearly on the map. The withdrawal of ten kilometers north and south of the 38th Parallel, that is so clear that one does not have to look it up on a map.

In my statement this morning, I have again made clear the content of our proposal and pointed out that your proposal is unacceptable.

You have deliberately maintained, in order to confuse people, that the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone you proposed are based on the present battle line and that they are located in the general area of the battle line. You have also deliberately confused the military demarcation line, the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone and the present battle line.

In order to support your proposal of pushing the military demarcation line to the north of the 38th Parallel, deep into our positions, you have persistently emphasized the so-called superiority of your naval and air

forces and that, therefore, you must be compensated on the ground.

Yet, today you have presented a new and strange argument that since our army is already superior at present, it will be more so after armistice and, therefore, you should be again compensated for reasons of security In using these self-contradictory arguments in support of your proposal, do you not feel ridiculous?

You said that because your air and naval forces were strong you should be compensated, and now you admit that your army is weak, but again you claim that you should be compensated. Just imagine, you need compensation no matter whether you are strong or weak. Is that not completely without reason, and wholly nonsense?

It has been proved that your proposal is untenable and that our proposal is based on reason. Therefore, whatever novel and ridiculous arguments you should fabricate, they would never bolster up your proposal.

I can tell you frankly that as long as you do not abandon your unreasonable proposal, it will not be possible for our conference to make any progress.

As for our proposal, its reasons are irrefutable, therefore it is unshakable. We insist on our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line.

ADMIRAL JOY: Yesterday you used the word “arrogant” in connection with a proposal the United Nations Command delegation now has before this conference. The United Nations Command delegation has been in search of an expression which conveys the haughty intransigence, the

arbitrary inflexibility, and the unreasoning stubbornness of your attitude. Arrogance is indeed the word for it.

From the first day of these conferences your arguments have reflected the very essence of arrogance. You stated, in your opening remarks, that *your* view in regard to a military line of demarcation *had* to be accepted. You have made the same statement over and over again. Once more yesterday, you stated that *your* solution to the question of a demarcation line "must be accepted". Your attitude has been that of an arrogant dictator, not that of a negotiator seeking in good faith an end of hostilities.

By your obdurate and unreasoning refusal to negotiate you have brought these meetings to a standstill. You have slammed every door leading to possible progress. By trying to deceive the world into believing that you have defeated the United Nations Command, you have delayed and stalled these meetings. You refuse to negotiate except on your own terms, thus seeking to falsely portray yourself as a victor dictating to the vanquished.

When the United Nations Command delegation presented its original proposal regarding a demarcation line, you rejected it summarily. You stated you would not give it serious consideration. You contemptuously knocked aside the map we offered for your consideration.

When the United Nations Command delegation proposed that possible adjustments of the demarcation line based on the battle line be considered you flatly rejected this proposal. You implied there was no need to study the physical location of a demilitarized line, since

you had already provided a solution you unilaterally considered suitable.

When the United Nations Command delegation urged you to join it in studying the proposed demilitarized zone from a map, you refused. The United Nations Command delegation pointed out that to study the proposed demilitarized zone on a map would at least clear up any possible misunderstanding concerning the proposal. You rejected even that.

Yesterday you placed a conclusive cap on your record of arrogance. You stated, and I quote "We oppose the scheme of fixing the military demarcation line at the present battle line", unquote. You thus revealed clearly the fact that you engaged in these conferences only to present demands, not to negotiate solutions. You seek to gain a political division of Korea by mere repetition of your arrogant demands. You offer no logic because you have none. You merely state, restate, and state again your peremptory demands.

All the world realizes that a military armistice is a device to halt the fighting until the issues which caused the fighting to start are settled. All the world knows, therefore, that military armistices are and ought to be a reflection of the over-all military situation at the time the armistice is put in effect. Yet you, in your absurd arrogance, oppose a military demarcation line conforming with present military realities.

The United Nations Command delegation has thus been unable to negotiate the question of a demarcation line with you who refuse to negotiate. As a result, the United Nations Command delegation yesterday proposed

to shift discussion to Item 3 of our agreed agenda, dealing with Concrete Arrangements for the Cessation of Hostilities. The United Nations Command delegation explained to you its hope that by putting aside temporarily the question of a demarcation line and delving into the details of stopping hostilities, a later return to the matter of a demarcation line might find a favorable atmosphere. Using a previously prepared statement you rejected this also In addition to rejecting the proposal to discuss concrete arrangements for ceasing hostilities, you gratuitously rejected discussion of Item 4, dealing with relieving the suffering of prisoners of war. I ask you to reconsider these decisions.

In adhering to your futile fixation on an effort to divide Korea by cloaking political maneuvers under the guise of a military armistice, you have blocked every earnest effort of the United Nations Command delegation to make progress toward a cessation of bloodshed and suffering. Your cold calculations take no account of such matters as the pitiful suffering of the Korean people.

Ruthlessly, arrogantly, and with the assumed air of a victor, you baldly assert that your demands must be met. The record of these proceedings has become your unanswerable accuser. You did not come here to stop the fighting. You did not come here to negotiate an armistice. You came here to state your price your political price for which you are willing to sell the people of Korea a temporary respite from pain. You have tried to camouflage your purpose in words cleverly designed to trap the unwary. You are failing.

Your arrogance and your bad faith stain through every attempted deception. The immutable facts hold you

guilty of having delayed, and of continuing to delay, the end of hostilities in Korea. I do not envy you the place to which Truth assigns you.

Today we have again made no progress. I trust the proceedings have provided you an opportunity to reflect on the unreasonableness of your inflexible position, and of your refusal to give serious consideration to any but your own ideas. I trust they have impressed upon you the firmness of the rejection by the United Nations Command delegation of your effort to negotiate a political division of Korea. I hope they have brought to your mind those who die in the continuing warfare, victims of your refusal to discuss a military solution to a military problem. I hope they have raised in you a desire for the end of bloodshed which would attend a cessation of hostilities. If so, the way is open to you. I leave these thoughts with you.

I propose a recess until 1100 hours our time tomorrow.

GENERAL NAM IL: There is nothing new in your statement. Your statement does not frighten us and cannot change our stand. As our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the military demarcation line and our proposal of establishing a demilitarized zone is fair, reasonable, and proper, we will continue to insist upon it.

We agree to your proposal of recessing until tomorrow, 1000 our tune, and 1100 your time.

The most extended delay imposed upon the Korean Armistice Conference by the Communists was in connection with the exchange of prisoners of war. The United Nations Command took the position that all prisoners of war should

be “screened,” that is, questioned individually as to whether they wished to return to the side of their origin. We contended that if a prisoner refused to return to Communism, we should not force him to do so at gun point. This was the procedure of “screening” and the principle of “no forced repatriation” of prisoners advocated by the United Nations Command delegation. The Communists attacked the “screening” process as one the United Nations Command conducted under a reign of terror. Violent riots plotted and executed by the Communist prisoners held by the United Nations Command had resulted inevitably in some injuries and deaths among these prisoners. Thus the Communists provided themselves with excellent propaganda with which to denounce our screening process and our principle of “no forced repatriation”.

For more than a year the Communists refused to accept this procedure and this principle. In the end they did accept them, unchanged in any significant detail from their substance of a year earlier, when first advanced. This delay cost all involved more than fourteen months of war in Korea. Casualties resulting in that period ran into hundreds of thousands. Yet, throughout, the Communists clung to the hope that their delaying tactics would so impose upon either the impatience or the humanity of the Western governments as to cause us to abandon the principle of no forced repatriation. When they finally came to the conclusion that such an erosion was not going to occur, the armistice was achieved. As an illustration of the unchanging nature of the United Nations Command position on prisoner exchange, consider the following discussion. These exchanges took place more than a year before the armistice was signed. Bear in mind that the ultimate exchange of prisoners did not

involve forcing unwilling prisoners to return to the side of their origin.

GENERAL NAM IL: The iron-clad fact is that your side has carried out violence against our captured personnel and pushed through your so-called screening by force in an attempt to retain forcibly our captured personnel as your cannon fodder. The reason is perfectly clear. If the criminal acts committed by your side in pushing through by violent means your so-called screening among our captured personnel had not reached an intolerable degree, our captured personnel would not have run the risk of mass murder by raising their just demands to your side. Your side has employed violence, conducted forcible screening to retain our captured personnel, and rearmed them to serve as your cannon fodder.

The responsible authorities of your side attempted to deceive the world by claiming that your side would not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery But it is exactly your side who would not hesitate to pay the cost of an armistice in Korea for the forceful retention of captured personnel to be subjected to your murder and slavery. And in order to attain this objective your side has already subjected our captured personnel to constant slaughter and slavery.

Can your side deny that the criminal acts of “insults, torture, forcible writing of petitions in blood, threatening, confinement, mass murder, shooting and machine gunning, making experiments on prisoners of war with poison gas, germ weapons, and atomic bombs” carried out by your side against our captured personnel in

disregard of the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war and repudiating the minimum standard of human behavior are all concrete facts of slaughter and slavery?

To retain our captured personnel for your murder and slavery, that is the substance of your unilateral and unreasonable proposition on the question of prisoners of war embodied in your proposal. The heroic struggles of our captured personnel have revealed to the whole world the substance of your proposal.

Your side has no longer any pretext to continue to insist on your unilateral and unreasonable proposal, to delay the armistice negotiations, and to block the realization of an armistice in Korea. Our side has pointed out long ago that it is an inescapable and absolute obligation of the commanders of both sides to repatriate unconditionally all the prisoners of war in their custody following the armistice, and that it is totally impermissible to conduct any screening of the war prisoners.

The so-called screening is in itself absurd. It is in violation of the explicit stipulations of the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war, and in contravention of all international laws. Screening itself is absolutely impermissible. It becomes even more so when your prisoner-of-war camps are fraught with overt and covert maltreatment and persecution and intimidation, when there is no freedom at all in your prisoner-of-war camps for our captured personnel to express their free will, but only freedom for your side to perpetrate violence and acts of murder and to coerce our captured personnel by overt and covert and direct and indirect means, and when no genuinely impartial organization would go to your prisoner-of-war camps to conduct the so-called

rescreening, which is utterly impermissible, and to be deceived and suffer insults by your side.

Your so-called screening is only a direct design to deceive the people both on our side and your side, and by which you attempt to retain forcibly our captured personnel. Our side is firmly and unshakably opposed to it.

In these conferences your side has persistently taken the peremptory attitude of refusing to reason, refusing to negotiate, and refusing to carry out discussions, and attempting by this to force our side to accept your unilateral and unreasonable proposition. Outside of the conferences, your side has successfully carried out frequent provocative acts in violation of agreement, including strafing against your own captured personnel, attacking vehicles serving our delegation and attacking the Kaesong neutral area, resulting in repeated serious incidents of bloodshed. Your such peremptory attitude and provocative acts will avail nothing except to reveal to the people throughout the world your intention to delay and even to disrupt the armistice negotiations. And the responsibility for delaying the armistice negotiations rests entirely upon your side.

Our side has categorically rejected your unilateral and unreasonable proposal. Our proposal is the only reasonable basis for the settlement of the question of the prisoners of war and the attainment of an armistice. The question of prisoners of war is now, in effect, the only question blocking the realization of an armistice in Korea.

ADMIRAL JOY It has been our thought that in a very short time your propaganda would become so transparently

ridiculous as to condemn itself. Your statement today confirms that judgment. Will you agree to put your wild charges to the test of fact by repeating the screening process under the joint supervision of both sides, or do you fear the outcome? We are willing to repeat the screening of prisoners under conditions of strict equity as between your side and ours. What you object to is not the screening process but its results.

As long as you continue to have nothing constructive to offer, I suggest a recess until such time as you desire to meet again.

GENERAL NAM IL: How can it be wasting time when we ask you to deal responsibly with your clear violation of the agreement, and how can it be a waste of fame when we ask your side to accept our proposal for the settlement of the question and when we point out your illegal actions? We have all the rights to point out at the conference all the serious incidents in which your side has successively violated the agreement and we have the right to ask you for a responsible settlement of them.

Your attempt to use the word “propaganda” to cover up the iron-clad facts which are detrimental to your proposition only serves to show that your side has already run out of any reason or argument, that your side cannot look into the eyes of the people of the world. Your side has taken the peremptory attitude of refusing to reason and refusing to negotiate, and all people throughout the world can make the judgment that it is exactly your side and only your side which is delaying and even trying to disrupt the negotiations.

As I have already pointed out, the so-called screening in itself is impermissible, the forced screening conducted by your side among our captured personnel is a criminal act. No sober or just-minded person would enter your prisoner-of-war camps under overt or covert or direct or indirect pressure, thus to legalize the criminal acts perpetrated by your side.

In order to realize the ardent wish of the peace-loving people of the world for an armistice in Korea, it is our duty, which should not be evaded by either side, to come to these conferences and conduct discussion. In accordance with our consistent stand of striving for an armistice in Korea, our side insists on the normal holding of conferences. However, I must point out that the conferences are held through agreement by both sides. If your side is determined to disrupt the armistice negotiations, your side is free to declare that you are not coming to meet with us, but unless your side officially announces the disruption of the conferences, our side will continue to insist upon the normal holding of conferences to explain day after day our reasonable proposal, to refute your unilateral and unreasonable proposition, and to insist upon settling the issues confronting the conferences through reasoning and negotiating.

Our side proposes that the conferences be continued at the usual time tomorrow

ADMIRAL JOY: Very well, we agree.

In total, the Communists utilized delaying tactics to string out the Korean Armistice Conference for more than two years. A period covering seventeen days was required to

reach agreement on what was to be discussed. The conference was suspended by Communist action over the previously described Kaesong "bombing" incident for a cumulative period of approximately two months. Agreement to use the actual battle line as a cease-fire line was finally reached more than four months after the conference began. Agreement to refrain from forcibly returning prisoners to the side of their origin was wrung from the Communists after two years of delay. In each of these cases, the delay imposed on the conference was the direct result of Communist tactics, since in each case the ultimate solution was substantially that which had been originally proposed by the United Nations Command, months or years earlier.

To the uninitiated it may seem inequitable to charge the Communists with deliberately delaying the conference during periods in which they argued for their proposed solution of a particular issue as against the solution proposed by the United Nations Command. One must consider the nature of the proposals involved, however, to determine responsibility. We Americans tend strongly to a line of action that we call "being reasonable;'. This means that each party to a dispute should be prepared to modify his position somewhat in an effort to achieve an agreeable solution. Yet, such an attitude is based on the implicit assumption that each party to the dispute sincerely believes his position is the correct one. We do not compromise with a man who insists that 2 plus 2 equal 6. Nor would we seriously consider the view of one who presented us a bill for $10,000 in connection with repairing our television set. The point is that the relative reasonableness of initial positions taken must be considered before we decide that both parties in a dispute should give a little.

Initially the United Nations Command delegation proposed a truce line north of the line of ground contact. We contended that a northward adjustment of the ground-contact line was necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of United Nations Command air and naval operations, which ranged hundreds of miles north of the embattled ground forces. This was a bargaining position, and even while proposing it we made plain our interest in a solution on the line of ground contact. The Communists, however, insisted on the 38th Parallel.

Thus the effective proposal of the United Nations Command was that the truce line conform to the line of ground contact between the two opposing armies. This proposal required neither side to withdraw its ground forces from the positions then held, to surrender no territory then controlled. It did require the United Nations Command to withdraw its air and naval forces from areas in which they were freely operating. In contrast, the Communists insisted on a truce line, the 38th Parallel, that would have required a general withdrawal of the United States Eighth Army twenty to fifty miles, with a corresponding advance of the Communist army. With this solution, the Communists would have achieved the capture of a large territory they had not been able to win in war.

It is apparent that the two solutions of the truce line question cited above cannot be considered rough equivalents, representing two differing but equally sincere views. The battle-line solution was, in itself, a substantial concession to the Communist viewpoint, in that the United Nations Command agreed to suspend the activities of our air and naval forces deep in the Communist rear. By accepting this solution, the Communists received at least equity. The

months they expended in an attempt to gain advantages far in excess of equity must be charged to them as delaying tactics.

Because of our American tendency to feel that a deadlocked issue should be solved by mutual concessions, the Communists are on favorable ground in applying their delaying tactics. By proposing that 2 plus 2 equal 6, and by then delaying an agreement interminably, the Communists hope to lead us to agree that 2 plus 2 equal 5.

CHAPTER VI

VI PREMEDITATED CRIMES.

Communists realize that negotiations must necessarily result in some few agreements that are objectionable from their point of view. They know that the very nature of the act of negotiating involves accepting some of their opponent's proposals either in whole or in part. Since they appreciate this as inevitable, Communists seek to reduce the magnitude of commitments they are compelled to make and which they intend to dishonor. They aspire to reduce the scope of investigations which may arise from their premeditated violations of agreements. There is no question in my mind that this dark thought lies behind the current Communist refusal to accept effective inspection and supervision of any international agreement to disarm.

To illustrate the curious Communist concept we are now considering, let us take a hypothesis that a town existed in which there was no police force, no organization of any kind devoted to maintaining law and order. In such a case let us suppose that the respectable people of the town insisted upon the establishment of a police force. If the criminal element was unable to prevent the formation of a police force, would not these criminals seek to restrict its size? Since the criminal element intended to continue the practice of crime, how much better for them would it be if the police force consisted of only one officer? This is analogous to the Communist approach to agreements they intend to dishonor.

They strive to reduce the effectiveness of the supervisory and investigating capabilities applying to agreements.

Perhaps the most striking example of this Communist tactic occurred in connection with determination of the number of "ports of entry" during the debates on Agenda Item 3. This agenda item dealt with setting up armistice safeguards against either side increasing its military capabilities during the truce period. Agreement had been reached between the two delegations limiting the resupply of war materials and replacement of military personnel to that necessary to sustain the existing levels in Korea at the time the armistice went into effect. No increases in levels of war materials or personnel were to be permitted. As a result of this agreement, it became necessary to specify the cities, or ports of entry, through which permissible resupply was to be effected, and to provide groups of observers – "policemen" – at each entry port to supervise the resupply activities. This would mean that all permissible resupply must pass through the specified entry ports, there to be checked by the observers appointed from neutral nations which had not participated in the Korean War. For this purpose, the Communists proposed one city in North Korea, one in South Korea.

In order to appreciate the meaning of this Communist proposal, one must recall that the Communist army in Korea numbered nearly one million men. All military supplies for this force came from outside Korea. To sustain a force of such numbers, even under conditions of truce, through one entry port in North Korea was and is a logistic fantasy. Calculations by the logisticians of the United States Far East Command indicated that a minimum of five ports of entry would be required to support the United Nations Command

forces in Korea, despite the fact it numbered less than half the Communist strength. With all due respect for the ingenuity of the Communists in solving their logistics problems, it could not be accepted that they were ten ties as capable as the United Nations Command. We, therefore, were forced to conclude that they had no intention of abiding by the agreement to use only the specified ports of entry, regardless of the number. In furtherance of this intention they sought to limit the number of ports of entry, since by doing so they would reduce the number of neutral observers behind their lines, and thus gain greater freedom to violate the agreements regarding resupply.

Being intent on honoring the resupply agreement scrupulously, and having no fear of any number of neutral observers, the United Nations Command initially proposed ten ports of entry on each side. The Communists absolutely refused to consider this. They wanted no such number as ten neutral observer teams stationed in their rear areas, and embarrassing their opportunities to violate agreements.

After extended debate the Communists altered their original proposal to provide for three ports of entry on each side. In seeking to gain our acceptance of this insufficient number, the Communists expended more than a month of conference effort. It was apparent they were quite anxious to have no more neutral observer teams in their rear areas than could not be avoided. For our part, we realized that the Communists probably had no intention of honoring the agreement on ports of entry, but since the United Nations Command intended to comply with that agreement we had to insist on enough ports of entry to render our compliance possible. After many weeks of debate, agreement on five ports of entry was finally reached.

In like manner, the Communists argued stubbornly against the United Nations Command proposals regarding allowances for the rotation of personnel. Rotation allowances were intended to provide authority for the replacement of personnel as they were withdrawn from Korea on completion of tours of duty. It must be remembered that the basic conditions being sought by the armistice conference were those of *truce*, not of *peace*. Accordingly, it was necessary to sustain the military strength of the United Nations Command during the period of truce, and until a peace settlement was reached. Without rotation allowances, the individuals in Korea would be obliged to remain there indefinitely, or alternatively the force would have faded out of existence as a result of routine completion of tours of duty. The United Nations Command policies provided for one year of duty in Korea for each military man, at the end of which the individual was withdrawn and another took his place. As a result, it was necessary to replace about 35,000 men each month. In this manner a force of 420,000 men could be completely replaced in a year's time. Yet, with a force in Korea of about 1,000,000 men, the Communists initially proposed a rotation rate of only 5,000 per month. This would have meant a tour of duty of seven years for American soldiers in Korea, and a tour of about fifteen years for Chinese soldiers in Korea. Despite the obvious nonsense of this proposal, the Communists held to it for months. Their purpose was a dual one. First, by holding personnel rotation allowances to a grossly insufficient figure, they hoped to accomplish the attrition of United Nations Command forces until none remained in Korea. Second, the Communists hoped to reduce the number of neutral observers needed in their rear areas by curtailing the scope of the activities to be observed. They did not succeed. On

the question of rotation allowances, Washington for once permitted the United Nations Command delegation to hold firm. In the end the Communists grudgingly accepted our figure of 35,000 for monthly rotation of personnel.

At the root of the Communist attitude toward such questions as the ports of entry, rotation allowances, and related neutral observer teams lay their settled intent to circumvent any aspect of the armistice agreement that did not operate to their advantage. It was with this same intent in mind that they approached the question of airfield reconstruction.

The United Nations Command delegation proposed to the Communists that as of the time the truce was signed, no new construction or rehabilitation of airfields should take place on either side. This proposal was consistent with the spirit of other proposals already accepted by the Communists. Our intent was to freeze the military situation in Korea as it existed when the armistice went into effect. Agreements to limit resupply of military matériel and replacement of personnel were designed to prohibit an *increase* of combat effectiveness by either side. The article agreed to by the Communists in respect to resupply of matériel specified that replacement of military equipment should be earned out on an item-for-item basis, "without increase of combat effectiveness". Obviously, to build military airfields constituted an increase in combat effectiveness, since the capabilities of air power are a function of aircraft and bases. This was especially true in the case of the Communists, who possessed not a single continuously operational airfield in North Korea. The Communist MIG aircraft that operated along the Yalu River did so from bases in Manchuria, immune from attack. Airfields in North Korea, however, were

regularly bombed by United Nations Command aircraft and had not been "combat effective" during any significant period of the Korean War. It did not make military sense, therefore, to allow the Communists to utilize the respite from bombardment afforded by a truce in rebuilding destroyed airfields or in building new ones. With restored airfields in North Korea from which to operate, the short-ranged MIG jet fighter could sweep down out of the Manchurian sanctuary, refuel on the North Korean bases, and launch heavy attacks deep into South Korea. This capability depended completely on the existence of operational North Korean bases. Such bases did not exist during the Korean War. We of the United Nations Command delegation could see no reason why the Communists should be allowed to develop an important military capability during the period of truce. We felt that to allow such action regarding airfields was not greatly different than to allow the introduction of additional infantry divisions into Korea, or any other action which would materially increase Communist military capabilities. We had to consider the inescapable possibility that the armistice might not endure, and therefore we could not willingly accept substantial augmentation of our enemy's strength during the truce.

The Communists attempted to imply by vague statements that they really had no intention of building up military airfields during the truce period, but simply could not agree to what they termed "unwarranted interference in our internal affairs". (After the armistice was signed, the Communists built more than twenty military airfields in North Korea.) They contended that the United Nations Command sought to perpetuate the damage done by its "wanton bombings" which, according to the Communists, had not really damaged airfields, but instead had only killed innocent

women and children and laid hospitals and cultural buildings in ruins. Still, they insisted on their right to rehabilitate the airfields which, they inferred, we had failed to damage. Listen to Nam Il on this point.

GENERAL NAM IL: I will make a statement. In your statement yesterday you once more put forth the proposal of the so-called limitation on the increase of military facilities of both sides during the period of the armistice, and the view that the supervising organ should have free access to all parts of Korea. I must point out once more that this proposal and this view obviously involve political questions, and that the military armistice conference absolutely should not and cannot make decisions on them. Such a proposal and view constitute a direct interference in the internal affairs of the other side, and are absolutely not to be tolerated.

You say, "It is incredible that with good faith you could propose inclusion into the armistice agreement of provisions which would permit you to build up your military power." I must emphatically point out that it is entirely a matter of internal affairs of the Korean people to deal with their own defensive facilities during the armistice, and that there is entirely no necessity to require that the provisions for this permission should be made in the armistice agreement.

Whose air force has been carrying out inhuman and wanton bombing in Korea, and whose air force has been heroically fighting in self-defense against such inhuman and wanton bombing is well known to the peoples throughout the world. It is exactly because of the fact

that our anti-air-raid facilities are as yet not so universal as to cover the whole of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the wanton bombing of peaceful Korean towns and villages by your air force could have brought the Korean people such a disaster as they shall never forget. And yet your side openly refuses to withdraw from Korea, during the military armistice, the air force of your side which is used for offensive purposes, and even refuses to discuss this question. What reason then can you have to interfere with the sacred and inviolate right of the Korean people to defend themselves by arranging their defensive facilities?

The view put forth by your side that the supervising organ shall have free access to all parts of Korea likewise constitutes an interference in the internal affairs which our side absolutely cannot tolerate. I have already pointed out that, under any circumstances whatsoever, it would be inconceivable and even less warranted that during the military armistice, when the state of war is yet to be terminated, one of the belligerents should establish observation posts for conducting ground, sea, and air observation beyond the demilitarized zone at principal cities, ports, and communication centers of the other side which is an independent sovereign state, that it should have freedom of movement over the principal lines of communication in the rear of the other side, and that it should carry out aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance throughout the rear of the other side. You state that your side would welcome observation by our side, but our side has no intention whatsoever to carry out reconnaissance in the so-called area under your control, nor does our side have the intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the so-called area under your

control, nor in any case will we agree to your attempt to have free access to the territory of our side to carry out reconnaissance.

ADMIRAL JOY: You have offered nothing new in your statement. We have heard the same propaganda before. Your statement only convinces us of the purposes you have in mind during the armistice. From what you have said this morning, it is clear that you don't want an armistice. All you want is a total cease fire so as to permit you to increase your military capability to the extent you desire and at will. Our idea of an armistice is a simple one that neither side gain a military advantage over the other during the period of the armistice. This is the only basis upon which we can agree. It should be the only basis upon which you should agree if you were sincere in desiring an armistice. As military men, you should recognize that the United Nations Command cannot enter into an armistice with you which does not involve an understanding by both sides to refrain from attempting to gain a military advantage during the suspension of fighting.

GENERAL NAM IL: The question of the military faculties is an internal question, and is not a question to be discussed at the armistice conference. As to the observation question, too, you want to have a freedom of movement in observing in the rear of our side, but that is also an interference in the internal affairs of our side. Outside of the demilitarized zone agreed upon by both sides, you have no right to observe freely in the rear of our side. You said that we, too, could make observation in your rear, but we do not make any such demand and we are

not accustomed to doing so. We hope you will clearly understand such stand of ours.

It was the full expectation of the United Nations Command that if the Communists were allowed to build airfields in North Korea, they would then secretly introduce jet aircraft into Korea, violating the armistice terms thereby, and thus assemble a formidable jet air force in North Korea. Today this expectation is a fact. A powerful MIG force now operates from a multitude of air bases in North Korea. Before the truce was signed, this deadly Communist capability did not exist.

In dealing with the airfield question, the Communists could not settle for mere reduction of the magnitude of an agreement they intended to violate. They could entertain no agreement at all on this subject. Their apparent reasoning was flawless. It is an easy thing for them secretly to introduce into North Korea more tanks or guns than the armistice agreement allows, and even easier to keep the presence of such unauthorized tanks or guns hidden from the eyes of neutral observers. Airfields, however, are impossible to hide. Accordingly, the Communists flatly refused agreement to refrain from building airfields. Weak as was their argument regarding "interference in internal affairs," the Communists clung to it until higher authorities in Washington finally directed the United Nations Command delegation to concede the issue to the Communists. This concession utterly departed from the basic principle on which the United Nations Command delegation had been trying to arrange the armistice the principle of freezing the military capabilities of both sides so that neither could add substantially to its strength during the period of truce.

In order to explain the attitude of the United Nations Command delegation on the airfield question, I am compelled to deal briefly with the basic philosophy of an armistice as we understood it. First of all, an armistice is not enduring peace, it is a cessation of hostilities, quite possibly only a temporary cease fire. Technically, a state of war continues to exist during an armistice. During the period of cease fire, the governments involved attempt to arrange a peace permanently terminating hostilities. It must be kept in mind, however, that the governments involved may not be able to agree on peace terms, as indeed they have not in respect to Korea. It is conceivable hostilities may then be resumed and continue for an indeterminate period. Accordingly, our concept of an armistice was that of a cease fire arranged under conditions precluding substantial change in the relative military strengths of the opposing sides. Thus, if hostilities were resumed after a period of truce, no significant advantage would have been achieved by either side. This concept supported the entire complex of agreements by which we sought to safeguard the armistice. It was also the basis of the United Nations Command insistence upon a line of demarcation providing defensible battle positions for the ground forces and was the principle reason we opposed the 38th Parallel solution offered by the Communists.

When Washington decided, in a final effort to achieve an armistice, to allow the Communists to build airfields in North Korea during the truce period, the basic premise upon which the armistice had been designed went up in a wisp of smoke. With that action, there was no longer any chance to prevent the military capabilities of Communist forces in Korea from increasing in a major degree during the truce. And so they

have, fulfilling the criminal premeditation of the Communist negotiators at Kaesong and Panmunjom.

CHAPTER VII

VII THE VETO

When their attempts to avoid agreements tending to restrict them are not entirely successful, and their efforts to reduce the magnitude of agreements they intend to dishonor have been pressed as far as possible, the Communists then seek to retain a veto on all machinery of enforcement of agreements. In the discussions on Agenda Item 3, relating to the supervision of the Korean armistice, the Communist interest in retaining the veto power became apparent. Over the steady objections of our adversaries, we of the United Nations Command delegation had insisted upon the creation of supervisory organs to check the compliance of both sides with terms of the armistice. Two organizations were visualized. One, a Military Armistice Commission, was to supervise, among other things, proceedings in the narrow neutral strip between the two opposed armies after the cease fire went into effect. The other, a Supervisory Commission, was to be charged with the inspection of activities of each side in the rear areas. This latter commission would conduct its inspections by means of a number of observer teams permanently located at ports of entry, and by another group of mobile observer teams which could be sent anywhere to investigate reported armistice violations. In order to facilitate the functions of these mobile neutral observers, we had proposed that the observers be afforded the right to reconnoiter by air any area of Korea. The Communists refused to agree. They insisted on a two-

edged veto. First, they proposed that the activities of the supervisory bodies be contingent upon unanimous agreement of the members. A dissent by one of the Communist members would constitute a veto. Second, they refused to allow aerial reconnaissance. Thus, even if all Communist members of the supervisory organ voted in favor of investigation, the observer teams on the ground could be effectively frustrated through lack of aerial reconnaissance.

Discussions between the full delegations in plenary sessions had resulted in some agreement on general principles dealing with armistice supervision. On the other hand, discussions of the armistice safeguards mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, as well as other related matters, had proved unprofitable. Accordingly, I had proposed to the Communists that sub-delegations be formed composed of only one or two delegates, and that these less formal groups be charged by the main delegations to resolve matters at issue. The following excerpts are from a meeting of such a sub-delegation on 15 December, 1951. For the United Nations Command, Major General H. M. Turner, USAF, and Major General H. I. Hodes, U.S.A., were the delegates. For the Communists there were that formidable Chinese Hsieh Fang and the omnipresent North Korean liaison officer Colonel Chang.

GENERAL TURNER: Do you have the answers to our questions of yesterday?

GENERAL HSIEH: You have asked “Does your proposal contemplate that the military armistice commission will have directing and control authority over the neutral observation teams?” The inspection teams of neutral

nations are under the supervisory commission of neutral nations. That is to say, above the inspection teams of neutral nations there is the supervisory commission of neutral nations. The supervisory commission of neutral nations entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission will dispatch inspection teams of neutral nations to carry out the functions of supervision and inspections as stipulated by the armistice agreement. The Military Armistice Commission and the supervisory commission of neutral nations are on an equal footing, and the relationship between them is one between the entruster and the entrustee. It is not a relation between a superior and a subordinate.

You have also asked, "What do you mean by according full convenience to the neutral teams?" My answer is that both sides, both your side and our side, should accord the inspection teams of neutral nations full convenience in performing their duties in performing their functions. By full convenience, we include the convenience in traveling over the lines of communication as agreed upon by both sides.

In another question you ask, "You say the Military Armistice Commission must approve rotation requests. Does this mean all members of the Military Armistice Commission must agree to this?" Our answer is In order to prove that either side really has the need for rotating its military personnel, and that it is not introducing into Korea reinforcing forces, ground, naval, or air, there must be reasons stated and tabular data given for such requests. Such requests should be agreed upon by both sides, that is, approved by the representatives of both

sides on the Military Armistice Commission before the rotation can be earned out.

With regard to your question, "How did you arrive at your figure of 5,000 a month in relation to rotation?" Our answer is that the number of personnel to be rotated should not exceed 5,000 monthly. That is, 5,000 is the maximum figure and it refers to the rotation both ways – 5,000 to come in monthly and 5,000 to go out monthly – and our side considers that this figure is sufficient for meeting the requirement of the rotation of your military personnel.

With regard to your question, "Does your proposal contemplate the use of aerial observation by the neutral observer teams?" Our answer is that the duties and the rights of the supervisory organ of neutral nations are limited to supervising the adherence to the inspection of any violations of the armistice agreement which have occurred outside the demilitarized zone. Therefore, we think it is not necessary for this supervisory organ of neutral nations to carry out aerial observation and, also, this aerial observation is impermissible.

GENERAL TURNER: In those instances where you have given us a specific answer to our specific questions, you have merely accentuated the differences existing between our two sides. In those cases wherein you have evaded giving a specific answer, I shall make no further comment at this time.

You call a major concession your proposal that rotation he carried on only with the approval of the Military Armistice Commission. Your members of the Military Armistice Commission can, of course, refuse to

agree. Therefore, you retain the right to preclude, unilaterally, any rotation at all. Now is this a difference from your former view?

For the past week we have refuted your arguments time and again. Once more I shall try to clarify our stand on matters of disagreement.

On the question of no rotation and replacement of personnel, we have heard your explanation, "There should be only outgoing and no incoming of military forces," so many times that you need not repeat it again. You know the figure of 5,000 is wholly inadequate. We know as well as you know that this is your idea of forcing a withdrawal of troops by the attrition process. You are well aware of our firm stand against the withdrawal of troops from Korea since the beginning of the armistice talks. We do not intend to change our stand. All your talk about "contradictions" and "increasing the military capabilities" has no validity, and you know it. It is your side that has been inconsistent and contradictory about these matters. You blandly state that you intend to increase your military capabilities during the armistice by rehabilitation and construction of airfields, since this is an internal affair of yours. Then in the same breath you insist the United Nations Command must reduce its military capabilities by not introducing replacements of personnel for rotation purposes, except for the token number of 5,000 monthly, and even that you could prohibit by use of the veto. We'll not be responsive to this illogical argument any longer.

Next, the question of internal affairs. You have persistently stated that our principle which prohibits the rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing

airfields and aviation facilities, and construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities, interferes in the internal affairs of your side. You have also stated many times that effective inspection such as aerial reconnaissance is your internal problem. However you may clothe in words your desires to increase your aviation capabilities, the bare fact is that you seek to increase your military capability during an armistice. You wish to gain a military capability you do not now have. That is inadmissible. It is only with the recognition of this important fact that we can achieve an effective armistice.

We have assured you any number of times that the United Nations Command has no desire whatsoever to interfere with your internal affairs. However, we have no intention of letting you build up your airfields and aviation so as to increase your air-force capabilities during the armistice, and we expect to see that aerial reconnaissance is employed as one of the means of determining compliance with this.

It is not because we are interfering with your internal affairs that you keep bringing this subject up. Rather, it is very clear that you have ulterior motives. We would like to know just what your motives are for wanting to rehabilitate, expand, and improve your airfields and aviation facilities and just what is your reason for not wanting effective inspection by aerial photography and aerial reconnaissance. As you well know, this inspection will be earned out by the neutral nations inspecting teams, and this will not interfere with your internal affairs, unless you are planning to violate the agreements of the armistice. Therefore, the restriction of construction of new airfields, air facilities, rehabilitation,

expansion and improvement of existing airfields and air facilities, and a thorough observation throughout Korea as agreed upon, is the only answer to a successful execution of the armistice. Now, the question of inspection in the rear. Many times in the past few days you have made the statement that the inspection of the rear is our idea. We accept that and will continue to praise its merits. This we will do because this principle is the main safeguard against violation and evasion of the terms of the armistice. But inspections of the rear by neutral observers instead of by the belligerents was your own thought, as you well know.

Your proposals accept only partial observation in the rear areas of both sides. By so doing you are obviously limiting the effectiveness of the armistice. It is indeed nearsightedness to believe that adherence to the terms of the armistice can be checked only at ports of entry. If observation is to be effective, it must also be conducted at selected communication centers and over all of Korea through aerial reconnaissance. These measures are essential to adequate observation.

It is difficult for us to conceive how your side can insist upon a fair, reasonable, and effective armistice and then contradict your implication of this sincerity by refusing to accept measures which will make it effective.

Now, I hope you fully understand our firm position in these matters and will refrain from using your old arguments over and over again. I have fully refuted them. If we should hear them again, you can expect to hear these same final refutations again. It will gain you nothing and will only delay progress.

That is all.

GENERAL HSIEH: After listening to General Turner's long statement, it has brought to my mind many questions. But before I would ask for clarification on these questions and before I make comments on your statement, I would like first of all to clarify your attitude toward these negotiations, because your attitude toward the negotiations is directly connected with the progress of the negotiations. For example, your statement just now is a repetitious and unreasonable statement, just as the statements you have made before. And yet I took the attitude of carefully listening and seriously analyzing your statement. However, your side takes the attitude entirely to the contrary. Of course, you are calling anything which is not to your taste "illogical." At the end of your statement, you stated you are not willing to listen to us. I must point out that such statements are an indication of your attitude of refusing to negotiate, and I must point out also that such an indication is given after our side has made our proposal.

It is not from today that you start this attitude of refusing to negotiate. Since 12 December you took this attitude and for four days successively you have been taking this attitude. We want to call your attention to this and suggest that you review the proceedings of the past four days. You can see that so long as your side continues to use such an attitude of refusing to negotiate, then there will be no progress in these negotiations. As soon as you give up such an attitude to our position, we will make some progress. It is because you have assumed this attitude of refusing to negotiate for four days successively, and because in your statement this morning

you employed such words as I have pointed out and showed such an attitude, that our side cannot but doubt what is your real attitude toward the armistice negotiations. Before I continue the discussions, I would like to clear up this point. I want to clear up what you mean by using such words. I wish to have your answer to this question first.

GENERAL TURNER: From the noise you have made over the words that I have used, I believe that you pretty clearly understand what I mean. We are willing to negotiate. We have patiently listened to your illogical arguments. We do not care to listen to them again. Let us negotiate. What have you to offer that can be considered a forward step in the negotiations? So far you have only been stalling and wasting time. Let us make some progress today.

GENERAL HSIEH: I could have used the same kind of words. I could have said that your statement made just now is a statement which I have listened to patiently, and is an illogical statement for stalling and delaying the negotiations and wasting time. It is particularly because you still unreasonably and illogically insisted upon your views that you made me doubt what is your attitude toward the negotiations. Of course, you said that before me, but I can assure you that our side will not take the same attitude of refusing to negotiate as you do and we will not think that such an attitude is reasonable. Of course, you have the right to choose such an attitude of refusing to negotiate, but if that is what you really mean, you should make a resolution and seriously state that you will not continue the discussions if we do not accept your positions.

I wish to remind you of just one thing, rotation of personnel is surely an increase of military forces. You have indicated that in order to continue to increase your military force and to raise the morale of your troops, you must rotate, you must have more rotation, you must shorten your period of rotation by two months or three months. It is clear from this that rotation is urgently needed by your side. Our proposal made the concession on the point of rotation in taking account of the interests of your troops and the peoples of your countries. That is a major concession, and yet you do not admit that there is anything new in our proposal. Such is your logic. If you do not admit such a concession as a step forward, as something new, then there is no necessity for us to carry on more discussions. If that is really what you mean, and you mean to insist upon such attitude, then whatever our side will suggest could be refused consideration by your side. I wish you to clarify this point seriously.

GENERAL TURNER: As to irrelevant remarks about my attitude, I dismiss and ignore them as propaganda deserving no comment. You have made a number of statements attempting to show that principles advocated by the United Nations Command are unfair, unreasonable, and unwarranted. You condemn our insistence on prohibiting the rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields as being interference in your internal affairs. You object to our intention to rotate and replenish our forces in Korea. You object to aerial observation as being more interference in your internal affairs. On the other hand, we defend these principles as insuring against an increase of military capabilities during the armistice and thereby a threat to the stability of the armistice.

Now let's look at the situation as it is today. You are not threatening our rear in any way. You are not preventing us from rehabilitating airfields or building new ones. You are not conducting aerial surveillance of our communication centers. You are not preventing unlimited rotation and replenishment of our forces. You do not interfere in the internal affairs of our side in any way. Under the conditions of combat, as they exist today, you do none of these things and we have no fear that you might. You do none of these things because you cannot – you lack the military capability to do them.

But how do you find the situation today on your side? We do keep your airfields unusable. We do conduct aerial surveillance throughout your rear. We do limit the extent to which you can replenish your forces. We do interfere in your so-called internal affairs by disrupting your internal communications systems and by destroying communication centers in your rear. We do these things today because we have the military capability to do them. Until the armistice is signed we will keep on doing them.

Now, to preserve the existing situation as to military capabilities, to replace the effect of the United Nations Command military operations, we propose only that during the armistice you shall not gain a military capability which you do not now possess. We go even further. We agree to apply the same restrictions to ourselves, even though you lack the military capability today to implement these restrictions by force of arms. But you complain this is unfair. You who are unable to impose any of these military restrictions upon our side by your own strength. You complain that it is unfair for us to insist on continuing restrictions through armistice terms

which we are fully able to impose, and are imposing on you by military means during hostilities. In short, you seek to gain, through negotiations, what you could not win through fighting. You seek to avoid, through negotiations, what you could not avoid through fighting.

In accepting the restrictions advocated by the United Nations Command you merely accept a continuation of limits on your military capabilities which exist today as a result of United Nations Command military operations. Your capabilities should continue to be limited by the terms of the armistice. You lose nothing. You gain much, for these same limits are applied to the United Nations Command, even though you cannot today affect them by military means.

It is clear, therefore, that our proposed principles are more than fair to you they are wholly to your advantage as compared to the situation existing today. Once again, I repeat we are willing to give serious consideration to any proposal you may make which provides for effective supervision of, and adherence to, the armistice terms, and for prohibition of increasing the military capabilities. We are talking about military realities upon which this armistice must be based. Now let us get down to negotiating. What have you to offer?

GENERAL HSIEH: I am greatly disappointed at your statement this afternoon. I thought you would change your attitude this afternoon from the attitude you took this morning. But my impression from your statement is that you have even accentuated your attitude of refusing to negotiate. Your statement gave me the impression that you once again reveal your attitude of assuming to be a victor in these armistice negotiations. You reveal to me once

again that you aim at maintaining the state of war in the Korean battlefields and you fear the arrival of genuine peace. You reveal to me once again that you refuse to take the attitude of negotiating.

Your statement merely repeated your hackneyed, unreasonable and absurd statements at the beginning of July when you came to this conference table. It is a pity that you attempt to harp on your hackneyed tunes of July. But after the lapse of five months your voice is not as loud as it was. You have retreated very much. Since you say that we have no military capabilities, then why do you fear that we might have it? Since you take the attitude of a victor, why should you come to negotiate? If you intend to use such an attitude as a threat on your part in these negotiations, I tell you, you must take back that attitude. If you intend to use your statement as propaganda, I suggest that you publish the whole statement to the world and let the people judge.

For four days successively you refused to negotiate, and this afternoon you went to the length of openly bragging of your military capabilities. Whom do you attempt to awe? If you do not attempt to change your attitude, there will be no result from these negotiations and the responsibility for delaying of the armistice is entirely on your shoulders. So long as you do not change your attitude we have nothing to offer or to say today.

I hope you will change your attitude. Are you insisting on this attitude of refusing to negotiate? Are you attempting to use coercion to make me accept the whole of your proposal?

GENERAL TURNER: I shall reread two statements that I just made. We are talking as realists. We want a genuine armistice leading to a genuine peace. Once again, I say we are willing to give serious consideration to any proposal you may make which provides for effective supervision of, and adherence to, the armistice terms, and for prohibition of increase in military capabilities. If you are not willing to carry on the negotiations today, then will you please set a time when you are willing to carry on these negotiations.

GENERAL HSIEH: You have missed the point. Your last question is the question I have asked you. It is not for you to ask me.

GENERAL TURNER: I have answered your question. Do you have anything new to present?

GENERAL HSIEH: You have not yet answered my question. Are you still refusing to negotiate or are you using coercion, trying to force us to accept the whole of your unreasonable proposals? If you take back and change your attitude, I have never refused to carry on discussions, but if you attempt coercion, I advise you to take back this attitude quick and soon.

GENERAL TURNER I shall take back not one word of what I said. If you are ready to negotiate, proceed. We are ready on our side.

Thus the Communists fought to retain a veto on the essential machinery of armistice supervision, a veto on initiation of supervisory action and on effective means of executing investigations. Later on, Washington required the United Nations Command delegation to concede the

question of aerial reconnaissance to the Communists. As a result, though we did eventually win grudging Communist agreement to procedures not contingent upon unanimity in the supervisory organizations, our victory was hollow. We lost the most effective means of investigating violations of armistice terms, violations that the Communists began to perpetrate as soon as the truce was signed. Without aerial reconnaissance, armistice supervision becomes blind. Being blind, the supervisory organs have proved to be as ineffective as a sightless floor detective in a department store. With the result foreseen, we of the delegation protested to higher authorities against the decision to abandon insistence upon aerial reconnaissance. When we reluctantly did concede that equitable and necessary element of armistice supervision, the subject of rear-area inspections became academic. The Communists had their veto, and well have they used it to their advantage.

CHAPTER VIII

VIII RED HERRINGS

A basic negotiating technique of Communists is to introduce spurious issues and use them as bargaining points. To illustrate, imagine that two men are discussing the sale of an automobile. Suppose that the seller demands $1,000 for his car the buyer offers $700. If the seller followed the Communist method, something like the following would occur. The Communist seller would propose that the buyer agree in writing to purchase all his future automobiles from the same Communist salesman. The buyer rejects this, pointing out how unreasonable such an undertaking on his part would be. The Communist seller insists, however, that the buyer should accept the proposal, and continues to so argue over an extended period of time. Naturally, under such circumstances, you or I would terminate the discussion peremptorily and find another source of the automobile we need. This is not possible in international negotiations, however, since matters of life and death are at stake. Accordingly, our analogy must continue. After pressing his proposal to commit the automobile buyer forever to buy from only one source, himself, the Communist seller at last states that he will withdraw his proposal only if the buyer will agree to pay $1,000 for the car in question. When the buyer protests, the Communist seller contends that he has made a great concession in withdrawing his proposal, therefore, the buyer should be willing to make a concession on the price of

the car If this sounds fantastic, read further and observe it in practice.

After long opposition to any kind of armistice supervision agency, the Communists at last proposed the principle that a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should be established. This commission, to be composed of representatives of nations *neutral* in the Korean War, was to have the task of supervising execution of armistice terms by both belligerent sides. To this much, both delegations were agreed. The only question remaining was to agree on the specific nations to compose the commission. Each side was to nominate three neutral nations acceptable to the other side. The United Nations Command nominated Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway.

Allied to the question of composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was that of airfield rehabilitation. The Communists had already made it evident that they would not agree to be limited in building or repairing their military airfields during the truce period. They needed a negotiating device with which to bargain for United Nations Command agreement which would allow them to construct military airfields in North Korea after the armistice was put into effect. To this end the Communists dredged up the most absurd red herring it has ever been my misfortune to encounter: they proposed that the Soviet Union, along with Poland and Czechoslovakia, be named as members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. In effect, they asked the United Nations Command to agree that the Soviet Union had been and was neutral in respect to the Korean War.

The guns, the aircraft, the tanks, the marine mines, the ammunition, the fuel, the trucks, and the military advice that

had been used by Communist forces in the Korean War came from the Soviet Union. When my senior liaison officer first established contact with the Communists at Kaesong, he was held at the point of Russian machine guns, conveyed to the meeting place in a Russian jeep, even offered a bottle of vodka. It was the Soviet Union that attempted to prevent United Nations assistance to South Korea. It was the Soviet Government that sought to block United Nations resolutions condemning North Korea and Red China as aggressors and calling on all United Nations members to assist the victims of their aggression. This was the government proposed by the Communists as a neutral in the Korean War.

There is not a doubt in my mind that the Communists realized fully how unacceptable the Soviet Union was to the United Nations Command. They knew that we would oppose their nomination of the Soviet Union as a neutral nation, and they intended to withdraw that nomination at a later date in return for favorable resolution of the airfield issue. Exactly that ensued. The Communists must have been astounded, however, at one aspect of the developments with regard to their red herring. They accrued a bonus they could not have expected. The United States Government declined to base its opposition to Soviet membership in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on the frank and solid argument that the Soviet Union was not a neutral in the Korean conflict. Instead, the United Nations Command delegation was directed to object to Soviet membership on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on the grounds that the Soviet Union had a common border with North Korea. While this was an unassailable fact of geography, it had little relevance to the issue at hand.

The fact that the United Nations Command delegation could not denounce the Soviet Union for what it was – the mainspring and logistic base of aggression in Korea – soon became apparent to the Communists. Gleefully they exploited the situation. Again and again the Communist negotiators taunted us.

> "Why do you give no logical reason for opposing the great, peace-loving U.S.S.R. as a member of the Neutral Nations? You give no reason because you have none. You are unable to deny that the USSR is a true neutral in the Korean conflict."

And so it went day after day for many weeks. Meanwhile, Washington offered us further ammunition of the "common-border" variety. We were authorized to point out that the Soviet Union participated in the liberation of Korea from Japanese forces at the end of World War II, and, therefore, should be excluded from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Communists ridiculed this lame argument as enthusiastically as they had lambasted the "common border" offering. I could not understand the reasoning of those in Washington who felt that we should refrain from declaring the truth, of objecting to the Soviet Union because that government was a party to the aggression in Korea. After some years of reflecting, I have been unable to perceive any sound reason for such timidity, nor observe any worth-while fruits of that attitude. There is still a great deal to be said for forthrightness, even in international negotiations.

Discussion of the issues by senior officers of the two delegations soon reached a point of complete impasse. In an effort to make progress, the United Nations Command delegation proposed, and the Communists agreed, to direct the staff officers of each side to carry on the discussions.

Accordingly, Colonels Darrow and Kinney for the United Nations Command and Colonels Chang and Pu for the Communists tackled the thorny question of the Soviet Union as a neutral nation. The following excerpts from February, 1952, meetings of these staff officers indicate the manner in which the Communists exploited our inability to state flatly that the Soviet Union was no neutral in the Korean War.

COLONEL CHANG: I would like to make a statement. I submit hereby the names of three neutral nations which the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers are prepared to invite, namely, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, I formally propose in regard to the solution of this problem that both sides agree mutually and simultaneously to the submitted neutral nations of both sides.

COLONEL DARROW: I am authorized to state that the neutral nations of Poland and Czechoslovakia are acceptable to the United Nations Command The Soviet Union is not acceptable.

COLONEL CHANG: I am sure that your side has understood the thought of our side in making the foregoing proposal in resolving this question I am also sure that if one side refused something without supporting it with appropriate reasons, the other party would fail to understand such refusal.

COLONEL DARROW I should think it would he obvious to your side why the Soviet Union is not acceptable as a neutral nation and we shall give you the reasons therefor at a later time.

COLONEL CHANG: Our side fails to discover any reason by which your side opposes those neutral nations which our side has submitted. I must point out first of all that such an attitude on your side is not solving the question but is stalling this question.

COLONEL DARROW: There are a great many neutral nations which your side could invite which would be acceptable to our side. However, the Soviet Union is not one of them I shall be prepared to give you full reasons and amplify my remarks at the next meeting.

COLONEL CHANG: I again point out the fact that the suggested three neutral nations are in full compliance with the definition of the neutral nations that both sides understand. We fail to find any reason that your side should oppose our suggestion. Such an opposition on your part will only inevitably lead to show that your side is attempting not to resolve this question.

COLONEL KINNEY: The principle already agreed to in plenary sessions is as follows "Both sides agree to invite neutral nations *acceptable to both sides* which have not participated in the Korean War." The agreement specifically states that these neutral nations must be acceptable to both sides.

COLONEL CHANG: By interpreting the principle reached upon by both sides, our side cannot find any reason that the other side should oppose these suggested neutral nations.

COLONEL DARROW: As I stated before, we cannot accept your proposal with the neutral nations that you have submitted. I haven't anything further on this matter today.

COLONEL CHANG: Once again I request that your side should give very serious consideration to our proposal in order that we may resolve this question.

I would like to inquire as to how your side could possibly resolve this question if your side only engages in refusals instead of giving any concrete reason at all for rejecting the proposal that the other side has made with regard to the matter of the nominations of neutral nations. Our side submitted the proposal that both sides shall agree mutually and simultaneously to the proposals submitted by both sides regarding the nominations of neutral nations. I, therefore, am against your attitude in refusing the proposal that our side has submitted with regard to the question of the nominations of neutral nations, without giving any reasonable substantiation for your refusal. Accordingly, I request that your side should retract such a stand, which is only unreasonably blocking the progress of the negotiations. I make this request with a view to facilitate the resolution of this question as soon as possible.

COLONEL KINNEY: Colonel Chang, as your side has said many times, the representatives of the neutral nations in the Supervisory Commission have a status in the area under the control of both sides as guests. You have made that point on a number of occasions. These persons are to enter the area that we control as guests. We agree to your view on that point.

Now, what you are attempting to do is to force on our side an unwanted guest. Not only are you attempting to force on our side an unwanted guest, but you inquire as to the reasons why this particular person is an unwanted guest.

I am sure that you perceive that this action on your part is quite inconsistent with the proprieties. The Soviet Union does not fit the criteria established by agreement between the delegates, and your failure to nominate a nation which does fit those criteria, including the criterion that the nations shall be acceptable to our side, is in direct violation of the agreement reached between the delegates and in violation of the instructions given to the staff meetings.

COLONEL DARROW: I might further point out, Colonel Chang, that it was your side which suggested that neutral nations be used. It was also your side that suggested and stated that the neutral nations which would be invited would be agreed to and acceptable to both sides. With this understanding, we did agree to your suggestion of inviting neutral nations which would be acceptable to both sides. You are now asking us to go back on the understanding that was originally proposed by your side and accept a nation that is not acceptable to our side.

COLONEL CHANG: If the statement Colonel Kinney has just made is an official one, I cannot but come to the conclusion that your side is not interested in the resolution of the points at issue now, but rather, is attempting to delay the negotiations by availing yourselves of this question as a stumbling block on your part.

If it was not a mistake on the part of the interpreter it must surely have been a mistake on the part of Colonel Kinney.

Our proposal of nominating neutral nations, none of which may be excluded, is worked out in accordance with

the stipulations made in the agreement of the principles and with the understanding thereof by both sides. None of the neutral nations that our side has nominated is an exception to the rule in complying with the principle and understanding.

* * *

COLONEL DARROW: Your side has said many times that we have no reason and cannot give any reason for objecting to the nomination of the Soviet Union as one of the neutral nations.

We have carefully considered these statements made by you. The United Nations Command does have reasons for rejecting the Soviet Union as one of the nations to participate in the Supervisory Commission. The reasons are clear, cogent and irrefutable.

I should like to point out, however, that neither side is obligated to state reasons for the acceptance or rejection of any particular nation. Both sides agreed to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides. The acceptability or non-acceptability of any given nation, therefore, is a unilateral matter beyond the purview of these discussions.

In the furtherance of understanding, however, and so that our position may be unmistakably clear to you, we will give our reasons for stating unequivocally that the Soviet Union is not acceptable to our side.

The United Nations Command holds that it is in the interest of all concerned that members of the Supervisory

Commission should be drawn from those nations not in close proximity to Korea and without a record of past participation in the Korean question.

This is not the introduction of a new principle It is our rightful and unilateral application of logic to the problem of selecting nations acceptable to both sides. I repeat, the Soviet Union is not acceptable to our side

COLONEL PU: The so-called reasons given by your side are indeed surprising. What is the logic upon which your side attempts to exclude nations who are in close proximity to Korea as neutral nations?

If the neutral nations nominated by our side have any record of participation in the Korean question, it is the record that they strongly oppose any intervention in the Korean war. It is the record that they firmly support a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Can your side deny that any of the neutral nations nominated by our side is consistent with the definition agreed upon by both sides? Can your side deny that the Soviet Union is a nation which is most strongly against any intervention in the Korean war and which is most strongly in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question?

Your side cannot give, neither does it have, any reasons for objecting to any of the neutral nations nominated by our side.

We suggest that your side seriously reconsider the reasonable method of solution proposed by our side

COLONEL DARROW: Our statement is clear and stands on its own merits. We do not propose to enter into endless

> discussion of matters which are self-evident. We strongly recommend that you give our statement serious consideration.

The Communists also applied their red-herring technique to an issue concerning the activities of neutral observer teams. These neutral observer teams were to be stationed at ports of entry, there to check the flow of military personnel and matériel into and out of Korea. The United Nations Command delegation wished these observers to have the maximum practicable latitude in executing their tasks. The Communists, on the other hand, sought to limit strictly the areas in which the observers could operate. It was the Communist concept that the neutral observers would remain closely confined to certain specified buildings and points within the city named as a port of entry. They conceived that the neutral observers would be notified by the local authorities when a shipment was to enter Korea, and could then proceed to the railway station, dock, or airfield being used. The neutral observers could then, and only then, check the entry or exit involved.

It is only too apparent how ineffective the neutral observers would be under the Communist concept of their activities. All inspections depended upon the honesty of the local Communist military authorities in notifying the neutral teams of the impending exchange of personnel or matériel. We in the United Nations Command delegation were more than dubious about Communist honesty. We preferred to allow the neutral observer teams complete freedom to roam as they would within and around each port of entry, checking activities at random and without notice.

Seeing that a difficulty with the United Nations Command delegation was arising in connection with the relative freedom of neutral observers, the Communists produced another red herring. They proposed that the neutral observers be authorized to inspect every detail of military equipment as they checked it in or out. Since the "neutral" teams were to have Communist members, such a procedure would have exposed all United States technological secrets to our enemies. The bombsights and electronic gunsights of our aircraft, the directing mechanisms of our antiaircraft guns, the inner workings of our radar sets – all of these would have been divulged to Communists' eyes. On the other hand, Communist aircraft and radar were in Manchuria, exempt from investigation by neutral observers.

It was utterly fantastic to expect that any nation would expose its most critical military secrets to the eyes of its enemies. The Communists knew this. They hammered away, therefore, insisting upon unrestricted rights of examination of our equipment by their Communist members of the observer teams. After a period of such insistence, they withdrew this phony proposal, contingent upon the United Nations Command accepting limits on the general activities of the neutral nations. Thus, the effectiveness of the neutral observer teams was foredoomed to impotency in North Korea. Events since the armistice was signed have overwhelmingly demonstrated that ineffectiveness. The Communist red herring has spawned insecurity for United Nations Command forces in Korea and degradation for the prestige of the United States in Asia. Not bad fishmongers, these Communists.

CHAPTER IX

IX TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES

Communists have two techniques with which to deal with truth. One they deny it. Two they distort it. The flat denial of truth is the less frequent tactic of Communists, because they have learned that truth is buoyant submerged, it will pop to the surface at embarrassing moments. Therefore, the Communists much prefer to employ the tactic of distorting truth.

The distortion of truth as practiced by the Communists is a science. The basic procedure is to select out of the whole truth certain parts, which, if put together in a particular way, produce a conclusion exactly contradictory of the whole truth. An example might be the story of the witness of a street fight. A man was accused of mayhem, it being alleged that during a street fight he had bitten off the ear of his opponent. There was only one witness to this fracas. The witness was put on the stand by the lawyer for the accused. The lawyer asked.

"Did you see my client bite off the ear of this man during the fight?"

The witness replied, "I did not."

The lawyer for the accused, being encouraged, then pursued the point further.

"I want this to be very clear. You witnessed the entire fight, but you did not see my client bite off his opponent's ear?"

The witness replied, "No, but I saw him spit it out."

Now the Communist would never have allowed that last statement to appear. He would have halted the record at the witness' first reply, leaving an utterly false conclusion to the hearer.

The simple fact is that with all respect to the military power of the free world, Truth is Communism's most dangerous enemy. Communism knows this, and therefore has become expert at fencing with Truth. Communists cannot afford to allow the full truth to appear unchallenged at any time. If necessary, they deny it outright, especially when they are confident the full truth is not known to their adversaries or, if known, cannot be proved beyond doubt. Such was their procedure in connection with prisoners of war said by the Communists to have been "released at the front."

By February, 1952, the unresolved issues between the two delegations had narrowed to three: (i) The Soviet Union as a "neutral", (2) the question of building airfields during the truce, (3) the exchange of prisoners of war. The prisoner-of-war question became the main stumbling block of the armistice effort, delaying a truce for over a year. In December, 1951, however, we had not entered this raging issue fully. Tentative discussions were beginning. Almost at once the Communists began to twist truth.

During the course of the Korean War, nearly 100,000 soldiers of the United Nations Command had been listed as missing in action. The vast majority of these were troops of the Republic of Korea. Our own estimates of total numbers

captured had been roughly validated by propaganda boasts uttered over their radios by the Communists. On several occasions the Communist propaganda radio had claimed that around 65,000 United Nations Command troops had been captured. Knowing the barbaric nature of the Communist prison camps, the United Nations Command did not expect to receive back the full 100,000 who were missing in action. Some would have died of natural causes, some would have been murdered. But we were not prepared for the Communist distortion we encountered. When the two delegations exchanged lists of prisoners, the Communists reported they had on hand only 11,599 prisoners of war. After recovering from our amazement, we inquired where the remainder were some 55,000 a figure based on the Communists' own radio claims. How the Communists responded with a weird distortion of truth is exemplified in the following extracts from meetings of the sub-delegations dealing with the prisoner-of-war issue.

ADMIRAL LIBBY: The Republic of Korea Army has a total of 88,000 persons officially reported as missing in action. You say you have only 7,142 of these men, which is less than 9%. The United States alone has 11,500 men missing in action. You say you have only 3,198. That is only 28%.

These percentage relationships between the number of prisoners of war admittedly held by you and the number of men missing in action are extremely revealing. 9% of the Republic of Korea Army missing in action and 28% of the United States soldiers missing in action are admitted by you to be prisoners of war against some 62% of your missing in action who are in our custody as

prisoners of war. Now, if we should assume that you captured 62% of our missing in action, you would have almost 62,000 prisoners of war. Now, remember, in the first nine months of hostilities, your General Headquarters announced capturing 65,363 prisoners. Now, in the face of either of these figures, the 65,363 officially reported by your General Headquarters for the first nine months of hostilities, or the 62,000 which is a reasonable estimate based on expected percentages, you now list only 1 1,559 for the entire period of hostilities. Certainly there can be no actual discrepancy of this magnitude. We are convinced that you are holding thousands of prisoners of war, United Nations and Republic of Korea, for whom you have failed to account. We request your explanation. As we said yesterday afternoon, this is the first order of business today. We request that you account for the minimum of some 50,000 prisoners of war missing from your list I repeat, we request that you account for the minimum of some 50,000 prisoners of war missing from your list.

GENERAL LEE SANG JO: Today, too, basing upon your figure of missing persons, you calculated the figure that we should possess of your prisoners of war held by us. That is illogical. You yourself know it's a fact that it is unscientific and unreasonable to request from the other side the figure of the detained prisoners of war with the figure of your missing persons. Of course, basing upon a certain basis we can calculate out a certain figure. But in doing so you can calculate out relatively accurate figures only when you consider the necessary conditions and only when you make use of the necessary conditions.

When you consider this question, what conditions must be considered? Firstly, you must understand that last year, before and after September, there was a sudden change in the state of war, that the hostilities went on under a radical change. That is to say, there was a large-scale movement on the front. You must remember that under such circumstances we meant not to retain so many prisoners of war, and in accordance with our traditional policy towards the prisoners of war we released a large number of prisoners of war immediately at the front. At that time we released many, many prisoners of war directly at the front. At that time most of the prisoners we had held in Seoul, and in regions south of Seoul, were released. You must know that it is a fact that we captured many prisoners at the front, but you must also know that the movements of our troops were being done at night. And you must know that the distance between our front and your positions is not far. This is a fact which I witnessed at the front myself. In transporting a large number of prisoners of war, it was done with very few of our escorts. During such movements at night we often suffered from your night air raids. What does it mean? You must understand there is the possibility that with a small number of escorts and with the transportation of the prisoners of war at night, the prisoners of war can be dispersed, that they can desert, that they can run away. Accordingly, the fact that the list we handed over to you contains not so many prisoners of war is not a bad or strange phenomenon as you say.

At the front, when we talked with the prisoners of war and found that they are opposed to the war and that they wished to go back home, it was then our policy to

release most of them. That we have been continuously doing and that we will do. We don't think that it is the increase of the military forces, as you think, to return the military forces directly from the front. I tell you that we think it is right. Our policy of releasing the prisoners of war en masse was right, it was for the benefit of the prisoners of war and better than detaining so many prisoners of war. Accordingly, we do not think that the smallness of our list which we handed over to you was inappropriate or not good as you think. On the contrary, we rather think it was a good thing. Those many persons who are released and who have gone back home and are enjoying a comfortable life will certainly know that we are really serving the people, that we are working for the people. Accordingly, you shouldn't ask why we have so few prisoners of war in our prison camps, but you should know that they are leading a family life at home.

Accordingly, you shouldn't ask us about persons which we do not detain in our prisoner of war camps but instead, if you are really humanitarian, you should congratulate the released people on their life at home.

ADMIRAL LIBBY: With respect to General Lee's statement. You have stated that one reason for the extremely small list of prisoners of war that you hold is that you have released many, many prisoners at the front. Our information shows that exactly 177 prisoners of war were released by you at the front. That is the number that have returned to our lines, 177. We have indicated that on the chart. The number is too small to be shown on the scale but the number is there – 177. They are scarcely a drop in the bucket in the 50,000 plus, that we consider you must account for. Now, you stated that owing to the

fact that a large number of prisoners of war were moved at night under various conditions and with a small number of escorts, some of them could run away or escape. Surely you don't contend you mislaid some 50,000 prisoners of war in this manner? We have not available at the moment the exact number of escapees that returned to our lines, but it is a safe estimate that it will not exceed 100 at the most. With respect to your contention about our use of missing in action figures as a basis of calculation to your contention that it is unscientific and untenable admittedly the percentage ratio is not definitive but it is most certainly indicative.

With respect to the condition of combat mentioned in General Lee's statement. There were large-scale movements on the front after September, 1950. In general, and over-all since then, your forces have been retiring and defending. It is characteristic of a retrograde movement that the missing-in-action figure is relatively high. The missing-in-action figure is relatively high because some soldiers who are actually killed in action are listed as missing in action since no one has knowledge that they were killed, and the rearward movement prevents recovery of the body. Thus, the missing-in-action figure tends to be overestimated by the retiring force, whereas the missing-in-action figure is known quite accurately for the pursuing force, which is able to find all its killed in action. Thus, under the over-all combat conditions since September, 1950, your missing-in-action figure is inflated while ours is the more accurate. Yet we hold a minimum of 62% of those you carry as missing in action, while you admit to holding only 9% of the Republic of Korea Army missing in action and only 28% of the United States missing in action. So much for

conditions of combat. However, we are willing to drop for the time being further consideration of the ratio between killed in action and missing in action, if you prefer, and to base our case on your own official General Headquarters reports. Now, let us summarize the situation.

Your General Headquarters official claims are that your side captured 65,363 United Nations Command prisoners of war in the first nine months of the war. Yesterday you insisted that this was an accurate and reliable figure. You listed exactly 11,559 United Nations Command prisoners on the prisoner-of-war list you gave us. We asked you about the remaining 53,804 and you replied that you released "many, many" at the front. Our information shows that this "many, many" consisted of exactly 177. This leaves you with at least 65,186 prisoners of war to account for, based on your official General Headquarters claims and giving you credit for the number who came back to us after having been released at the front. You claimed that there were a large number of people who escaped. How many escaped and where are they now? Yet your prisoner-of-war list still accounts for only 11,559 total. Therefore, using the most optimistic figure for your side that we can generate by any process of logic known to us, we still maintain that there are upwards of 50,000 prisoners of war admittedly taken by you for whom you have not given any accounting. Now let the eyes of the world observe your account for these people. We would like to know where they are. We would like a convincing, factual accounting.

GENERAL LEE: Today in your two statements you did mention two facts. One fact is that you hold many

prisoners of war. The other is that we hold a small number of prisoners of war. Your arguments are not sound. They are arguments which ignore many facts.

We tell you again that the figure published by our General Headquarters, as well as by our government, is correct. With the figure you have published, you are trying to give us the impression that the ratio of prisoners of war held by you is great, but you have forgotten the fact that in the figure you published and in the lists you have given us, many other persons are included. You forget the fact that should you include the figure of the persons you kidnaped from our side, it would be an astonishing figure, and comparing it with the figure which you have given us, your figure is even more astonishing. You think it is strange that our list of the prisoners of war is small.

And with a view to obtaining a certain motive you say that the people released by us amount to only 177. There is no doubt that this does not coincide with the facts. It is a preparation for ignoring an important fact. It is no more than your aim of underestimating the fact that we released so many prisoners of war directly at the front. If we had, like you, detained all the persons we captured, it would be possible that we would have the 50,000 you mentioned. But we allowed those who wanted to go back home and who did not want to join a war against their country to go back home and lead a peaceful life at home. And we directly released at the front those foreign prisoners of war who did not want to join the war against people who fight for their real independence, who fight for their own people. These measures of ours are perfectly right and I tell you that the righteous people of

the world praise this revolutionary policy of ours towards the prisoners of war.

Now you doubt our right and humanitarian measures and our most revolutionary measures of releasing the prisoners of war, and you deliberately try to give us and others the impression that that was not real. Whether you recognize that fact or not, that is an unshakable fact. This is no more than your scheme of justifying your unfair insistence on retaining part of the prisoners of war, and not releasing them, with the reason that the figure of the prisoners of war held by us is small whereas the figure of prisoners of war held by your side is large. Then, speaking concretely, tell us what persons we did not release"

ADMIRAL LIBBY: General Lee, you referred to what our aim was in this discussion. Our aim is extremely simple. We are not trying to twist or distort your figures. We are using your official figures, plus such additional facts and I emphasize facts as we have, to arrive at our best estimate as to how many of our prisoners of war your side has never accounted for by any means whatsoever. We are seeking a simple, factual accounting for people. We have no dark aims or hidden motives, we are seeking a simple, factual accounting for people, people we believe you hold and have not reported. So I must set the record straight in one very important particular. You said, General Lee, in your statement, and I quote as accurately as possible "In searching for an objective you say only 177 were released by us." What I actually said was, and what I would like to repeat is, that of the "many, many" you say you released at the front, a total of 177 got back to our lines. You say that you allowed many, you allowed all

those that wanted to go home, to go home. Since all we are seeking is an accounting, we ask you to account for these that you allowed to go home. We asked you how many were allowed to go home. Give us a list of their names. Since they were obviously nationals of the Republic of Korea and the countries of the United Nations Command, if you let them go home and they had gone home, we should have known about it. We do not know where they are or who they are. Give us an accounting of these people.

So we come up against the incontrovertible fact that of all the "many, many" people prisoners of war that you released at the front according to your assertion, only 177 ever reached our front lines and none that we know of ever reached their homes. They have disappeared from the face of the earth according to all the facts available to us. We should like an accounting of those people. We should like an accounting of the upwards of 50,000 men who, according to your own figures and the facts available to us, should be in your prisoner-of-war camps.

GENERAL LEE You asked us to give you the name list of those whom we released. You must understand that among the prisoners of war whom we released, there were those who were released directly at the front, and those who were brought to the rear and then sent to the front and released. Therefore, as to the majority of the prisoners of war whom we directly released at the front, we did not keep a name list and it was not necessary for us to make a name list.

ADMIRAL LIBBY: The United Nations Command knows, and your side knows that we know, that you have captured many more soldiers of the Republic of Korea than the

7,142 listed in your data. Where are all these soldiers now? Some of them who have succeeded in making their way back to our lines have told us of having been forced to fight against their own army until they managed to escape. But thousands of others are still serving in your army. You say they are all volunteers. We are by no means convinced that this is so, in the light of what those returned soldiers have told us. In any case, these captured soldiers are, and always have been, entitled to the status of prisoners of war. This means that they should never have been used to do work directly connected with military operations. This means that you should have shielded them and protected them from the effects of military action. Obviously, these two rights the right of all prisoners of war not to participate in work which contributes directly to the conduct of the war and the right to be protected from the effect of military operations preclude the use of prisoners of war in actual military service against their own forces. We feel that your side has flagrantly violated these basic precepts by impressing prisoners of war into your own forces. We believe that you have further violated their rights as individuals by striking their names from the list of the prisoners of war that you handed to us. And by this action you would deny them the right to be repatriated during an armistice. In other words, having used them illegally during a war, you would continue to use them illegally during and after an armistice. Now, quite apart from the effects of this practice upon the individuals concerned, what is its effect upon the basis of exchange of the prisoners of war? It constitutes, in our view, a rather transparent and fraudulent attempt to get something for nothing. Having deliberately presented

incomplete lists from which many thousands of names are missing, you then come to this meeting and demand an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war. As I told you yesterday, when you include in your lists all the prisoners of war that you actually hold, then your proposal for an all-for-all exchange, however unsound from a military point of view in a military armistice, would at least be honest.

GENERAL LEE: You want to know where, when, and how many prisoners we released. I think your insistence is no more than an insistence on not trying to solve the question but trying to continue the useless arguments. You again make such groundless statement that we should possess about twenty times as much as we actually possess at present. The fact is certain that of a large amount of prisoners of war released, some may be in your army and some may be living their family life at home. To release all the prisoners of war directly at the front during hostilities is possible only for an army which fights only for the people, that you may find it hard to understand.

So the arguments continued for many months. The United Nations Command representative daily demanded an honest accounting of the Communist-held prisoners In spite of our persistent efforts to ferret out the truth, our opponents clung stubbornly to their fantastic he that the question of the “missing” 50,000 men no longer existed because they “had been released at the front and were home leading peaceful lives.”

On repeated occasions, the United Nations Command delegation asked the Communists directly whether any prisoners held by them were in China. On each of these many occasions the Communists denied that any prisoners were being held outside of Korea. Admiral Libby even cited intelligence reports to the Communists, showing that American prisoners had been seen in China. The Communists flatly stated these reports were fictitious. Recent releases of American prisoners from China are comment enough on this question. But at Panmunjom, the Communist story was one of injured innocence.

ADMIRAL LIBBY: Military personnel of your side whom we have captured have related that they were members of details which escorted United Nations Command personnel to prisoner-of-war camps in China. One such individual even described in detail a prisoner-of-war processing center in Harbin, China, to which he personally had helped escort captured United Nations Command personnel. Yet your side has, across this table, categorically denied that you ever transported any of our personnel outside of Korea.

GENERAL LEE: Judging from your statement of today, you have not only not given up your attempt to fabricate non-existent facts continually, but have indicated that you are extending your continuous absurd position and trying to fabricate more fundamentally non-existent facts.

Your attitude of trying not to settle the question but to delay the meeting is shown clearly by your saying that we have transported prisoners of war outside of Korea, or by your saying that you knew something from the

propaganda made at the front by such rumors which you spread not only at the conference table but also outside the conference.

One of the wildest distortions of truth resorted to by the Communists arose early in the armistice conference, when we were attempting to fix a truce line across Korea. In their efforts to gain acceptance of a truce line more favorable to their ultimate purposes, the Communists sought to degrade the combat capabilities of the United Nations Command. They became contemptuous of American strength in Korea, especially of the effect of our air and naval strength. When reminded that it was basically United States naval and air strength that had brought Japan to surrender in World War II, the Communists asserted that United States military efforts against Japan failed, and that it was only after the Soviet Union entered the war that the Japanese surrendered. Notice that the last part of this statement is historically correct. The implication is, of course, grossly false. Japanese efforts to arrange a surrender to the United States began many months before the Soviet Union entered the Pacific War. Japan would have been forced to surrender to the United States even had the Soviet Union entered the Pacific War on the side of Japan. Yet the Communists sought to use the half-truth that the Japanese surrendered one week after the Soviets entered the fray to create an illusion totally contradictory to the actual facts. Listen to the voice of the Communist mouthpiece as he utters this distortion.

"You said that in the last war Japan was defeated as a result of blows inflicted by your naval and air forces. Your

> forces fought Japan for nearly four years without being able to defeat them. It was only by the Soviet Army that a crushing blow was dealt and Japan was finally defeated."

On occasion the Communists had to rely on flat denial of truth. Such an occasion arose when the details of the truce line were being fixed. It had been agreed that the demarcation line would be the actual line of ground contact between the two opposing armies. The question remained. Where, exactly, was this line of contact? Staff officers were assigned to work out on a map the actualities of the battle situation. Colonels Kinney and Murray for the United Nations Command delegation met with Colonels Chang and Tsai of the Communist group to accomplish this task.

Kinney and Murray were promptly presented with a Communist map showing the battle line about twenty miles behind the front-line positions of the United States Eighth Army. Some points on the Communist "line of contact" were even behind the division headquarters of our front-line divisions. Our staff officers recognized the futility of debating with Communists who were deliberately choosing to deny facts. Accordingly, they proposed to Colonels Chang and Tsai that all four officers proceed by helicopter along the battle line, identifying by actual examination the location of key points held by one side or the other. The Communists refused to do this, knowing that such a procedure would invalidate their position. They simply continued to deny that the battle line was where it in fact lay. One point claimed by the Communists lay some five miles south of Panmunjom, where the negotiations were being held. The Communist map showed the battle line crossing the crest of a mountain

at that point. Actually, the line of contact was five miles to the north, as attested by the fact that a vicious battle was raging there even as the staff officers talked. Knowing this, Kinney and Murray proposed that the Communist officers join them in going immediately to the site of the battle then in progress, thus to determine the actual line of contact at that point. The Communists refused. They wanted no close contact with truth.

Americans find it difficult to visualize a breed of men who fight Truth at every turn, not just occasionally, but always and repeatedly. Yet, the Communists are such a breed. Nothing is so perilous to their dark designs as the full, unveiled truth. I sometimes thought they would rather lie than tell the truth even when the truth would make a better case for them. By whatever means are most effective, they assault Truth. Indeed, dedicated as they are to the ascendancy of the greatest lie of history, they can do no other.

CHAPTER X

X INCHES INTO MILES

Communists regard any concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Many Westerners entertain the notion that to accept some part of a Communist negotiating proposal will encourage the Communists to respond in kind. On the contrary, such action is likely to induce an even more adamant attitude on their part. The Communists reason that their opponents would not accept any part of Communist proposals if any other choice were available. Communists expect their opponents to accept their proposals only when compelled to do so, or when an exchange of concessions by each side is involved. Therefore, if Western negotiators simply agree to a Communist proposal without insisting on an equal concession on another point, the Communists conclude that their opponents are in a weak general position. With this conclusion in mind, the Communists become more aggressive, demanding more, and conceding nothing.

Communists will never accept a Western proposal, or recede from one of their own, simply because logic or truth indicated such action, or merely to make progress in a conference. Accordingly, they will not credit their opponents with being motivated by logic or by a sincere desire to make progress. Whenever Western negotiators make a concession to Communist views for the purpose of making progress, Communists consider this action is evidence of a deteriorating Western position. Therefore, they press even

more strongly for further concessions, and become more confident that time plays on their side.

It has been described earlier how the United Nations Command delegation sought to gain Communist acceptance of aerial observation of the truce. Our purpose was to provide a means of checking, by fast and reliable means, the activities of both sides in abiding by truce terms. The Communists, however, objected strenuously to this procedure. Apparently, they knew that though they could completely frustrate ground observation of their intended violations of the truce terms, aerial observation would be most difficult to circumvent. Based upon considerable experience with Communists in Korea, the United Nations Command held fast to its proposal of aerial observation as an essential to safeguard the armistice terms. A stalemate resulted, with both sides eyeing each other for signs of recession. Excerpts from the ensuing discussion follow. (General Ferenbaugh of the United States Army was the United Nations Command spokesman at this time.)

GENERAL HSIEH: Will you cancel your proposal "In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights as are required will be performed by the noncombatant observer teams"?

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: We think our proposal has great merit. Our side has every right to be concerned for the security of our forces during the time of the armistice.

GENERAL HSIEH: You will not take away that stumbling block?

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: We gave you a proposal which will increase the stability of the armistice. It is your refusal to

accept such a provision that causes the deadlock, stumbling block, roadblock, or as you choose to designate it. It is your side that blocks progress by opposing a stable armistice.

GENERAL HSIEH: I cannot but point out that you have reversed right and wrong. Your proposal is an interference in our internal affairs. That proposal, every sentence and every word, was put there by your side. As I have repeatedly pointed out, the side that invites suspicion in these armistice negotiations and in the attitude toward the entire settlement of the Korean question is your side. The deadlock is created by your side and it is entirely up to you to break this deadlock.

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: I have a couple of thoughts. Why do you object to noncombatant observer teams, noncombatant pilots with noncombatant crews and noncombat airplanes, performing in the same manner as the ground observer teams will do?

GENERAL HSIEH: Our side holds that there should be no introduction of military forces in Korea. Therefore, inspection of ports of entry in the rear through which military forces can be introduced is sufficient. There is no need for flights and aerial inspection all over the country.

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: Let's take a hypothetical case. How do you expect observer teams to inspect the some 570 miles of the Yalu River?

GENERAL HSIEH: There is no need for me to answer that question.

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: I have another thought then. We are not concerned with whether we interfere with your internal affairs when the alternative to that is to increase

greatly the threat to our forces – in other words, the threat of your increased military capabilities. Security comes first during an armistice.

GENERAL HSIEH: This question has been answered by me many times. I have said that the side that invites suspicion is not our side but your side.

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: Let's carry this a bit further. Who invites suspicion? Who invites suspicion by wanting to rehabilitate airfields? Who is to decide right from wrong?

GENERAL HSIEH: It is not the right of any military armistice to discuss the questions of internal facilities of an independent and sovereign state, even less, to make any decision on it. Your side raised such unreasonable demands, we have a perfect right to refuse to discuss them. I tell you I am not here to negotiate this point the question as to what can be rehabilitated and what cannot. You had better not harbor such an illusion.

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you might as well accept the fact the United Nations Command is going to keep on insisting on a safeguard, insurance if you will, against the threat of the development of a military air capability on your side during the armistice.

GENERAL HSIEH: Your side should be well aware of our attitude on the settlement of the Korean question. Our position on this question constitutes no threat at all to your side.

GENERAL FERENBAUGH: We think there is a lot of good hard common sense in our statement. I suggest that you apply this in reading our proposal. I suggest that you give earnest consideration in connection with that proposal.

GENERAL HSIEH There is a prerequisite to our consideration. If your side insists on including the proposal for aerial observation, we will not give any consideration to your proposal.

As mentioned before, the United Nations Command delegation (over its objections) received orders from Washington to renounce its position favoring aerial observation of the truce. Evidently, Washington believed that a no-strings-attached backdown by the United Nations Command delegation would produce a better atmosphere at the conference table, leading to greater progress toward a truce. Nothing could have been more removed from reality.

No sooner did the Communists witness the United Nations Command concession on aerial observation of the truce than they stiffened noticeably in their opposition to the United Nations Command proposal on airfield rehabilitation. We were seeking to prohibit the construction or rehabilitation of military airfields in Korea during the armistice. The Communists opposed this proposal. Until the United Nations Command delegation conceded the question of aerial observation, however, the Communists' arguments regarding airfield reconstruction were somewhat less than categoric [sic]. After our concession on the aerial observation issue, the Communist position on airfield reconstruction became absolutely inflexible. They never did yield on the question of airfields. The armistice agreement as finally signed contained no provision for aerial observation and no prohibition of airfield construction. Thus by a "naked" concession on one issue we gained nothing and prejudiced another.

A similar sequence of events occurred in connection with the setting up of an organization to supervise the armistice. The United Nations Command delegation advocated a joint supervisory commission composed of representatives of the two belligerent forces in Korea . The Communists initially opposed any land of armistice supervisory agency, other than the Armistice Commission itself which would be empowered only to supervise the demilitarized zone. Later, however, they proposed a "neutral nations" commission. We were well aware that the Communist conception of a "neutral" would be a Communist state. We could see nothing but hypocrisy and disadvantage for the United States in an armistice supervisory agency made up of "neutrals" who were Soviet satellites. When the question reached a point of impasse, Washington directed the United Nations Command delegation to accept the "neutral nations" concept, although we had warned that inspection by neutral teams would be nothing more than a gesture with respect to the principle of inspection.

When the Communists were apprised of our recession on the composition of the supervisory agency they pondered the matter for several weeks. As described previously, at the end of this period they proposed the Soviet Union as a neutral-nation member of the supervisory commission. I felt that the Communists took this action somewhat with tongue in cheek. They could scarcely have believed that we would accept the Soviet Union as a "neutral". They must have wished to probe Western weakness in order to discover whether it had a bottom. In any event, the issue of the Soviet Union as a "neutral" grew directly from our concession regarding the composition of the supervisory organization. Give the Communists an inch and they seek to take a mile.

Perhaps the greatest single blunder of which the Western world was guilty in the Korean Armistice Conference arose from the fallacy of "concessions". The first mistake in this connection occurred when the demarcation line, or truce line separating the two sides, was being established. As mentioned before, from the standpoint of hindsight, the United Nations Command delegation made a major error in allowing determination of the truce line to precede other agenda items. We could have recovered from this error, however, had we been permitted to do so. But the error was compounded and made irrevocable by a directive from Washington.

When the United Nations Command delegation approached the question of a truce line across Korea, we came to an early conclusion that there should be no firm identification of that line until just prior to the signing of the armistice agreement. We recognized that to specify a particular line on the map as the truce line would tend to freeze the combat situation, relieving the Communists of military pressure. Accordingly, we sought agreement in *principle* that the truce line should be the line of contact between the ground forces *at the time the armistice agreement was signed.*

Such an agreement would leave the Eighth Army free to continue its northward advance and thus to exert continuing pressure on the Communists to reach an early armistice agreement. The more the Communists delayed, the more they would lose in Korea.

The Communists recognized the implications of a freewheeling truce line as well as we did. They were insistent, therefore, that the truce line be fixed once and for all. They realized that once a line was finally set and agreed

upon, the United Nations Command would not be free to conduct military operations and to seize territory that would have to be surrendered again at the time the truce was signed. Furthermore, the casualties inevitably resulting could not be justified. In short, they wanted a "*de facto*" cease fire as a relief from the Eighth Army's pressure.

In order to secure a "*de facto*" cease fire, the Communists sought the agreement of our General Hodes and Admiral Burke to fix the truce line at once. Listen to Communist General Lee Sang Jo.

GENERAL LEE SANG JO: Our entire position on Item 2 of the agenda cannot be fairer or more reasonable. We propose that we strictly abide by the present line of contact with necessary adjustments in fixing the military demarcation line and establishing the demilitarized zone. If only you agree to abide strictly by the contact line, we could proceed swiftly to checking the existing line of contact according to factual data.

GENERAL HODES: I want to straighten you out on one point right quickly. We did not say at any time that we would agree that any line of contact or demarcation line could be fixed only during the period of discussion of Item 2 of the agenda and neither will we agree to any such fixation. We made it very clear to you, and until today we have understood that you were in full agreement, that any changes in the line of contact at any time prior to the final signing of the armistice would be reflected in the demilitarized zone. In other words, since the line of contact is not fixed, the demilitarized zone is not fixed until the armistice is signed. I hope that is very clear.

GENERAL LEE SANG JO: You either misunderstood or twisted our statements. By repeating a statement we can correct your misunderstanding.

GENERAL HODES: The part that is particularly difficult for us to understand is why you want to take the time necessary now to determine exactly the line of contact for mutual agreements as of now when we must determine where it is at the time we finalize the agreement for an armistice. Of course, it can be done. We think that since it must be done at the proper time there is nothing to be gained by doing it at this time.

GENERAL LEE SANG JO: The question is: Can we determine the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone here or not? I think we can reach an agreement on that here. But in spite of that, you say you cannot determine it and that you are not going to have any final decision at this time. The question of determining this is the question of laying the foundation for the armistice negotiations. Although the delegations have not yet determined and signed the agreement, if they reach an agreement there can be no great change in the battle front. The question of whether either delegation brings forth changes after the determination is the question of their good faith towards the armistice. Suppose there is a line on which both sides agree, then it will not be necessary to make changes in the line both have agreed to, since if this line is determined, the foundation for the armistice has been reached and the other questions will be easily settled.

ADMIRAL BURKE: This morning you have raised a new problem. This further complicates an already difficult question. Contrary to our previous understanding of the

> expectation of both sides that the armistice agreements must be based on conditions existing at the time of signing, you now state you want to fix a line of contact now and that line of contact will not be subject to change between the time of fixing the line and the signing of the armistice.
>
> In July, when the conference was started, we believed that an armistice would be obtained in a short time. We had hopes the fighting would cease soon. Our hopes did not materialize, 118 days have passed since the conference began. Do you believe that anyone then could have prophesied that the line of contact would be where it is today, four months later? Neither we, nor you, nor anyone have any way of knowing now how much time will elapse before we reach an agreement on how much conditions will change. An armistice agreement must be based on conditions existing at about the time the armistice is signed.

The question at issue in these premises was not one of real estate It was a question of military pressure, without which we doubted that the Communists could be compelled to negotiate reasonably. On the other hand, we felt sure that if our United Nations Command attack was kept up in full strength the Communists would have no choice but to accept equitable armistice terms within a reasonable time. It was evident to us that the Communist negotiators analyzed the situation likewise.

At this point the United Nations Command delegation, over our and General Ridgway's strenuous objections, received instructions from Washington directing us to agree to

immediate delineation of a truce line across Korea. These instructions specified that we should require the Communists to agree to a provisional truce line conforming to the battle line which would hold good for thirty days, after which the truce line would become the battle line at the time the armistice was signed. In effect, this decision gave the Communists what they had been seeking a "*de facto*" cease fire for thirty days which enabled them to dig in and stabilize their battle line. This concession to the Communists was the turning point of the armistice conference. Thereafter, because the fighting slackened, we lacked the essential military pressure with which to enforce a reasonable attitude toward the negotiations. Our delegation no longer had a strong lever to use against Communist intransigence. Thereafter we were confronted with Communist stalling and delaying tactics at every turn. It is my considered judgment that this error in offering a concession to gain nothing more than apparent (and illusory) progress in the negotiations cost the United States a full year of war in Korea and armistice terms far more disadvantageous than otherwise could have been obtained. I hope our government learned a lesson. Certainly we paid a monstrous price for the schooling.

CHAPTER XI

XI THE WELSHERS

Communist negotiating procedure is replete with devices designed to avoid agreements in any way prejudicial to their objectives. Yet when these have been fully employed the Communists have not shot their final bolt. Communists are not embarrassed in the least to deny an agreement already reached. It makes little difference that such agreements may be in written form. If so, the Communists simply state that your interpretation is an incorrect one.

Communist tactics in welshing on agreements are often identical to those of the man who was required to state, under oath, whether a certain written sentence was correct. The sentence was, "Jones said Smith was the guilty party." The man certified under oath that this statement was correct. Later he decided to change his position on the matter in question. Consequently, he then stated that the correct version was, "Jones," said Smith, "was the guilty party." By inserting punctuation he changed the sense of the sentence 180 degrees. With people who are capable of such tricky reversals of their field, having agreements in writing helps very little.

As discussed in the preceding chapter, the first major agreement reached in the Korean Armistice Conference was to use the ground battle line as the truce line. Staff officers labored for weeks to reach an agreed version of where this line of contact lay. After seemingly interminable haggling by

the Communists, a line was finally marked out, mile by tortured mile, on a huge map of Korea. Each point on the line was disputed, until finally one side or the other conceded the position. After long days and nights of such crawling progress, at last a line existed on the map that had been accepted in all parts by both groups of staff officers. No sooner had the last section been drawn in, completing the line to the sea, than the Communist staff officers began welshing on their agreements. Colonel Tsai turned to previously agreed sections of the map and announced that he could not accept the positions marked thereon. The first point he indicated as unacceptable was contained in a section of the line that he himself had marked in with a red pencil. Thus, Tsai denounced as unacceptable to his side a section of the truce line he himself had just entered on the map and which had been agreed to by our United Nations Command staff officers. Colonel Murray, our United Nations Command staff officer who had developed the line along with Tsai, slammed down his fist on the conference table and grated at the Chinese "Why, you damned buffoon! You deny agreements you entered into not an hour ago, in fact one you yourself offered!" This outburst by Murray, a formidable-looking Marine officer, caused Tsai to retire to the far corner of the tent muttering that he could not be bullied. In the upshot, the disputed points were resolved, but not without extended wrangling.

Some months later, the question of exchanging prisoners of war arose in all its complications. As will be discussed later, on instructions from Washington the United Nations Command delegation adopted the position that only those prisoners who would not forcibly resist repatriation should be returned to the Communists. This principle required that a screening of all United Nations Command-held prisoners be

accomplished to determine which ones were to return to the Communists. After objecting for many weeks to such a procedure, as well as to the principle of no forced repatriation, the Communists tacitly agreed to the screening process. They even proceeded to assist the United Nations Command in executing the screening by providing a letter to be read to all prisoners urging them to return to the Communist fold. The letter stated in part:

> "We wholeheartedly welcome the return of all of our captured personnel to the arms of the motherland, we have further guaranteed, in an agreement reached with the other side, that all captured personnel shall, after their repatriation, rejoin their families to participate in peaceful construction and live a peaceful life."

Thus the Communist negotiators contributed to the screening process before the screening of prisoners was accomplished and before results displeasing to them became known. Now hear them on this same point after the screening count had come in, showing that the majority of the prisoners did not wish to return to Communism.

GENERAL NAM IL: We absolutely do not recognize any of the so-called screening and its results conducted by your side! Our side absolutely cannot agree to any such course of action taken by your side! This figure, which does not in the least represent actual facts, is meaningless and our side absolutely cannot consider it! In taking such a course of action and presenting such an absurd figure, your side

is in effect attempting to make our side accept completely, through this round figure, the principle of so-called "voluntary repatriation" of your side. That principle of "voluntary repatriation" is, in effect, a principle of forced retention of the captured personnel of our side. It has met with firm opposition from our side for the past four months and that is what our side absolutely cannot accept. Your side has overthrown the basis for further negotiations! Such insistence by your side on our acceptance of your absurd and unreasonable proposition of forced retention of the captured personnel of our side will not have its way and will not achieve its aim. Such insistence by your side only makes us more doubtful whether your side really intends to settle questions through negotiations and to reach an armistice at any early date.

Our side is firmly opposed to the retention of our captured personnel by your side and to any screening which is designed for the retention of our captured personnel. It is inconceivable and nobody would believe that our side, who is firmly opposed to the retention of our captured personnel by your side under whatever name, could have agreed directly to your so-called screening!

The question now is whether your side would choose to insist upon your unilateral and unreasonable proposition to retain our captured personnel rather than reach an armistice in Korea. If you do this, you will be condemned by the families of tens of thousands of war prisoners by both sides and by the peace-loving people throughout the world.

ADMIRAL JOY: You furnished our side for use in our screening process a statement of amnesty from your official sources. In short, you knew that screening was to take place, you acquiesced in its accomplishment, and only when its result was not to your liking and expectation did you decide to object to it. Had the results been to your liking, you would have enthusiastically welcomed the product of the screening. Thus it is clear that your complaint that the screening of prisoners of war was illegal is a hypocritical complaint, based on your unwillingness publicly to acknowledge the truth.

GENERAL NAM IL: Our side has always been opposed to your screening of our captured personnel. Our side opposed it in the past, opposes it now, and will oppose it in the future. But you have the audacity to say that, "The screening of prisoners was entered into in good faith and was done with your full knowledge and acquiescence." I must point out with emphasis that this is completely fabrication and slander. The record of the discussions of the prisoner-of-war question thoroughly belies such unfounded fabrications of yours.

Thus the Communists executed denials of agreements they had entered. To them the matter is very simple. An agreement has no special validity of its own, no matter how solemnly ratified. An agreement is binding on Communists only if it operates to the advantage of their purposes. If they discover that an agreement works to the disadvantage of Communism, then it is invalid. To their devious minds, it is irrational to abide by an undertaking that is working out badly for their cause, no matter what dishonor might attend

the act of welshing. Whoever rests his faith on the reliability of Communist agreements hangs perilously by a frayed rope.

A somewhat amusing indication of the Communist tendency to welsh occurred in February, 1952, when we took up Item 5 of the agenda. This item was cryptically stated as "Recommendations to the governments concerned". The Communists wished to incorporate in this item all manner of proposals relating to the general situation in the Far East. The United Nations Command delegation firmly maintained, however, that the "charter" of the Korean armistice conference limited it strictly to Korea. Finally, the Communists submitted a proposal regarding Item 5. The sense of this proposal was substantially that after the armistice was signed, a political conference should be held to discuss such matters as withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, a peace treaty for Korea, and related matters.

Our delegation considered the Communist proposal from the standpoint that, after all, it constituted no more than a *recommendation* to the governments involved in the Korean War. Those governments could accept or reject the recommendations as they saw fit. Therefore, we promptly accepted tie Communist proposal.

When I informed Nam Il that our side accepted his wording for Item 5, the Communist delegation went into a state of confusion. Not only had the United Nations Command delegation accepted their wording for Agenda Item 5, we had accepted it quickly. The Communists were all suspicion. Where had they blundered? Nam Il asked for a forty-minute recess.

At the end of the recess, Nam Il asked that the recess be extended until the following day. On the following day, the

Communists again extended the recess for another twenty-four hours.

When we met again with the Communists, Nam Il delivered a long statement full of escape clauses affecting his own proposal. At the end of this, still apparently uncertain about his own proposal, Nam Il proposed that staff officers be directed to discuss Item 5 further. Colonels Chang and Kinney were delegated to this task, but I instructed Kinney not to agree to any substantive change in the Communists' proposal. No further meetings were ever held on this subject.

The Communists did not actually welsh on their own proposal regarding Item 5, but I think it is obvious they thought long and hard about doing so. Though they had submitted their proposal in writing and argued for it in vigorous fashion, none of us in the United Nations Command delegation would have been at all surprised if they had denounced it utterly when our meetings were resumed. Perhaps the moral of this story is: Never trust a Communist promise, however given – trust only Communist deeds.

CHAPTER XII

XII WEARYING TACTICS

Allied with all other Communist techniques heretofore considered, and invariably used in conjunction therewith, is the Communist procedure of endless, stupid repetition of their demands. By "stupid" I do not mean to imply that their procedure *as a whole* is senseless. Far from it. Altogether too often, mere repetition of their demands gains Communist objectives. The substance of the statements used in repetition of demands introduces the irritatingly stupid element. On day after barren day the Communists will regurgitate the identical statements, the same arguments, used endlessly before. They seem to follow the philosophy of the small lad who had a dollar bill changed into pennies at one bank, then back into a bill at another bank, then back into pennies, ad infinitum. When asked why he pursued this seemingly senseless practice, the lad replied, "Sometime somebody is going to make a mistake, and it isn't going to be *me*".

It has been described earlier how the Communists sought to impose on the Korean Armistice their idea that the 38th Parallel of latitude should be the truce line. The arguments they advanced to support this proposal were few, simple, and utterly fallacious. Their chief point was that since the war began on the 38th Parallel, it should end there. Such a policy applied to our war with Japan would have resulted in our surrendering every area of the Pacific we had won in battle back to Pearl Harbor, since it was at Pearl Harbor that the war began. Despite the nonsense of their proposal, the

Communists held to it, repeated it, replayed the same old broken record over a period of four and one-half *months*. It would be impossible to describe the unutterable boredom of listening to the same hollow arguments that long In an effort to break the singsong monotony of Communist speeches, and with a hope of making better progress, the United Nations Command delegation first proposed recessing the full meetings of delegates into meetings of sub-delegations. Hearing the same story at these sub-delegation meetings, we then proposed recessing into meetings of staff officers. Always, however, the arguments presented by the Communists were almost letter-perfect repetitions of those presented earlier. Our own interpreters hardly needed to follow the current declamations of the Communist spokesmen they knew them by memory.

Each morning, prior to proceeding to Kaesong or Panmunjom for the day's events, the delegation held an informal meeting to discuss what should be done during that day's conference. At one of these, our fine young interpreter, Lieutenant Kenneth Wu, reeled off a long statement which he predicted would be made by the Communists at the forthcoming session. He may have missed it by a comma, but not more.

When negotiations at Kaesong were suspended by Communist action – they called off all meetings "indefinitely" – a period ensued in which the respective liaison officers met in an effort to arrange resumption of the conference. The United Nations Command position was flat and clear we would resume anytime, anywhere, except at Kaesong. Their sole argument was that the conference had begun at Kaesong and should therefore continue at Kaesong. The United Nations Command delegation, through our liaison

officers, explained that the Kaesong site had a record of three major interruptions of the conference, owing to circumstances peculiar to Kaesong. We would not return to that site, but would meet anywhere else that provided a more neutral setting.

After stating our case against Kaesong, our liaison officers met daily with the Communists between August 2zd and October 25th, listening to the same Communist tune. Come back to Kaesong. I have no idea how long the Communists might have continued to repeat themselves regarding a return to Kaesong had it not been for the following salutary turn of events.

During the course of the liaison officers' meetings, the United Nations Command resumed its check-reined offensive against the Communist armies in Korea. All United Nations Command forces ground, naval, and air opened up their powerful attack. Soon the Communist forces were reeling from these heavy blows. No sooner had this condition been created by our military action than the Communists became most reasonable at the conference table. Suddenly my liaison officers were able to achieve marvels of negotiating skill. Chang, for the Communists, became a model of cooperativeness. Sitting in my tent at Munsan after a day of unprecedented progress at Panmunjom, and cocking an ear at the sound of our shells and bombs crunching against Communist positions, our Colonel Kinney remarked to me, "Those [the explosions] are your most effective arguments". I am convinced beyond any doubt that had our powerful offensive during the autumn of 1951 been continued, we would have had an armistice in Korea a year earlier than we did.

The prisoner-of-war issue was the backdrop against which we listened to the Communist technique of repetition *ad nauseam*. On December 11th, 1951, debate on the prisoner-of-war question began. It continued for eighteen months. Communist arguments against our United Nations Command principle of "no forced repatriation of prisoners" were repeated, I would say, at least a thousand times. Literally, there were millions of words spoken by the Communist negotiators condemning the United Nations Command for refusing to return prisoners to Communism at bayonet point. Consider the following three speeches by Communist spokesmen, each given at a different fame, each replete with untruths and distortions.

On 25 April, 1952

COLONEL TSAI: Your side insists on the application of the so-called "voluntary repatriation" to all of the captured personnel of our side, but the aim of your side that is, the ultimate result which you are pursuing is forced retention of more than 100,000 of the captured personnel of our side. You have made use of the Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee special agents to perpetrate all kinds of criminal activities in the prisoner-of-war camps of your side, tattooing the captured personnel of our side, forcing them to write petitions in blood, and even not hesitating to resort to bloody massacres and to carry out bloody criminal activities. These facts are well known to all the people of the world. You must know that the captured personnel of our side are under the military control of your side, and that such criminal acts of yours are in open and direct violation of the Geneva Convention, and will not be permitted by just people all over the world.

Your side, however, unreasonably insists upon this proposition of so-called "voluntary repatriation" which is not at all tenable. Under your military control, how could there be the conditions for expression of free will and purpose? There has never been anything as "voluntary repatriation" throughout history. This proposition is in itself invalid. It is a direct violation of the Geneva Convention, from which your side has been quoting so readily and frequently. I think that in your hearts you yourselves are also aware that your proposition is in no way justifiable. As a result, the discussions on the question of prisoners of war during the period from December 11, 1951, to March 5, 1952, has yielded no result.

In fact, the aim of your side is not to solve the question through negotiations on a fair and reasonable basis. Your side is not in the least concerned with the interests of the tens of thousands of captured personnel of our side and their families. Your true purpose is to delay these negotiations, or even to wreck them, so as to satisfy your desire of gathering cannon fodder for your further extending the war in collaboration with your friends Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee.

On 18 May, 1952.

GENERAL NAM IL: To release and repatriate all war prisoners in the custody of both sides after the cessation of hostilities is a matter of course, and is also explicitly required by the Geneva Convention. If this self-evident principle is followed, the question of war prisoners should have been settled speedily and reasonably long ago. The

reason why the question of war prisoners is not yet settled is entirely due to your insistence on the absurd proposition of retaining our captured personnel as your cannon fodder, against the natural desire of war prisoners to return home to lead a peaceful life, and against the stipulation of the Geneva Convention as recognized by the whole world.

In order to reach your objective of forcibly retaining our captured personnel, your side has long since used Chiang Kai-shek's gangsters and Syngman Rhee's agents to maltreat our captured personnel – employing every barbarous method and even creating world-known bloodshed to screen our captured personnel by force and subject them to your slavery. Your criminal acts against the law and against humanity have developed to such a notorious extent that they are impossible for you to hide.

You should know that your proposition of retaining our captured personnel by force under the name of "voluntary repatriation" is itself in total violation of the Geneva War Prisoner Convention. Your such unilateral and unreasonable proposition is absolutely unacceptable. Your side disregards the urgent desire of your own captured personnel to go home and lead a peaceful life. Your side chooses to insist upon your proposition of retaining our captured personnel rather than stopping the Korean War.

On 21 May, 1952

GENERAL NAM IL: Your side has not yet made any account for the repeated massacre of our captured personnel perpetrated by your side. Yet your side once again

carried out bloody murder of our captured personnel. The serious sanguinary incident of May 20th, in which your side inflicted eighty-six casualties among our barehanded, captured personnel in your prisoner-of-war camp at Pusan, once again exposed before the whole world that your so-called voluntary repatriation and screening are a great hoax and your so-called respect for "fundamental human rights" and "personal dignity" and "humane principles" is a big lie.

After your design to retain our captured personnel by force collapsed in bankruptcy, you have taken a series of measures of terror against them to retrieve your bankrupt design.

It is obvious that you have overestimated the ability of the Chiang Kai-shek gangsters and Syngman Rhee's agents in coercing our captured personnel. You have underestimated the struggle and the unbending will of resistance of our captured personnel.

In order to manufacture the so-called results of screening, your side directly prompted the Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee agents to coerce our captured personnel into tattooing their own bodies, writing blood petitions, and fingerprinting. Your special agents mauled and beat our captured personnel unconscious and then dipped their hands in their own blood to put their fingerprints on your lists of so-called "Prisoners of War Resisting Repatriation". Is that your consideration of the dignity of the human person? Your side treats our captured personnel inhumanly, and continuously subjects them to massacre in an attempt to force them to accept your forcible retention and serve as your cannon fodder. But the firm will of our captured personnel to return

> home to lead a peaceful life is unshakable. Your principle of so-called voluntary repatriation and the screening activities stemming from that principle not only repudiated the charter of the United Nations and constituted a direct violation of the Geneva Convention but even does not represent the stand of all the nations which you claim it represents. They are only the absurd ideas against law and humanity held by a small number of bellicose elements of your side designed to wreck the Korean armistice. In the face of the heroic and righteous resistance of our captured personnel, and before undeniable facts, your so-called voluntary repatriation and screening have collapsed in utter bankruptcy in the last struggles for their salvage will be in vain.

Thus the Communists sought to wear away the stone by constant drippings. On the three issues I have used as examples, the stone held fast. But the Communists know that though their wearisome, grinding process of repetition may fail them in respect to the direct issue at hand, the weariness of the Western world remains and may be exploited on later issues. I must note that though the United Nations Command successfully resisted Communist repetitions of their demand that the 38th Parallel be made the truce line, we fell soon thereafter into the error of agreeing to fixing a truce line (the battle line) across Korea before other issues were settled. Though the Western world successfully resisted Communist tedious repetitions about prisoners of war, we gave up the principles of no airfield construction during the truce and aerial observation of the truce terms. The Communists could justly count their "wearying"' tactics something better than a complete failure.

CHAPTER XIII

XIII PRISONERS OF WAR

Preceding sections of this account of Communist techniques in the Korean Armistice Conference have followed a set pattern. In each section I have discussed a recurrent Communist tactic and illustrated that particular tactic from the record of events. This procedure will now be abandoned. The reason for this change is that the basic attitude of the Communists on the prisoner-of-war issue is not susceptible to exposure as a lying, deceitful, or fraudulent technique. Throughout the long arguments over the exchange of prisoners of war, the Communists engaged in every nefarious practice known to them. They lied, they blustered, they became vindictive, they welshed, they twisted, distorted, and denied truth, they delayed, they threatened. Even though all these despicable devices were resorted to by the Communists, thus clouding the true issue before the conference, in their basic argument on the prisoner-of-war question they had some sound reasons on their side. Basing their arguments on then: interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, the Communists contended that the United Nations Command had no right to withhold repatriation of certain prisoners of war merely because those prisoners expressed opposition to being repatriated. The United Nations Command contended that it had the right and the duty to refuse to repatriate those prisoners who could not be returned to the side of their origin without the use of force. On this I believe there is cause for thoughtful reflection. Accordingly, I will relate the story of the prisoner-of-war issue

chronologically, rather than in a pattern of Communist malevolence at the conference table.

I must stipulate one general reservation. I feel certain the Communists did *not* adopt the attitude they maintained toward the prisoner-of-war question because it was sound and correct. They were not motivated by sincere interest in the welfare of prisoners, nor by conviction that law and reason supported their stand. Instead, they were motivated by the basest of considerations – an advantage for Communism. Even so, we must not abandon our minds to the cliché that what is advantageous to Communism is therefore necessarily unreasonable and wrong. It is possible to be right, even with the worst of motivations. It is possible to be wrong, even with the best. Judge for yourself.

During the course of the war, the United Nations Command had captured 176,000 prisoners of war. In accord with the Geneva Conventions we had promptly reported the names of these prisoners to Geneva. An important fact to remember about these captured personnel is that they were captured. The overwhelming majority of these people did not come rushing into our arms voluntarily. Most of them were taken in General MacArthur's giant net, fashioned by the Inchon flanking operation early in the war. Almost all had been taken prisoner at the point of United Nations Command guns. Prior to that time, they had been energetically killing, wounding, or firing at United Nations Command personnel. Only a minute number were "surrendered personnel" who had come to our side because of hope for a better life. They were prisoners of war in the truest sense of the phrase.

During the same period, the Communists had captured approximately 100,000 United Nations Command personnel, most of them troops of the Republic of Korea. The

Communists had reported only 110 names to Geneva for reasons best known to them. They had boasted, however, on then propaganda radios of capturing 65,000 United Nations Command troops. Although the Communists had reported only 110 names to Geneva, they released 177 United Nations Command personnel held by them “at the front”. By “release “at the front” is meant they brought groups of prisoners to within sight of our front lines and told them they were free to go. All of these 177 men proceeded directly to our side and were recovered.

The opening gun of the prisoner-of-war debate was fired on 27 November, 1951, when I asked Nam Il to agree to the exchange of names of prisoners held by each side. The Communists evaded this proposal by simply ignoring it.

On December 4, 1951, I suggested that a sub-delegation be formed to initiate discussion of the exchange of prisoners. After considering the matter a week, the Communists agreed. Meetings of the sub-delegation began on 11 December.

Admiral R. E. Libby, senior member of the United Nations Command sub-delegation, pointed the first week of discussions at the objective of exchanging lists of names of prisoners. At last the Communists agreed to do this. We furnished a list of 132,000 names, about 20,000 Chinese and the remainder Korean. The Communists furnished a list of only 11,559 names, including 3,198 United States personnel. Obviously there were discrepancies between the totals previously announced by both sides and the numbers provided by name. The United Nations Command had reported 176,000 names to Geneva, but submitted a list to the Communists of only 132,000. The Communists had boasted of capturing 65,000 United Nations Command

personnel, but submitted a list to us of less than 12,000. These differences needed explanation.

During the rapid advance of the United Nations Command forces northward to the Yalu in 1950, many Koreans whose identity was questionable were swept into our military custody. The press and confusion of war made it most difficult to determine who was a guerrilla, who was not. This situation was the more confounded by the fact that North Korean troopers, faced with imminent capture, would shuck their uniforms and mingle with the Korean populace. When a screening was later performed under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 38,000 of those in our custody were found to be bona fide citizens of the Republic of Korea. These were reclassified as civilian internees, but we continued to hold them in custody against the necessity of having to account for them. Removal of this group from our reported total of 176,000 brought the figure down to 138,000. Deaths and escapes occurring in two years reduced the total to 132,000. This total was submitted to the Communists.

On the Communist side, the story was a weird one. The difference between their radio claims of 65,000 prisoners and their submission to us of 11,559 names about 53,000 men was explained away by Lee Sang Jo of the Communists with the bald untruth that these 53,000 were “released at the front”. Actually most of the 53,000 had been impressed into the North Korean Army. Such was the statistical situation when the great debate on prisoners of war began.

Originally it was the intent of the United Nations Command delegation to propose an all-for-all exchange of prisoners. This seemed the most promising approach to ensure beyond doubt the recovery of all the United Nations

Command personnel held by the Communists. We felt morally obligated to recover all United Nations Command personnel and to recover them as soon as possible. We felt that any qualification of an all-for-all exchange principle might be an opening wedge for the Communists to use in holding back our people. In Washington, however, other concepts were being entertained.

The United Nations Command delegation received instructions from Washington to propose that prisoners be exchanged on the basis of "voluntary repatriation". That is, each prisoner was to express his desire whether to return to the side of his origin or to remain with the side that held him captive. Later the principle was renamed "no forced repatriation". To the delegation, this concept posed severe dangers.

First, the "voluntary repatriation" principle would jeopardize the recovery of all United Nations Command personnel. Second, it would extend the negotiations, thus extending the period of captivity for the prisoners, and extending the war with its attendant casualties. Third, the principle of voluntary repatriation was an arbitrary one, commanding no solid support in the Geneva Conventions except by unilateral interpretation of that covenant (Articles 7 and 118 of Geneva Convention[2]). Fourth, to require

[2] "Article 7 Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention.

"Article 118 Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities."

prisoners to make a highly important and permanent choice under the conditions of imprisonment was to ask of them a decision they were probably not best prepared to make. Fifth, voluntary repatriation would establish a dangerous precedent which might well react to our disadvantage in future conflicts with Communist powers should they ever hold a preponderance of prisoners. We would have no recourse if they refused neutral visits to their prisoner camps and said that none of our men wished to be repatriated. Sixth, it was a political issue which strictly had no place in a military armistice agreement. A military armistice agreement should be no more than an agreement between opposing commanders to stop fighting. It should never be concerned with political questions.

The other side of this case was based on strong humanitarian considerations. It was assumed that the Communists would at least maltreat if not execute the prisoners they recovered. This was particularly feared in respect to those prisoners who had announced their desire to remain with our side. Some had even tattooed legends on their bodies declaiming their repudiation of Communism. Some of us believed the United Nations Command had a moral obligation to such prisoners not to hand them over to possible Communist kangaroo trials and probable death.

It must be admitted, however, that besides humanitarian considerations, the major objective of the Washington decision to insist on voluntary repatriation was to inflict upon the Communists a propaganda defeat which might deter them from further aggression. It was thought that if any substantial portion of the ex-Communist soldiers refused to return to Communism, a huge setback to Communist subversive activities would ensue. I regret to say this does

not seem to have been a valid point. There have been no wholesale defections from Asiatic Communism flowing from our demonstration that asylum would be granted. Nor has our demonstration deterred the Communists from their aggression in Indochina and their present warlike intentions pointing to Formosa. Whatever temporary loss of prestige in Asia Communism suffered from the results of "voluntary repatriation" has long since been overtaken by Communism's subsequent victory in that area.

"Voluntary repatriation" placed the welfare of ex-Communist soldiers above that of our own United Nations Command personnel in Communist prison camps, and above that of our United Nations Command personnel still on the battle line in Korea. I wanted our own men back as soon as we could get them. Since we were not allowed to achieve a victory, I wanted the war halted. Voluntary repatriation cost us over a year of war, and cost our United Nations Command prisoners in Communist camps a year of captivity. The United Nations Command suffered at least 50,000 casualties in the continuing Korean War while we argued to protect a lesser number of ex-Communists who did not wish to return to Communism.

Washington directed that we pursue the voluntary repatriation principle. The Communists objected to it vigorously. They pointed out that the Geneva Convention required the return of all prisoners to the side of their origin a correct literal interpretation of that covenant. We argued that the spirit of the Geneva Conventions was to protect the best interests of prisoners, and that our proposal did that. As described previously, after many weeks of wrangling, the Communists agreed to provide us with an amnesty proclamation to be read to all prisoners held by us prior to

screening them to determine their desires. Thus, the Communists lent themselves to the initial screening of prisoners, perhaps hoping that the results would not be too unpleasant from their point of view.

The screening of prisoners introduced severe difficulties. Many groups of Communist prisoners, still fanatic Communists, refused to be screened. Certain compounds of these fanatics held in our big prisoner-of-war camp on the island of Koje-do would not submit to questioning by our screening teams, and would not budge out of their compounds. These compounds were therefore considered 100 per cent Communist. Other compounds were dominated by thoroughly indoctrinated and equally fanatic anti-Communists. These leaders so intimidated weaker willed prisoners that many were fearful of expressing their desire for repatriation. When the totals of the screening process were taken and reported to the delegation we were all amazed. Only about 70,000 of the total 132,000 prisoners agreed to return to Communism.

On hearing these results the Communist delegation went through the overhead of the tent at Panmunjom. They charged the United Nations Command with every manner of crime relative to the prisoners. They contended that the screening was done under conditions forcing the prisoners to reject Communism. Admiral Libby remarked to me, “We have passed the point of no return.” Listen for a moment to the voice of our opponents as they raged over our alleged villainy.

GENERAL NAM IL: Everybody knows that for a long period of time you have been using Chiang Kai-shek’s gangsters and

Syngman Rhee's agents to take all kinds of barbarous measures to coerce our captured personnel into refusing repatriation. You have not hesitated to use methods of bloodshed and murder to gain your infamous aim. You have not yet made an account for the incidents of February 18th and March 13th, when your side twice massacred our captured personnel.

In order to assist you to gain the arm of retaining our captured personnel, the Chiang Kai-shek ring repeatedly directed their agents to force our captured personnel to start the so-called movement of refusing repatriation by writing blood petitions, making appeals, and even by announcing collective suicide. For all these facts, our side is in possession of incontestable evidence. Your activities in employing barbarous methods in an attempt to retain our captured personnel by force have already reached such an extent as makes it impossible for you to hide or deny them.

To strengthen your rule of bloodshed and violence over our captured personnel, your side recently moved large amounts of reinforcing forces to the locality of your prisoner-of-war camp, for further suppression of the just resistance of our captured personnel. The fact now placed before the people of the whole world is that in spite of your such barbarous measures, you violated the will of the captured personnel of our side. Thousands of them would rather die than yield to your forcible retention. Your side dares not face this fact In order to cover up this fact, your side has invented the myth that our captured personnel were not willing to be repatriated.

While the Communists talked, they were laying plans. Through their effective "grapevine" communications system with the United Nations Command prisoner compounds at Koje-do, they triggered massive riots of the prisoners. Our prison-camp commandant, a United States Army general, was taken prisoner in a Communist compound and held hostage. His replacement, another United States Army general, signed a paper prepared by the Communist prisoners in order to effect the release of the captured camp commandant. This paper said in effect that there would be no *more* forced screening, no *more* terrorization of the prisoners. This was the ammunition needed by the Communist delegation. Listen to them use it.

GENERAL NAM IL: The former commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp openly admitted that your side used all sorts of violence to screen our captured personnel by force in an attempt to retain them as your cannon fodder. The newly appointed commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp openly implied to our captured personnel that no *further* criminal activities in violation of the Geneva Conventions would be perpetrated. Is it not a fact that your side, in order to carry out forcible screening, committed all kinds of atrocities, even including mass massacre against our captured personnel in disregard of the Geneva Conventions and repudiating the minimum standard of human behavior? Is it not a fact that the commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp promised our captured personnel that "There will be no *more* forcible screening"? You cannot deny these facts.

Seeing that the prisoner-of-war issue was beyond negotiation, I submitted to the Communists on 28 April what we called our final package proposal. It was a complete armistice agreement containing sixty-two paragraphs, sixty-one of which had been originated by the United Nations Command delegation. In it, we conceded the question of airfield rehabilitation, omitted the Soviet Union and Norway as members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and held firm to our principle of voluntary repatriation. I told the Communists that that was the end of negotiating, thenceforward the question was simply one of take it or leave it. For our part, there were to be no more concessions, no substantive changes in the draft armistice agreement. That was it.

In bidding farewell to the Communists on 22 May, 1952, I had this to say.

ADMIRAL JOY: At the first Plenary Session of our two delegations, on the 10th of July of last year, I said, "The success or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of the delegations present." These words constituted both a promise and a warning – a promise of good faith by our side and a warning that we would expect good faith from your side. Today, at the 65th Plenary Session, my opening remarks on the subject of good faith are more than ever pertinent.

It has become increasingly clear through these long-drawn-out conferences that any hope that your side would bring good faith to these meetings was forlorn indeed. From the very start, you have caviled over procedural details, you have manufactured spurious

issues and placed them in controversy for bargaining purposes, you have denied the existence of agreements made between us when you found the fulfillment thereof not to your liking, you have made false charges based on crimes invented for your purposes, and you have indulged in abuse and invective when all other tactics proved ineffective. Through a constant succession of delays, fraudulent arguments, and artificial attitudes you have obstructed the attainment of an armistice which easily lay within our grasp had there been equal honesty on both sides of this conference table. Nowhere in the record is there a single action of your side which indicates a real and sincere desire to attain the objective for which these conferences were designed. Instead, you have increasingly presented evidence before the world that you did not enter these negotiations with sincerity and high purpose, but rather that you entered into them to gain time to repair your shattered forces and to try to accomplish at the conference table what your armies could not accomplish in the field. It is an enormous misfortune that you are constitutionally incapable of understanding the fair and dignified attitude of the United Nations Command. Apparently you cannot comprehend that strong and proud and free nations can make costly sacrifices for principles because they are strong, can be dignified in the face of abuse and deceit because they are proud, and can speak honestly because they are free and do not fear the truth. Instead, you impute to the United Nations Command the same suspicion, greed, and deviousness which are your stock in trade. You search every word for a hidden meaning and every agreement for a hidden trap. It would be charitable for me to say that you do these things by instinct, but you

are people of intelligence and it is probably truer to say that you do these things with purpose and design.

From the very first, the United Nations Command has had but one objective in Korea – To bring an end to the Korean War so that a permanent and enduring peace might be established as quickly as possible. This has been the precise objective of the United Nations Command delegation in these negotiations. This is what we meant by good faith on our part. You have but to examine the record to see the many evidences of our restraint, our constructive suggestions, our willingness to conciliate and compromise, and our patience. There is very little evidence of similar contributions by your side. As an answer to the question, "Which side has brought good faith to these meetings?" Nothing could be more impressive than a comparison of the actions of the two delegations during our ten months of these conferences. They are as different as day and night. No amount of propaganda, however oft repeated, can hide your ignoble record. That these meetings have continued this long and that we have, after a fashion, resolved our differences to the point where only one major issue remains is testimony to the patience and dedication of the United Nations Command.

Now our negotiations have come to the point where the prisoner-of-war issue stands as a formidable barrier to the accomplishment of an armistice. Casting aside any pretense of humanity, you have made the demand that the United Nations Command must return to your side all the prisoners of war in its custody, driving them at the point of a bayonet if necessary. You even have the colossal impertinence to document your position by

referring to the Geneva Convention. What could be more ironic than your attempt to found your inhuman proposition upon an international agreement whose purpose is to defend and protect the unfortunate victims of war? These are strange words for you to employ. You who have denied the International Red Cross access to your prisoner-of-war camps, who have refused to furnish lists of prisoners to the Prisoner of War Bureau, and who cannot even account for over fifty thousand (50,000) United Nations Command soldiers whom you officially boasted as having in your custody before the Korean war was nine months old. After months of conciliation, of meeting you more than halfway on issue after issue, the United Nations Command has told you with all firmness and finality that it will not recede from its position with respect to the prisoners of war. On the 28th of April we offered you an equitable and specific solution to the issues remaining before us. We told you then, and we repeat now, that we firmly adhere to the principles of humanity and the preservation of the rights of the individual. These are values which we will not barter, for they are one and the same with the principles which motivated the United Nations Command to oppose you on the battlefield. No amount of argument and invective will move us. If you harbor the slightest desire to restore peace and to end the misery and suffering of millions of innocent people, you must bring to the solution of this issue the good faith which, as I said at our first meeting, would directly determine the success or failure of our negotiations. The decision is in your hands.

After ten months and twelve days I feel that there is nothing more for me to do. There is nothing left to negotiate. I now turn over the unenviable job of further

> dealings with you to Major General William K Harrison, who succeeds me as Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command delegation. May God be with him.

And that was *it*. Though the Korean Armistice Conferences continued for more than another year in fits and starts, the final agreement was substantially that which I had submitted on 28 April, 1952. Arrangements were made for a rescreening of prisoners under the supervision of India. This was accomplished without major alteration of the results we had long before reported. The armistice document signed at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953, was practically identical to that which I tabled in April, 1952, in all but details relative to the mechanics of exchanging prisoners. Thus, fifteen months were required to impose our principle of voluntary repatriation on the Communists. It was a long year for Americans on the battle line in Korea. It must have been a painful year for Americans in Communist dungeons.

I departed the Korean Armistice Conference for assignment as Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy on May 22, 1952. Major General William K Harrison of the United States Army replaced me as Senior Delegate. Though General Harrison is an unusually able officer whose skill as a negotiator is beyond question, there really was nothing left to negotiate. There was only the long waiting until time alone convinced the Communists our position on the prisoner issue was irrevocable.

Why did the Communists finally bow to the principle of voluntary repatriation after so much resistance? Since they had capitalized on the armistice conference by preparing and occupying almost impregnable defensible positions, the

desultory war in Korea was not too much for them to bear. Nor is it useful to look to areas of reason and logic for the answer. No, I think the cause of Communist acquiescence in the principle of voluntary repatriation was neither the continuing hostilities in Korea nor the mercurial status of world opinion. Their plans for the conquest of Indochina may have influenced their ultimate decision. But what influenced them most, I feel certain, were ominous sounds of impending *expanded* warfare, the prospect of United Nations Command forces being released from their confinement to Korea and allowed to range over Red China. During the spring of 1953, the United States began running out of patience. Serious consideration was being given to extending United Nations Command military operations into Red China. The threat of atom bombs was posed – defeat for Red China became a distinct possibility. Thus at the last, the one negotiating factor that Communists respect above all else was beginning to appear – naked, massive power and the willingness to use that power when necessary. Red China did not dare challenge the unrestrained military strength of the United States. That way lay ruin. In understandable prudence, they took the only step open to them to remove the growing threat of a holocaust in Red China. It was as simple as that. It had always been as simple as that.

CHAPTER XIV

XIV FROM THIS THORN, THESE WOUNDS, THESE WARNINGS

The Korean Armistice Conference terminated in July, 1953, after two years of agonized travail. The formal result of this conference was an armistice agreement, duly signed, sealed, and delivered to the governments concerned. That agreement has been considered by some as the alternative to world war – others saw it as a sorry substitute for American victory in Korea.

Whatever may be the ultimate judgment of history regarding the significance of the Korean Armistice, those who must deal with the problems of today can learn from it certain sharply pertinent lessons. Taken to heart, this painfully acquired knowledge may save us all from the creeping disaster of unskilled effort in later negotiations between our world of freedom and that of tyranny.

The greatest single influence on the Korean armistice negotiations was the failure of the United States to take punitive action against Red China. During the winter of 1950, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River from Manchuria into Korea and executed a crushing attack on the Eighth Army. All evidence showed beyond doubt that this assault was directed by the Red Chinese Government. Despite a severe military setback, and grave casualties among United States troops attacked by the Red Chinese Army, the United States refrained from taking retaliatory military action against the

territory and military facilities of Red China. For the United States, this was an unprecedented backdown before a show of force. Failure to take immediate punitive action against Red China was at the root of most of the difficulties encountered by United Nations Command representatives in the Korean armistice negotiations. Our seemingly weak and fearful withdrawal in the face of an unprovoked attack on our forces in the Far East gave the Communists good reason to believe that the United States would not stand firm on any aspect of the continental Asian problem. The question was posed: Would our government possess the determination to continue an abortive and unpopular war in Korea rather than to accede to Communist terms for an armistice? Throughout the Korean armistice conference the Communists acted as if they definitely thought not. It has been contended that the United States Government as executive agent for the United Nations was in no position to take punitive action unilaterally against Red China. This does not seem reasonable when one considers that the United States took the initiative in sending ground forces to Korea to repel the North Korean attack, supplied over 80 per cent of the resources required to prosecute the war, and sacrificed many more lives in the war than any nation except South Korea. Had not the United States borne the brunt of the war, and had it not been for the prompt action of the United States in the first place, all of Korea today would be under Communist control. Moreover, as the recognized leader of the free world in the struggle against international Communism, the United States had every good reason from a moral standpoint to take the initiative in punishing the Chinese aggressor, particularly when the United Nations General Assembly had denounced Red China as an aggressor nation in the Korean War.

The recall of General Douglas MacArthur when that renowned officer was vigorously advocating a strong and aggressive policy in the Orient, particularly toward Red China, gave further reason for the Communists to believe we had no steel in our attitude, that we were, in their phrase, a “paper tiger”.

On 24 June, 1951, Soviet Minister Jacob Malik made a radio announcement suggesting that a truce be arranged by the opposing military commanders in Korea, *based on both sides withdrawing equal distances from the 38th Parallel*. Washington immediately directed General Matthew B. Ridgway to broadcast an announcement to the Communist field commanders that the United Nations Command was willing to discuss an armistice. This was not only done in great haste, it was done without denouncing the 38th Parallel as a line of demarcation. The Communists, therefore, concluded that the United Nations Command *needed* an armistice, and that the 38th Parallel would be a truce line acceptable to the United States. These misunderstandings cost us many months of fruitless negotiations.

The armistice negotiations were profoundly affected by the restraints imposed on the United Nations Command forces in Korea United Nations Command forces were not allowed to attack their enemies in the most effective manner nor with the most effective weapons. In consequence, the United Nations Command could never exert the decisive military pressure of which it was capable. *United Nations Command negotiators at Kaesong and Panmunjom were not in a position to deal from maximum strength, and well did the Communists know it.*

The armistice effort in Korea taught this: Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for armistice. Increase

it. In June, 1951, the Communist forces were falling back steadily, suffering grievously. Then Jacob Malik issued his truce feeler. As soon as armistice discussions began, United Nations Command ground forces slackened their offensive operations. Instead, offensive pressure by all arms should have been increased to the maximum during the armistice talks. Force is a decisive factor, the only logic the Communists truly understand. It has been argued that to endure the casualties which result from offensive operations while an armistice was potentially around the corner would have been an unacceptable policy. Yet, I feel certain the casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long years of negotiations far exceed any that might have been expected from an offensive in the summer of 1951. The lesson is: Do not stop fighting until hostilities have ended, not if you want an armistice with the Communists on acceptable terms within a reasonable period of time.

The foregoing leads to the lesson that armistice conferences should be brief. A time period should be set for reaching an agreement. If an acceptable agreement is not reached within a reasonable fame, discussions should be terminated until the enemy again indicates a desire for (that is, a *need* for) an armistice. To allow armistice talks to become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This encourages your Communist opponents.

The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the area of conflict. In the case of the Korean armistice conference, a site outside Korea would have served far better than did a neutralized area lying on the battle line in Korea and interfering with combat operations. The plague of “incidents” which delayed and disrupted our negotiations

would have been at least less intense, if not non-existent, in areas where "live" warfare was not in progress.

Communists should not be allowed unilaterally to select the site for a conference. If one cannot successfully negotiate a site for talks, why expect to negotiate substantive issues successfully? Finally, and above all, the site of negotiations should not be, as Kaesong was, within the enemy's lines and subject to his military control. This invites the Communists to arrogance, and they need little invitation on that score.

Reaction to a Communist suggestion for a conference or to discuss an armistice should be unhurried. My liaison officers were in Kaesong talking with Communist representatives only two weeks after Jacob Malik mentioned the possibility of an armistice in Korea. This is much too short a period in which to study the ramifications of the question thoroughly and well. It is especially important that a military command not be rushed into armistice discussions when it has the upper hand in combat, as we did in the spring of 1951.

The team selected to conduct negotiations with Communists should be of the highest available quality. Rank, renown, and position are a secondary consideration. Clear thinking, rapid thinking, are the criteria to be sought. Every man should be the best in his line, whether stenographer, signalman, interpreter, or delegate. You can be assured that the Communists will put in their first team. You can be assured your second team will not be good enough.

The system of procedure used by the United Nations Command delegation at Panmunjom is worthy of consideration in future conferences. As a general matter, we

attempted to secure agreements on broad principles at the plenary sessions of full delegations. This being done, we arranged for meetings of subcommittees of delegates to expand upon the general principle that had been established in plenary sessions. We then had groups of staff officers discuss the finer details of the agreements reached by the delegates. Our liaison officers were charged to attend to "incidents" and to make arrangements governing the conditions of meetings. In the case both of the United Nations Command delegation and of the Communist delegation, the liaison officers were also notably active as staff officers.

The United Nations Command delegation followed a practice of "staffing" all formal statements uttered in the armistice conference by delegates. Each day staff officers prepared a number of proposed statements for use by the delegates. These were considered and discussed by the delegates and staff officers in meetings at our camp at Munsan, before proceeding to Panmunjom for the day's events. The statement finally worked out was almost never the work of any one individual. It was the product of careful editing by all delegates and final approval by the Senior Delegate. Thus the benefit of all the fine intellects available to the delegation was used to the fullest.

Subsequent to each day's meeting with the Communists, the United Nations Command delegates and staff officers gathered in my tent at Munsan, to discuss the steps to be taken the following day. When a basic decision was reached, staff officers prepared implementing statements for use on the morrow.

Press coverage of negotiations should be as unfettered as physical facilities permit. If your objectives are honest and

sincere, if your methods are above reproach, if your skill in negotiating is adequate, you need not fear the press. The American people deserve to know what is going on, since they must foot the bill in lives and in dollars.

Candor compels me to report a rather unsavory aspect of press coverage of the Korean armistice. On repeated occasions, articles appeared in United States publications, attributed to "authoritative sources in Washington," which predicted concessions by the United Nations Command delegation to the Communists. Sometimes the accuracy and timing of these articles left little doubt that they were in fact "leaked" by official sources in Washington. One example of this undermining procedure was an article, date-lined Washington, which stated, "UNC Ready to Yield on Airfield Ban". Instructions to make this concession had been received by the United Nations Command delegation, classified *"Top Secret''* The delegation intended to use the concession on airfields as a lever to pry out Communist agreement on the prisoner issue. Once such a "leak" occurred, however, the Communists were not likely to pay a price for something they believed we were prepared to surrender.

Another "leak" attributed to official sources suggested that "professional" negotiators be sent to Panmunjom to replace the military personnel of the United Nations Command delegation. Although the record of our and other "professional" negotiators at such places as Yalta and the Geneva Conference on Indochina leaves some room for improvement, that consideration is not my reasons for mentioning this particular leak. Rather, the important point is the weakening of our position at Panmunjom that resulted. On reading that the United Nations Command delegation

might not have the full confidence and backing of the United States Government, the Communists could reasonably decide to delay a while longer. They could hope that a new United Nations Command delegation would be less firm about the disputed issues.

I do not criticize the press for printing these stones. To do so is their business. I suspect, however, that the person who planted them did not have the best interests of the United States in mmd when he did so.

Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to make progress. Make the Communists pay for your acceptance of their point of view. Require an equivalent concession to match yours. This will not only double the number of agreements you achieve in a given period of time, but will impress upon Communists the conviction that you are neither softheaded, gullible, nor weak. To a Communist, your ready acceptance of his proposed solution merely because it is logical and correct is a sign of at least undue haste, indicating a precarious basis on your part. Never imagine that any point is unimportant. To concede a minor point to Communists without a like concession from them is but to convince them that in more substantive issues you will ultimately submit to their viewpoint. Exact equating concessions from the Communists in respect to every matter, large or small.

Avoid a “hurry-up” attitude, for such an attitude tends to invoke a Communist conclusion that you are pressed for time. The enemy will not credit you with humanitarian motives. Quite to the contrary, show plainly that you are willing to terminate or suspend negotiations at any time the Communists may desire. If no progress is perceivable in a reasonable period, then terminate the negotiations.

The agenda of a conference with Communists should receive careful study. In retrospect, it is clear that we made a mistake in agreeing to discuss the line on which hostilities were to cease prior to reaching agreement on all other matters. Early agreement upon a specified line on which hostilities will cease removes the justification for continued military pressure on the Communists. That item of the agenda dealing with supervision of the armistice should be placed first. The first objective of an armistice conference is to set up safeguards which will ensure the stability of the truce. Neither belligerent should be permitted to capitalize on the armistice by increasing his military capabilities. A requisite for achieving this objective is adequate supervision of the armistice terms and observation of the forces and activities of the belligerents during the period of truce. Without such supervision and observation, any and all terms of agreement in an armistice document are worth only the valuation placed on the good intent of each side by the other. When dealing with Communists, one would be reckless indeed to assume good faith on their part.

When a firm position has been taken, from which you do not intend to withdraw, do not thereafter engage in longwinded and repeated statements supporting your position. Having put forth your final proposal, simply be quiet, or at best rebut the Communist attacks by terse, positive, dignified statements denouncing or ridiculing their verbal acrobatics. Defense of your final proposal in response to Communist verbal attacks only offers grist for the Communist mill. The more you talk, the more you offer targets for the Communists' insidious propaganda. On the other hand, Communist negotiators are nonplused by, and fearful of, an unresponsive opponent because such tactics are contrary to their teachings. How not to conduct

negotiations was illustrated by our action in connection with our final "package" proposal. The United Nations Command Delegation planned to table this proposal and thereafter remain relatively silent, thus indicating the bleak finality of our offer. After we had presented our "package" we were allowed to remain quiet for several days. During this period the desperation of the Communist negotiators became apparent. They could find nothing to shout about. Then Washington issued an ill-advised directive requiring that we support our proposal with extended arguments at each meeting. With misgivings, the delegation obeyed. The relief and satisfaction of the Communists at this change of tactics were immediately apparent. They leaped upon our daily statements with enthusiasm. No progress was made until, after some five months of insistence by the delegation, Washington permitted the delegation to suspend the meetings, a step we had recommended shortly after our final proposal had been tabled. Then the Communists became convinced they were confronted with a truly firm United Nations Command position.

We learned in Korea that crystallization of political objectives should precede initiation of armistice talks. All personnel in the United Nations Command delegation were aware of the chameleon-like character of American political objectives in Korea. United States forces entered Korea, in accord with political objectives, to prevent an impending collapse of the South Korean Government and to help repel aggression against South Korea. When the North Korean aggressor was thrown back north of the 38th Parallel from whence he came, these two political objectives had been secured. Then United States policy shifted to the intent to unify Korea. Accordingly, United Nations Command forces swept north of the 38th Parallel, headed for the Yalu When

the Red Chinese plunged into the fray, the controlling political objective of the United States became a desire to avoid all-out war with China. When the Soviets suggested an armistice, the political objectives in Korea became an honorable cease fire. During the armistice negotiations, we took on a political objective of gaming a propaganda victory over Communism in respect to prisoners of war. Thus the political objectives of the United States in Korea weather-vaned with the winds of combat, accommodating themselves to current military events rather than constituting the goal to be reached through military operations. Consequently, the delegation, and indeed General Ridgway, never knew when a new directive would emanate from Washington to alter our basic objective of obtaining an honorable and stable armistice agreement. In such circumstances it is most difficult to develop sound plans, to present one's case convincingly, to give an appearance of unmistakable firmness and finality. It seemed to us that the United States Government did not know exactly what its political objectives in Korea were or should be. As a result, the United Nations Command delegation was constantly looking over its shoulder, fearing a new directive from afar which would require action inconsistent with that currently being taken.

On issue after issue the United Nations Command delegation sought advice from Washington whether the then current position of the delegation was or was not final, whether we could count on the unwavering support of the United States Government to and through the point of termination of negotiations. We needed such information in order to avoid prejudicing future discussions of other issues with the Communists. For example, if the United Nations Command delegation announced a particular position on an issue as final, then later, on orders from Washington,

recanted and accepted the Communists' version of the issue, one could expect that our next announcement of "finality" would make little impression on the Communists. Precisely this happened in the successive cases of airfield rehabilitation and prisoners of war. For many weeks the United Nations Command delegation firmly announced to the Communists that we would never agree to an increase of their military capabilities during the period of truce. This, of course, included the rehabilitation and construction of airfields. Later, under instructions from Washington, we did propose to delete from the armistice agreement any prohibition of development of airfields. Subsequently, the delegation, General Ridgway, and President Truman announced that our position regarding exchange of prisoners of war was final and irrevocable. Apparently the Communists thought otherwise for more than a year. Thus we learned a lesson which it is to be hoped will be heeded by those who set our political objectives. Before entering a conference with the Communists (or a war), political objectives should be determined and disclosed to those who must pursue them. Thereafter they should be altered only when a change is vital to the national interests. There is stall much to be said for remaining on the same horse in midstream.

Let no one think that in negotiating with the Communists we should reject the threat of force. On the contrary it is only through the imminent threat of application of our military power that the Communists can be compelled to negotiate seriously for the alleviation of the basic issues between their world and ours. We must be prepared to accept the risk of war if we hope to avoid war. When the Communists believe that failure to resolve issues with the Western world will engage a serious and immediate risk to their present empire, they will then, and only then, seek to

resolve those issues. They will not be bluffed, however. Successful negotiations with the Communists will ensue when the United States poses employment of its tremendous military power as the *actual* alternative. We must be prepared to carry through that threat or it cannot succeed in its peaceful purpose. We must accept whatever risk of world war may attend such a procedure, knowing that should the Communist world choose war, war was coming in any event.

At last it must be concluded that there should not have been a Korean armistice such as was accepted. The principal reasons for seeking an armistice in Korea when and how we did will not bear critical examination. Consider the reasons most often heard:

Military victory could not be achieved by the United Nations Command. Therefore, an armistice was the only practical course of action. Military victory was not impossible, nor even unusually difficult of achievement. Elimination of the artificial restraints imposed on United States forces, coupled with an effective blockade on Red China, probably would have resulted in military victory in less time than was expended in truce talks. This is the considered judgment of senior military commanders of the United Nations Command.

There was a danger the Korean War would expand to war with Red China, and thence into world war. War with Red China should have been the instant response of the United Nations to the Red Chinese attack of November, 1951. The USSR never showed the slightest intention of expanding the Korean War. In fact, Soviet overtures for a Korean truce plainly indicated the direction of Soviet purposes. I know of not a single senior military commander of United States forces in the Far East Army, Navy, or Air Force who believed

the USSR would enter war with the United States because of any action we might have taken relative to Red China. Had the Soviets entered a Sino-American war on the side of Red China, the resulting conflict in Asia would have wrecked Soviet aims in that area, and established a position of unassailable strength for the free world. The Soviets must have known this.

If the Korean War continued, total war might accidentally evolve therefrom. In this era of nuclear weapons, total war will not "evolve" from any set of circumstances. To initiate total war, a positive decision to deliver nuclear weapons on targets vital to the opponent is required. This decision cannot be "accidental" or "evolutionary" in character. In past decades the step between limited war and total war was a short one, often of insignificant implications. Today, the difference between limited war and total war is that between life and death for all humanity. No government will take such a leap without long and careful deliberation. Accordingly, had United States action in Asia coincided with the outbreak of total war, this would have been so only because total war had already been decided upon by the Soviets.

A truce in Korea would mean less American casualties. Between July, 1951, and July, 1953 (the span of the truce negotiations), more American casualties were suffered in Korea than are likely to have resulted from decisive, victorious military operations. I do not know how many United Nations Command prisoners in the hands of the Communists died during the two years we talked truce.

A truce in Korea demonstrating that aggression does not pay would deter further aggressions. First of all, the truce in Korea, making Red China the first nation in history to fight the United States to an inconclusive ending, profited Red

China enormously in prestige and influence throughout Asia. Second, the truce in Korea assisted, rather than deterred, subsequent Communist aggression in Indochina by releasing Communist war materials and technical assistance from the Korean front to be used against Dienbienphu.

A truce in Korea, involving acceptance by Communism of permanent defection by many prisoners of war, would inflict a tremendous propaganda defeat on Communism. First, a military armistice conference is no place to seek a propaganda victory. Second, what has that propaganda "victory*' gained the United States? Has there been wholesale defection from Asiatic Communism as a result? Has the cause of Communism in Asia faltered? Has the prestige of Red China sunk? The answer, of course, is that the Korean armistice was a victory for Red China her prestige has continued to rise, the transient setback in respect to prisoners of war was quickly erased by Communist victory in Indochina. Where are the masses of defectors it was supposed would rush to escape Communism, once safe asylum was a demonstrated fact? Why did Communist troopers in Indochina not rush to join the opposing forces?

General MacArthur has said that in war there is no substitute for victory. The record of Korea certainly justifies that conclusion. The broader struggle in which we are now engaged, however, is not entirely a battle of guns and ships and aircraft. We are in a world conflict with Communism, one presently being fought with threats of force, with ideologies, diplomatic maneuverings, and economic pressures. It is a fight to the finish. In it, there will be no substitute for victory either the darkness of Communism will engulf the world, or the banner of freedom will fly over all lands.

If freedom is to be the victor in the great world conflict, we should enter negotiations with Communism when, and only when, negotiations serve the cause of freedom best. We must not negotiate merely because the enemy wants to do so. Once we have decided that to negotiate is in the best interests of freedom, we should do so with the *full* backing of the strength of the United States. There will never be a situation in which that strength is insufficient, if we Americans remain as strong as we have the resources to be. We must negotiate not merely *from* strength, but *with* strength. Granting that, no American need fear the outcome.

How Communists Negotiate
– C. Turner Joy